Archaeological knowledge and its representation an inter-disciplinary study of the problems of knowledge representation by Webster, David S.
Durham E-Theses
Archaeological knowledge and its representation an
inter-disciplinary study of the problems of knowledge
representation
Webster, David S.
How to cite:
Webster, David S. (1992) Archaeological knowledge and its representation an inter-disciplinary study of the
problems of knowledge representation, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses
Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/5607/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
David S. Webster 
Archaeological Knowledge and its Representation 
An inter-disciplinary Study of The Problems of 
Knowledge Representation 
Thesis Presented for the degree of M.Sc 
Durham University : October 1992. 
Abstract 
The thesis is a study of archaeology viewed from a perspective informed by (a) 
social constructionist theory and pragmatism; (b) techniques of Belief and 
Knowledge Representation developed by Artificial Intelligence research and (c) the 
conception of history and historical practice propounded by the philosopher, 
historian and archaeologist, R.G. CoUingwood. 
It is argued that Gibsonian affordances and von Uexkull's notion of the Umwelt, 
recently discussed by Rom Harre, provide the basis for a description and 
understanding of human action and agency. Further, belief and knowledge 
representation techniques embodied in Expert Systems and Intelligent Tutoring 
Systems provide a means of implementing models of human action which may 
bridge intentionality and process and thereby provide a unifying learning 
environment in which the relationships of language, social action and material 
transformation of the physical world can be explored in a unified way. 
The central claim made by the thesis is that Collingwood's logic (dialectic) of 
Question & Answer developed in 1917 as a hermeneutic procedure, may be seen as 
a fore-runner of Newell and Simon's Heuristic Search, and thereby amenable to 
modem approaches to problem solving. Collingwood's own approach to History/ 
Archaeology is grounded on many shared ideas with pragmatism and a social 
constructionist conception of mind and is conducted within a problem solving 
framework. Collingwood is therefore seen as a three-way bridge between Social 
Psychology, Artificial Intelligence and Archaeology. 
The thesis concludes that Social Psychology, Artificial Intelligence and 
Archaeology can be integrated through the use of Intelligent Tutoring Systems 
informed by a Collingwoodian perspective on Archaeology, Mind and History -
construed as Mind's self-knowledge. 
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Of all the works of man 
Of all the works of man I like the best 
Those which have been used. 
The copper pots with their dents and flattened edges 
The knives and forks whose wooden handles 
Have been worn away by many hands: such forms 
Seemed to me the noblest, so too the flagstones round 
old 
houses 
Trodden by many feet, ground down 
And with tufts of grass growing between them: these 
Are happy works 
Absorbed into service of the many 
Frequently altered, they improve their shape, grow 
precious 
Because so appreciated. 
Even broken pieces of sculpture 
With their hands lopped off, are dear to me. They too 
Were alive for me. They were dropped, yet they were 
also carried. 
They were knocked down, yet they never stood too high. 
Half ruined buildings once again take on 
The look of buildings waiting to be finished 
Generously planned: their fine proportions 
Can already be guessed at, but they still 
Need our understanding. At the same time 
They have already served, indeed have already been 
overcome. All this 
Delights me. 
Bertolt Brecht 
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PROLEGOMENA 
I was a very recent graduate of archaeology when I started this thesis (part-time). 
Before coming to university, I had spent the previous thirteen years working in 
Local Government. Over most of the period of my research and writing up I was 
employed as a research assistant for Dr K. Richardson of the Centre for Human 
Development and Learning based in the Open University's School of Education. 
The origins of this thesis lie in my long standing (pre-university) interest in 
philosophy and history. But the spur was given by the somewhat hobby-horsical 
attitude that I came to have about the philosophy and archaeology of Robin George 
Collingwood. 
When I came to Durham to read archaeology, 1 was somewhat shocked to find 
that most i f not all of my year group had never heard of Collingwood, or i f they 
had, they only knew him as a 'Romanist' i.e. an archaeologist of the Roman 
period. Members of staff, when asked what they thought of Collingwood, gave the 
almost knee jerk response of 'he was an Idealist' in a tone of voice that meant 'do 
not trouble yourself with him'. I f Collingwood was not quite a hobby-horse of 
mine when I arrived at Durham, he was soon to become one. 
As well as studying archaeology, I took options in the History and Philosophy of 
Science and the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. In this way I fed my interest in 
Philosophy. I also, of course, continued reading Collingwood. 
It became apparent to me that Collingwood had a much better standing in 
philosophical and historical circles generally than he had in archaeology, and that 
was irritating, because Collingwood's philosophical interests were shaped and 
refined through his historical and archaeological work. As he said himself ' It was 
necessary for the advancement of my philosophical work that I should be constantly 
engaged not only in philosophical studies but in historical studies as well...for this 
purpose Roman Britain was very suitable.' (Collingwood, 1987: 120) Here then, I 
thought, was a worthy role model. This thesis, however, is not intended to be a 
lionization of Collingwood, rather, it is a recognition of the spirit of his 
scholarship, i f frankly, not a match for it. 
When the time came to write my undergraduate dissertation, my interests were as 
much philosophically orientated as they were archaeological. The standard 
dissertation topic of geophysical, or worse, parish surveys certainly did not appeal 
to me. I was looking for a topic that would engage both my main interests. 
Classification and its philosophical foundations came to mind and this eventually 
coalesced around the problem of sorting and classifying mass produced decorated 
Roman Pottery. This pottery, known as Samian, is an important dating tool on 
Roman sites, but its identification and provenancing was a specialist job. To be told 
you had just found a sherd of Samian which was of the type Dragendorf 37, was 
not very informative. It also served to create a sense of unrequited mystique. The 
answer to this, I decided, was Expert Systems. 
The two poles of attraction became classification and expert systems. Both led me 
to language, as did the philosophy of social sciences. Language led me to thought 
and thinking as did Collingwood (and to Samian ). Together, they propelled me 
towards Psychology in its various guises. But the hobby-horse had not gone away, 
Collingwood was not, as far as I understood the term, an Idealist, or at least, not 
just an Idealist. And even if he was, he was still important to archaeology. 
Archaeology today seems to be facing a crisis of identity. On the theoretical side 
the 'philosophical turn' to Carl Hempel's ideas about hypothetico-deductive method 
and hypothesis testing, made in the 1960's, created a lot of disillusionment. All the 
thorny problems of interpretation were left as intractable as ever. The next 
philosophical turn - towards structuralism / post-structuralism / Hermeneutics / 
Literary Criticism / Psychoanalysis - made in the 1980's, only served to create a 
schism in Anglo-American Archaeology!. 
The aforementioned constitutes the general background to the thesis and hopefully 
goes some way to explaining the rather unusual convergence of topics and issues 
therein. The thesis aims to show that (a) Collingwood can be used as a three-way 
bridge between Social Psychology in its pragmatist guise^ (i.e. social 
constructionism). Cognitive Psychology / Artificial Intelligence and archaeology ; 
1 Archaeology on the Continent is lagging somewhat behind in theoretical matters. This is 
probably to their gain. 
2 Pragmatism is the term coined by C.S. Peirce for his doctiine of meaning which held that' we 
come down to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as the root of every real distinction of 
thought..there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible 
difference of practice' The term was subsequenUy adopted by William James who extended the 
doctiine to include truth as well as meaning. For James, pragmatism showed that our beliefs and 
ideas are 'discerned by asking what difference they make to our lives; and they are true if living by 
them produces "satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience"' (Collinson, 1990 pp. 
114-9). Social Constructionists may be broadly taken to be on the Jamesian side of the matter, but 
there seems to be littie consensus even about this. 
and (b) in so doing, point the way forward (tentatively) for archaeology and take 
it out of the theoretical morass into which it seems to have fallen. 
The first chapter of the thesis is straight-forwardly an introduction to archaeology. 
Its purpose is to inform the non-archaeological reader (since the thesis is a study of 
psychology) about the why's and wherefores of archaeology. The chapter ends by 
noting the re-emergence of human intentionality as a central problem for 
archaeological interpretation. The newly perceived problematical relation of 
intentionality to process is taken as the jumping off point for the rest of the thesis. 
The second chapter reviews perspectives on the 'Psychological Environment' as I 
have chosen to call it. Basically, it reviews issues in social and ecological 
psychology together with issues in the philosophy of language pertinent to the 
social constructionist perspective. 
I discuss the notion of Umwelt developed by von Uexkull in 1909, now being 
promoted by Rom Harre; closely related to this work is that of J.J. Gibson and his 
theory of Affordances. Social cognition is taken up in the light of Gibsonian 
Affordances by Reed and this section is followed by a return to Harre who 
develops a Wittgensteinian perspective on the social construction of self together 
with a critique of mainstream psychology's emphasis on process and structure 
leading to a discussion on the nature of human agency. This discussion on agency 
is followed by a section on Folk or Naive Psychology as Andy Clark terms it, and 
in its turn, folk Psychology is followed by Dilman's Wittgensteinian treatment of 
Induction. Finally, the chapter looks at Edward's discussion of the relationship of 
discourse to categorization. 
The third chapter looks at issues in mainstream cognitive science including 
knowledge and belief representation, mental models, deduction, intelligent tutoring 
systems, and finally, it reviews work in archaeology which already attempts to 
utilize expert systems. 
In reviewing the approaches to cognition and its instantiation in A I programmes, 1 
have sought to map out the strengths and weaknesses of such approaches for 
understanding human intentionality and actions. I conclude in this chapter that much 
of the current work on archaeological uses of expert systems pays scant regard to 
the problematical nature of archaeological knowledge as embodying an account of 
human agency and activity based on contentious epistemological grounds and 
interpretative strategies. 
The fourth chapter deals with the topic of human consciousness by reviewing 
Edelman's theory of the biological foundation of consciousness built on 'Darwinian 
automata'; Dennett's Multiple Drafts; Brooks work in robotics and Bridgeman's 
'Plans'. The review of such work in this chapter and the previous two grounds the 
later discussion of cognition within a Collingwoodian framework which links the 
concept of mind and history. The second half of this fourth chapter details the 
origins and content of this framework. 
The f i f th and sixth chapters attempt to bring the various strands together. The f i f th 
chapter introduces Collingwood's doctrine of re-enactment of past thought, his 
logic of question and answer allied to which is the theory of absolute and relative 
presuppositions.Following on from this discussion of Collingwood spanning the 
later part of the fourth chapter and the first part of the fifth, is a consideration of one 
recent attempt in Archaeology to model human action. This attempt by Mithen 
(1990) to model human action in the Mesolithic period has come under fire from 
other archaeologists. Criticism levelled at Mithen also brought Collingwood into the 
line of fire. In this chapter I defend Collingwood whilst broadly agreeing with the 
main criticisms of Mithen. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the problems 
faced in coming to understand and describe human action. 
In the sixth and last chapter I endeavour to set out a possible new direction for 
archaeology based on a Collingwoodian understanding of the nature and tasks of 
historical study which is informed by insights into human action gleaned from 
social (Gibsonian) psychology, but I also suggest that mainstream cognitive 
psychology has much to offer as well, particularly through the utilization of 
intelligent tutoring systems based on expert systems. 
CHAPTER ONE 
AN INTRODUCTION 
TO 
A R C H A E O L O G Y 
1.0 Introduction 
In this first chapter I will offer by means of a historical sketch, a general account 
of archaeology. The main issues dealt with are (a) Stratigraphy - the spatial and 
temporal relations of archaeological remains within the ground. Excavation is a 
controlled process by which the remains of past human activity are recovered to 
form the primary data base for archaeological interpretation; (b) E a r l y 
interpretational frameworlis e.g. intentionality or technologies; (c) The 
Role of Ideology in Interpretation ; (d) Scientific methods, Scientism 
& The New Archaeology; (e) Processual & Post-processual 
approaches ; and (0 Theoretical Impasse in Archaeology. 
1.1 Origins of Archaeological Thought 
An interest in other people's art and artefacts probably started with the Romans, 
given their fondness for all things Greek. Coming forward in time to Renaissance 
Europe, we find dilettante - those who delighted in the arts; the hunters of treasure 
and collectors of Greek and Roman art. 
There was however a more historically inclined group of antiquarians, who, from 
the sixteenth century onwards (in England at least) undertook topographical 
surveys of visible antiquities. What they lacked, though, was a chronological 
framework that would allow a proper ordering of the monuments to be made. It 
was therefore in the mid - late 19th century that what we recognise today as 
Archaeology properly emerged from Antiquarianism. 
Archaeology today constitutes a nexus at which many other disciplines meet; 
Geology, Biology, Anthropology, Geography, Chemistry, Physics, Linguistics 
and Psychology. Geology and Biology, however, may be cited as foundational. 
From Geology, Archaeology took the notion of stratigraphy, i.e. the delineation of 
spatial and temporal depositional sequences, and thereby gained its necessary 
chronological depth. The key to this development was the eventual ascendancy of 
uniformitarianism (the idea that geological processes are unchanging) in Geological 
thinking. This change in thinking brought with it the recognition that when found 
together in the same geological strata, human remains and worked stone was indeed 
contemporary with remains of extinct animals. The idea that depositional sequence 
could be used as a chronological measure prompted the idea of excavation as a 
method for exploring the past. The metaphor of "digging into the past" whereby 
time is measured in feet and inches has exerted a strong influence on archaeological 
thought. 
1.11 Stratigraphy 
The rudiments of archaeological stratigraphy are illustrated belowl 
Harris Matrix 
Fig 1 To the right of the illustration is a Harris Matrix that specifies the salient 
spatial and chronological relations between the strata. 
To briefly explain Fig 1: the earliest layer is clearly (9) which is overlain by the 
other eight layers. Next come (7) & (8) which are directly overlain by (6),(3) and 
(1). Layer (3) overlies (4), (5) and (6); layer (2) overlies (4), and layer (1) overlies 
layers (2) - (9). A point to note is that layer (4) and (5) are cut by layer (3) that is, 
the original deposition of both layers has been truncated by the creation of layer (3) 
and therefore (3) is later. Of course, it is never that simple ! 
The reason why it is never that simple is because illustrated above in terms of 
different patterned patches are what are in actual fact, ephemeral perceptual 
1 The illustration is taken from Techniques of Archaeological Excavation (Barker, 1982: 
201) 
distinctions arising out of differential moisture content (in the main) which in turn 
reflects compositional variations in the soil and compaction. The boundary between 
one layer and another can often only be seen when freshly exposed by the trowel. 
Again, there is a thin line to be drawn between recognizing the form and f i l l of say, 
layer seven in the illustration, and what in the illustration (layer nine) is bounding it. 
It is not always easy to tell when one is excavating the f i l l of a de facto hole, and 
digging it fresh. 
Edward C. Harris, who devised the Harris matrix has usefully set out the basic 
tenets of archaeological stratigraphy. These tenets are as follows: 
The Law of Superposition : in a series of layers and interfadal features, as 
originally created, the upper units of stratification are younger and die lower are older, for 
each must have been deposited on, or created by the removal of, a preexisting mass of 
archaeological stratification. 
The Law of Original Horizontality : any archaeological layer deposited in an 
unconsolidated form will tend towards an horizontal disposition. Sti-ata which are foimd 
with tilted surfaces were so originally deposited, or lie in conformity witii contours of a 
pre-existing basin of deposition. 
The Law of Original Continuity: any archaeological deposit, as originally laid 
down, will be bounded by a basin of deposition, or will tiiin down to a feather-edge. 
Therefore, if any edge of the deposit is exposed in a vertical plane view, a part of its 
original extent must have been removed by excavation or erosion : its continuity must be 
sought, or its absence explained. 
The Law of Stratigraphic Succession : any given unit of archaeological 
stratification takes its place in the stratigraphic sequence of a site from its position 
between the undermost of all units which lie above it and die uppermost of all those imits 
which lie below it and with which it has physical contact, all otiier superpositional 
relationships being regarded as redundant. 
(Harris, 1979: 112-3) 
When it come to using the stratigraphic sequence for relative dating there are two 
relational terms used; there is the terminus ante quern -that is, a date before which 
the earlier features must have been deposited.(Barker, 1982: 198) When later 
datable features seal or cut earlier features, the datable features give the terminus 
ante quern for the earlier ones. 
The terminus post quern - gives the date on or after which the layer or feature 
was deposited. Supposing on stripping off layer (1) we find a mosaic floor which 
completely seals all the other layers. We know from the texts that this mosaic floor 
was laid in 325 AD Thus anything we find in (1) is dated to 325 AD or later. 
Anything we find in the sealed layers is 4th century or earlier. The floor gives a 
terminus post quem date for Layer (1) and a terminus ante quern for the rest. But 
just suppose that we did not have a date for the mosaic floor, but rather found a 
coin sitting directly on the floor. This coin carries the date of 300 AD. The coin 
would give a provisional terminus post quem of 300 AD. That is, the earliest date 
on or after which the floor could have been laid. This date would have to be 
provisional, because of residuality. That is, the coin could have been an heir-loom. 
I f on removing the mosaic floor we now find a coin dated to 325 AD, then that date 
would now become the new terminus post quem. Thus in a continuous sealed layer 
in which there are independently datable items, the item which has the latest date 
gives the terminus post quem. As for the dates of the sealed layers, the latest date 
would be 325 AD, but the dates between the layers could be one day or several 
millenia. Hence we can see that spatial relations determine temporal ones and the 
physical positions of features or objects in a three dimensional grid stand as a 
metaphor (model) for events in time, the dimension of depth broadly marks the 
passage of time. 
Events are captured in space and the elements that mark the events constitute the 
spatial and thus the temporal context for each and every other element. 
The concept of context is central to archaeological thinking, which is why there has 
been in times past an enthusiasm (demand) for "total" excavation. Now no longer 
financially feasible or theoretically justified. Total recording was an ideal which 
many have aspired to but that of course presupposes that the individual element or 
constituting phenomenon has individual identity. Granted, artifacts which are the 
products of human endeavour happen to be "sensible" objects. But i f we take a 
wall for example, although a human artifact, walls need not, and often do not, leave 
unambiguous remains. An illustration of this situation would be the fragile daub 
fragments that survived as the only sign of a Wattle & Daub wall. Hypothesis : 
these settlements had Wattle & Daub walls.( unstated supposition : human 
settlements have walls of some kind, we are on the site of a settlement ) Evidence: 
daub (often burnt or showing signs of firing) Corroborating evidence : The daub 
when planned out demonstrated expected linearity (or curvilinearity) in the manner 
of walls. 
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By planning out the position of the daub as excavated, the plan provides the 
context for the fragments of daub by demonstrating that the fragments of daub share 
in at least two features associated with Wattle & Daub Walls, i.e. daub itself and 
linear (or curvilinear) alignment. Q.E.D. As the plan of the site is built up by the 
addition of more detail, so each detail added strengthens the interlinked 
suppositions about the site; or not, as the case may be. Just as the spatial relations 
within the ground stand as a metaphor for the temporal events, so the plan stands 
(or so it is intended that it should be) as a metaphor for the spatial relations between 
artefacts or features that pertain in the ground. Since not all the elements that go to 
make up the spatial/temporal matrix in the ground are recognized and thus recorded, 
there is also a pre-selection or prejudgement as to what elements are of significance 
and must be recorded. Thus the plan of the site is the product of the interaction 
between the de facto spatial relations of artefacts /features in the ground and the 
constellation of presuppositions about what is to be recorded. The process is 
dictated by the extent to which the archaeologist will allow the ground to alter and 
redirect the basis of recording. The site plan and the archive as a totality, therefore, 
already embody a wealth of interpretative activity and presupposition. 
From Biology, Archaeology took the theories of Evolution and classification 
current in the mid to late 19th century and thereby gained (a) a framework and 
mechanism to explain social change signified by changes in the Archaeological 
record and (b) guiding principles for the chronological sorting of artefacts. 
The influence of Darwinian evolution on 19th century archaeological thinking 
resulted in the view that modern European society was the outcome of intensive 
cultural and biological evolution and the most advanced result of natural selection. 
Technologically less advanced people were thereby held to be culturally, 
intellectually and emotionally inferior to Europeans. The mis-appropriation and 
misconstrual of Darwinian natural selection by early archaeologists is notorious. 
1.12 Early Practitioners of Archaeology 
The archaeologist of the mid-late 19th century was almost exclusively a member of 
the moneyed class. Either an owner of land, a well-to-do country parson, or a man 
with a military commission. One way or another, the nineteenth century 
archaeologists had both the time and the money to pursue their interest in the past 
through the recovery and collection of material artefacts. What marked these people 
off from some of their predecessors e.g. grave robbers, was that they professed a 
scholarly interest in the people whose material culture i.e. physical remains, they 
were recovering. They regarded such material remains as evidence of the past and 
not just loot to be traded for money. As scholars, many of them were associates of 
prominent men of Science e.g. Charies Darwin, Thomas Huxley,and Charies Lyle 
to name but three. 
A good illustration of this point is Augustus Pitt-Rivers. Pitt-Rivers was at one 
time or another, and often concurrently, a member of the Royal Geographical 
Society ; the Ethnological and Anthropological Society of London ; the Society of 
Antiquaries ; the Archaeological Institute ; the Geological Institute ; the Royal 
Institution ; the Linnaean Society and the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science. Sir John Lubbock a prominent practitioner of Archaeology and a 
student of Darwin's was also Pitt-Rivers' son-in-law. 
According to Pitt-Rivers, cultural artifacts are emanations (emphasis added) of 
the mind ; and as such, are similar to language. 
Pitt-Rivers argued that^ : 
these words and these implements are but the outward signs or symbols of particular 
ideas in the mind; and the sequence, if any, which we observe to connect them together, is 
but the outward sign of the succession of ideas in the brain. It is the Mind that we 
study by means of these symbols (emphasis added)... Words, as I said before, are 
the outward signs of ideas of the mind, and this is also the case with tools or weapons. 
Words are ideas expressed by sounds, whilst tools are ideas expressed by hands; and unless 
it can be shown that there are distinct processes in the mind for language and for the arts 
they must be classed together. 
(Thompson, 1977: 138-9) 
Pitt-Rivers goes on to point out that just as words must become public property 
before entering a language, so too do implements ; natural selection and survival of 
the fittest (sic) are held by Pitt-Rivers to determine what material forms persist. 
Pitt-Rivers's claim that in studying material culture we are studying the (past) mind 
is not a claim that many in Archaeology to-day would accept. 
1.13 Archaeology 1900-1960 
2 Htt-Rivers, A. (1875) 'On the Evolution of Culture' Proc. Royal Institution vol vii 496-
520 1875 
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The changes in the aims and methods of archaeology since the days of Rtt-Rivers 
are conveniently mapped out for us by V. Gordon Childe. Childe was one of the 
great synthesizers in archaeology. Influenced by Marxism and Soviet archaeology, 
Childe focused on craft specialisation, that is, the social division of labour and the 
economic aspects of social development that come out of the social division of 
labour. For the purpose of this introductory chapter, however, I w i l l review 
Childe's 1935 Presidential Address to the Prehistoric Society . 
In his address, Childe stated that Archaeology could not supplement history nor 
become prehistory until it succeeded in arranging its material in temporal order. 
Arranging things by material composition was of little use. In order to make 
Archeology a science,^ it was necessary to establish a systematic and significant 
classification for its materials. 
Thus Childe stated that: 
The first step to making archaeology a science was to establish a systematic and 
significant classification for its materials...Geology not only taught archaeologists the 
necessity of a chronological classification, it also indicated how such can be scientifically 
established. The rule of stratigraphy has been taken over from geology...But 
archaeology went on to borrow from geology methods and concepts that can not 
appropriately be applied to human science...The concepts of natural science caimot be 
applied without modification to himian sciences; natural history is far more abstract than 
human history, and prehistorians must advance from abstractions of the former to the 
concreteness of the latter. 
(Childe, 1935: 2) 
The thrust of what Childe is saying here is brought out by R.G.Collingwood when 
he points out that when an archaeologist finds a stratum of earth with pot sherds 
and in another stratum, different sherds plus coins, i t may be concluded by some 
that archaeologists treat the pot sherds and coins the same way as a geologist uses 
fossils: that is, to show that the strata belong to different periods and they can date 
them by correlating them with strata found elsewhere which contain the same type 
of relics. But this would be a wrong conclusion. Natural science unlike 
Archaeology, argued Collingwood, does not include the category of purpose in its 
^ As Jerry Fodor put it' What you need in order to do science is a taxonomic apparatus that 
distinguishes between things insofar as they have different causal properties, and that groups things 
together insofar as they have the same causal properties' Psychosemantics: the problem of 
meaning in cognitive science (1987) p. 34 Cambridge MA: MIT Press 
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working categories. While the stratigraphic sequence and thereby the temporal 
sequence is important to the archaeologist, i t is only so to the extent that the 
archaeologist can impute a use or purpose to the material ; for it is that purpose 
which makes i t evidence at all. As Collingwood wryly remarks, i f a palaeontologist 
told him that he never bothered to ask what trilobites were for, Collingwood would 
be glad for his (the palaeontologist's) immortal soul and the progress of his science. 
'If archaeology and palaeontology worked according to the same principles, trilobites 
would be as valueless to that palaeontologist as are to the archaeologist those " iron 
implements of uncertain use " which cause him so much embarrassment.' 
(Collingwood, 1987: 109) 
The concreteness that Childe seeks then, is historical concreteness. Or as Marx 
put i t , 'in history we ascend to the particular.'(Bruner, 1990: 350)^ 
Wi th this end in mind Childe embarks on a discussion which, in essence, is about 
the ambiguities embedded in the central concepts and terms used in the study of 
Prehistory, e.g. <Race>, <Palaeolithic>, <Neolithic>, <Bronze A g o and <Iron 
A g o . 5 
To the concept of Race based on shared physical attributes, Childe counterpoised 
that o f Culture; that social entity which is united by a common social 
heritage - by community of language, institutions, artistic and 
industrial traditions. Going further, Childe distinguished between Culture (as 
above) and a cultural-group signified by a particular material culture assemblage 
which makes up the archaeological remains. 
When we come to the terms Palaeolithic, Neolithic, Bronze Age and Iron Age, as 
Childe points out, the old, evolutionary ( i.e. chronologically linear) model is 
unsustainable. Basically, classification by material (stone/metal type) precedes that 
of economic subsistence resulting in a "Stone Age" wi th in which the 
Palaeolithic is distinguished from the Mesolithic in terms of tool assemblages^ and 
art, but sharing a Hunter / Gatherer mode of subsistence. In the Neolithic there are 
4 As opposed to ascending to the general as in logical abstraction 
^ Concepts, as opposed to terms, will be signaled by <....> 
^ Palaeolithic tools are singular whereas Mesolithic tools are often composite being constructed 
from a "tool kit" of different microliths. 
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also differences in tool assemblages but the mode of subsistence is that of 
agriculture and domestication of animals. With the advent of agriculture and metal 
working there ensues both economic and political development. Thus the distinction 
between the Bronze Age and the Iron Age goes beyond simply that of the dominant 
metals used. Chronological linearity suggested by the stone - bronze - iron 
progression is subverted by (a) stone tools being regularly used by societies who 
have and use alternative technologies, and (b) the inclusion of other criteria such as 
subsistence strategies and political culture within the concept <Iron A g o . In short 
the original terms have become mere shorthand for diverse technological and social 
formations; but which co-exist within the same chronological frame, e.g. the 
Central European 'Iron Age' tribes and the Graeco-Roman civilizations. 
The move to studying the political aspects (trade and war), and the social aspects 
(settlement and demography) of past societies as well as their technology, (tools, 
manufacture, subsistence) has pushed archaeology into trying to utilize the physical 
sciences directly. As Childe put i t : 
The study of a cultm-e from this angle imposes fresh obligations upon the 
archaeologist. He can no longer be content with merely describing and classifying the 
objects he uncovers; he must ascertain how they were made and whence the materials 
for their manufacture came. To do that the archaeologist must enlist the co-operation of 
the geologist, botanist, and zoologist, of practical fanners, artisans and engineers as well 
as ethnographers. And to see the culture fimctioning the environment to which it was an 
adaptation must be reconstructed. 
(Childe, 1935: 10) 
The distinctions that Childe made earlier between the concepts of natural science, 
which Childe says cannot be used without modification in the human sciences, 
foreshadow the tensions that would arise with the incorporation of natural science 
techniques and modes of explanation into Archaeology. 
The contrast with Pitt-Rivers could not be more vivid, for Pitt-Rivers the material 
culture was evidence of the conceptual repertoire and psychological development of 
our early ancestors, for Childe it is evidence of the technical, social and political l ife 
o f our ancestors. Which is not to say that material culture could not be evidence for 
both. 
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1.14 Ideology and Archaeology 
The motivations for archaeological research in any period are derived from the 
wider economic, political and social concerns of that period. By the time of Pitt-
Rivers (mid -late 19th century), the Enlightenment programme (18th century) which 
expressed a belief in universal rationality and anti-clericalism; as well as a 
naturalistic understanding of social processes and a f i rm belief in 'progress', was 
on the wane. Out of the Enlightenment came the idea of psychic unity i.e. all 
humans possess essentially the same kind and level of intelligence and share the 
same basic emotions (Trigger, 1990: 57). Thus until the mid 19th century scholars 
tended to assume that people in the past were in no important way different from 
themselves. 
This view of humanity gave way to naked racism and a disillusionment with the 
notion of 'progress' in the wake of Western military and economic expansion and 
industrialisation. From the late 19th century onwards, human inventiveness was 
depreciated and change was held to be contrary to human nature. The stability and 
continuity of society was stressed, and to this end, archaeology helped to provide 
the 'evidence'.^ The development of the notion of culture took place in an 
atmosphere where difference was stressed and universality was denied. Childe, 
while repudiating all the racist ideas that abounded in the thirties about the purity of 
the nation, still promoted the idea that the significant developments, e.g. metal 
working, were 'one offs ' and therefore the spread of such techniques was the result 
of the dif fusion of the idea or due to actual migration and the supplanting of 
populations. German expansion to the east was justified (at least to the satisfaction 
of the Nazis, i f no one else) on the grounds that Slovakia contained 'Germanic' 
cultural artifacts. 
In general then, archaeological interpretations took the form of culture-historical 
narratives (origin stories) which were to a greater or lesser degree the basis of 
support for Nationalist myths and territorial claims. 
The aftermath of the 1939-45 war was such that those peoples who had hitherto 
been subject to western imperialism and racism started to f ight for their 
independence and in doing so, constructed their own myths, with the help (once 
^ See Chapter 4 'The Imperial Synthesis' Trigger (1990) 
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more) of archaeology^. This development highlighted the ideological and political 
trappings that inhered to the culture-historical approach and the diffusionist model 
of cultural and technological dissemination. 
1.15 Science and Archaeology 
The other major post-war development in archaeology was the growth of scientific 
methods and the professionalisation of the discipline. The need of Archaeology to 
enlist the co-operation of other scientists (see above) was realised and expanded at 
this time. The wider adoption of functionalist approaches, e.g. environmental, 
economic, or demographic - based explanations of change, was made manifest by 
the growing incorporation of science into Archaeology. Functionalist approaches 
had however been a feature of archaeological theorizing since the mid 19th century. 
The contribution of physics to Archaeology in the form of Carbon 14 dating was 
revolutionary. The advent of 'absolute' dating methods such as Carbon 14, or 
Dendrochronology (tree ring dating) directly undermined the then dominant 
diffusionist model of social "progress" and Childe's own grand synthesis of 
European development. Carbon 14 dating effectively showed that megaliths (e.g. 
Stonehenge) in West Europe were chronologically prior to those in the east, this 
confounded the doctrine of east to west diffusion of peoples and technologies. 
The effects on archaeology and its practice of the importation of scientific 
techniques was welcomed by most; this development may also be seen as a 
contributing factor to the growing dissatisfaction with the culture-historical 
approach, particularly in America. The incorporation of scientific methods caused 
the focus of archaeological interpretation and activity to shift away f rom 
excavation and field work towards that of laboratory-based studies. The shift to 
laboratory-based studies drew up-and-coming archaeologists into a new academic 
milieu whose ethos and methodological outlook was derived from natural science. 
A split in approaches and objectives for archaeology was in the offing. 
In Britain such views as expressed by Jacquetta Hawkes (1968) were typical of 
the 'old guard' and still held sway amongst the general public. 
We have mocked the explorers of a century and more ago because they dug for "loot"... 
In the same spirit, we have criticized those great and dynamic men of pre-World War 1 
^ The re-interpretation of Great Zimbabwe is a good example: see Lowenthal 1985 p.335 
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vintages for imposing their personalities too strongly on their work. Yet in doing so they 
caught the imagination of the public, made the periods and peoples they revealed appear 
real and important. 
(Hawkes, 1968: 258) 
Hawkes tried to fight a rear guard action against the over emphasis, in her view, 
on quantification and the mathematization of archaeology. This led, she argued, to 
people getting bogged down in minutiae and the growth of obfuscating jargon. 
Thus Hawkes bemoaned the fact that despite the great amount of archaeological 
work going on, i t is lef t to the 'old guard' to ' distil history f rom the welter of 
disparate facts that f i l l the journals and excavation reports' (Hawkes, 1968: 
258) 
I n targeting the perhaps necessary consequences of specialist reports for 
archaeological interpretations ( f rom non archaeologically trained scientists), 
Hawkes attack misses the mark. The whole raison d'etre of the New Archaeology 
movement, which may be seen as the explicit manifestation of natural science 
pursuing an Archaeological past, was precisely to abandon historical accounts and 
historicism in general in favour of hard science and its methodological strictures. 
1.2 The New Archaeology 
Lewis Binford was a central figure in the debate that developed in the 1960s on the 
merits of the New Archaeology program. Binford argued that traditional 
archaeology was dominated by a normative view of culture, meaning that a culture 
is composed / defined by a set of internalized ideas or norms carried by individuals 
and transmitted by diffusion and socialization; thus 'a cultural tradition is a 
patterned and integrated whole formed by a set of covarying ideas or norms which 
' f low' across space and time.' (Gibbon, 1989: 69) 
B in fo rd rejected this normative view because of its mentalistic or idealistic 
accounts of the past. Such a normative view did not capture, for him, the fu l l 
complexity required to explain variability, discontinuities, reversal of trends and 
other anomalies in the archaeological record. Nor could it explain, he argued, why 
the norms themselves varied. The normative view simply assumed that past and 
present cultures were alike, thereby denying the possibility of a fundamental 
difference. By idealistic, Binford meant that the Culture-historical approach 
regarded culture as the product of the workings of individual minds. Culture was 
produced by the action of cultural and natural events on individual minds. 
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Culture-history was vitiated, according to Binford, because it had to accommodate 
the psychological make up of people no longer with us. 
Yet another problem with the 'idealistic' view was that similarities at the formal / 
physical level could not be taken at face value because people in the past may not 
have perceived the artefacts in question in the same way as ourselves. Their mental 
representations and conceptual structures could be quite different. To understand 
the true nature of past relics required the correct understanding of the differences 
between our mental structures and theirs. 
Binford maintained that this put the traditional approach in a paradoxical position. 
The only source of information about the past was the material artefacts and 
structures which survived into the present,^ but seen as emanations of the mind, to 
use Pitt-Rivers's term, the meaning of such artefacts was necessarily opaque. 
Since material culture was caused by the now opaque ideas in the minds of past 
peoples. Culture-historical archaeologists did not look for theories which would 
explain the dynamics operating between these ideas and the material worid. Binford 
and others argued that traditional archaeology could not test its theories because the 
"seat of causation", meaning the conceptions and beliefs of past peoples, was not 
preserved. Furthermore, the material outcome of the causal forces, that is, ideas in 
peoples mind, could only be described and systematized but not investigated 
because no regular relationship between similar material artefacts and their meaning 
(for their makers) could be seen to exist. As Binford put i t : 
The paradox of adopting a strict empiricist's view of science while at the same time 
adopting an idealist theory of causation, where the "black box" - the minds of the 
ancients -was not available for investigation... Strict empiricism argued against inference 
and interpretation, yet the past was gone and could only be known through inference from 
the remnants surviving in the present! 
(Binford, 1989: 52) 
This rather improbable imputation of 'strict empiricism' as Binford terms it to the 
Culture-historians is baldly contradicted further on when he tells us that 
archaeologists of the remote past did offer inferences and interpretation! The 
confusion displayed by the proponents of the New Archaeology about what 
'empiricism' meant is widely recognized and retrospectively admitted. What is fair 
to say about the Culture-historians is that they took a relativistic view of cultures. 
^ Ecofacts such as pollen, animal bones and plant seeds also survive but these are not emanations 
of the mind. 
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That is, they argued that each culture had to be understood on its own terms and not 
by comparison with an external standard such as a cultural evolutionary scale. 
(Trigger, 1989: 21) 
Binford's answer to this 'problem' was simply to redefine culture. Binford 
redefined culture by shifting the seat of causation away from ideas and towards the 
material ecosystem. Culture was now to be seen as a complex, systemic, 
integrated, adaptive, extrasomatic (i.e. social) and material-based organization of 
behaviour. As systemic, culture was composed of sub-systems and functional 
contexts. (Gibbon, 1989: 70) 
The functional contexts were held to be technological, social and ideological 
spheres. Material culture participated in all such contexts, therefore, each reflected 
the other and all mutually interacted. Ideas in the minds of people did play some 
role but had to be viewed as insufficient in explaining change or behaviour in 
general. Changes in the environment were now to be held as the primary causative 
forces which effected cultural change. Internal ideational causes of cultural change 
were thus replaced by external material (ecological) conditions. 
The New Archaeology was launched on two fronts ; as can be seen from above, 
changes in culture were now to be explained by changes in environment. 
However, research was now to be conducted in a rigorous 'scientific' manner - by 
proposing hypotheses and testing them against the archaeological record. 
A t the methodological level, the New Archaeologists embraced Logical positivism / 
empiricism, specifically, that of Cari Hempel's hypothetico-deductive description of 
the scientific method. 
Lewis Binford states that what was at issue in the New Archaeology, was the 
question of how one accurately gave meaning to archaeological observations. 
(Binford, 1989: 50) 
In other words, how does one verify the truth or falsity of explanatory statements 
made by archaeologists in response to the extant archaeological record. Traditional 
archaeology did not even make the attempt at verification and it was this fact as 
much as any that provoked the scorn of the new breed o f professional 
archaeologist. 
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In Britain, David L . Clarke became the leading exponent of the New Archaeology 
wi th the publication of Analytical Archaeology in 1968. Clarke's book was 
unlike anything else to be found in archaeological literature both in its scope and 
self-conscious rigour. Clarke introduced British archaeology to Systems Theory, 
Cybernetics, Statistical testing as part of computer modeling, Information Theory, 
Numerical Taxonomy and a glossary of terms and definitions which left many quite 
bemused. Not surprisingly, Clarke also deals in his book with the nature of 
scientific laws and the use of generalization and induction in archaeological 
explanations. 
Clarke drew attention to the problematic nature of many of the generalizations made 
by archaeologists ; thus Clarke states that archaeological observations are rarely 
general propositions, rather they take the probabilistic form of 'some A's are B's' 
as opposed to 'all A's are B's'. 
Thus, we might say that 'some Venus figurines are Gravettian', some Dimini pots have 
trichrome spirals', or' some La Tene burials are Celtic '. 
(Clarke, 1968:17) 
What, one might ask, is a Venus Figurine ? Gravettian or otherwise. Likewise, 
what makes a pot, a 'Dimini ' pot ? Cleariy not trichrome spirals, or all Dimini pots 
would have them. Again, what counts as a 'Celtic' burial i f only some La Tene 
burials are Celtic (others are Teutonic). 
The problem lies in the terms on which such 'probabilistic' generalizations are 
constructed. A type concept e.g. <Celtic>, <Dimini> or <Gravettian> i n 
Archaeology is marked by: 
..a minimum statement of the diagnostic attributes of any given type ; that is, it 
would furnish the minimum amount of information about any type which would be 
sufficient to distinguish it from all other types. In archaeology, most types are not given 
explicit definitions ; they are represented in the form of type descriptions rather 
than of definitions. [Furthermore] If a type concept is to be shared between two or more 
individuals, it must first be communicated in the form of a type description. This is a 
verbal and / or pictorial representation of the type concept which depicts as many of its 
known characteristics as possible. 
(Adams and Adams, 1991: 367) 
Thus the intension of the concept <Gravettian> is those attributes which 
diagnostically define the type 'Gravettian', originally in this case, being found at the 
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site of La Gravette in France and being dated to the Upper Palaeolithic. Today 
however, Gravettian denotes, not the specific geographical location, but the 
attributes displayed by the artifacts e.g. stone tools and figurines similar to those 
found at La Gravette. But the geographical distribution of such artifacts which 
display close similarity to those found at La Gravette covers much of the mid / 
south west to mid /south east Europe. So, the generalization 'some Venus figurines 
are Gravettian' could simply mean 'some Venus figurines are found at La Gravette' 
or ' Venus figurines are found in many places in Europe'. 
I n the same vein, the term 'Celtic' signifies a socio-political grouping with wide 
chronological and geographical boundaries. 'La Tene' denotes La Tene artifact 
assemblages found in graves at the site of La Tene. Again we have a shift in 
denotation of original terms which owe their origin to the practice of categorizing on 
the basis of geography, but which now denote attributes of artifacts as well as, but 
not necessarily, their original geography. 
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Fig 2 L e f t : A bone figurine f rom the Ruse Tell , Bulgaria (Neolithic) : Right, a 
Gravettian Venus FigurinelO. The excavator of the Ruse T e l l H , however, did not 
see f i t to indulge in fanciful descriptive terms for the material recovered. 
I t is, by and large, classification and typology that cuts across the goal of 
composing informative generalizations in the manner of natural scientific laws. 
Classifications and type terms take their saliency from the classificatory scheme in 
which they are embedded and the specific purpose the scheme was meant to serve 
e.g. dating. In short, such terms are too specific and context bound to partake in 
logical formulations; they need to be unpacked with the denotation of the terms 
made clear. As Clarke concluded : 
The mistaken concept of an Archaeological 'fact' as a general proposition has led to the 
incorrect handUng of data and helped to conceal the important relationships 
10 The romanticism of 'exploring the past' has often resulted in the labelling of 'interesting' 
artifacts with exotic names. This was particularly so in the 19th century when naked speculation 
was often as not paraded as 'obvious fact'. Thus the figurines foimd at La Gravette were 'obviously' 
fertility goddesses. A paper in Antiquity 65(1991) by Jean-Pierre Duhard, a French 
gynaecologist turned Archaeologist argues that the Gravettian figurines display the same 
relationship between adiposity and pregnancy as foimd in modem females. In other words, the 
figurines dsplay the realistic features of forms of adiposity found in females. The figurine above 
Femme au goitre found at the Grimaldi cave shows, he claims, signs of pregnancy and 
steatopygia. 
11 A Tell' is the term for a moimd which has built up over the years by levelling existing 
buildings and rebuilding directly on top. It literally means people hved on top of their own 
rubbish heap. 
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underlying archaeological concepts in a fog of imprecise terminology. [But] 
Archaeological facts are observational data samples which start as propositions about 
perceived attributes - those A's are or have B's. These selective observations are then 
further extended as inferred attributes in probability propositions - some qualified A's are 
or have B's. thus the observations escalate from arbitrary perceptions to probability 
propositions ; at no stage is elemental reality the unit of discussion 
(Clarke, 1968: 19) 
I t would be useful to know what is meant by the phrase 'elemental reality' but no 
further explanation was forthcoming. 
As things turned out, the original programme of the New Archaeology did not 
last beyond the late seventies, mainly because it totally failed to demonstrate any 
non-trivial covering laws through its application of Hempelian hypothetico-
deductive reasoning thereby fai l ing to live up to the promises i t made. The 
attempted use of hypothetico-deductive method was soon exposed as being based 
on an already discredited (in philosophy of science) account of what scientific 
method entails. What the New Archaeology left behind was a diverse set of 
commitments and methodological approaches which in general rely on techniques 
culled f r o m the natural sciences. Archaeological orthodoxy, a weakened and 
heterodox form of the New Archaeology now goes under the name of Processual 
Archaeology. 
1.3 Processual & Post-Processual Archaeology 
Processual archaeology typically involves the use of specific natural sciences in the 
analysis of the artifactual and ecofactual remains. In this way, questions about the 
growth and development of societies are framed against what we can tell about past 
conditions wi th respect to agricultural practice, hunting strategies, disease, diet, 
technology, population growth, demographic movements etc. Over-arching theories 
(e.g. Marx, Weber) about the interaction and reciprocal relations between the 
technological, economic, and political spheres of l i fe are imported f rom the social 
sciences to provide the schemata into which are fitted the 'results' of Archaeological 
research. 
Since the 1980s, Colin Renfrew has promoted a variant o f Processual 
Archaeology, namely. Cognitive Archaeology. In 1982, Renfrew gave his 
inaugural lecture at Cambridge entitled Towards an Archaeology of Mind, 
thus launching his own brand of Processual archaeology. With the apparent 
failure of the strong version of the New Archaeology by the late seventies, Renfrew 
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promoted Cognitive Archaeology, as a blend of what had gone before (e.g. 
culture-history) and what could be salvaged from the New Archaeology. Cognitive 
Archaeology as originally conceived, was also well able to absorb much of what 
was to come out of the other response to the perceived failure of New Archaeology. 
i .e .Post-Processual Archaeology. In particular. Cognitive Archaeology 
picked up on the Post-processual emphasis on symbolism and textuality (see 
below). 
A major new text on archaeology, aimed at undergraduate students, has been 
produced by Renfrew and Paul Bahn (Renfrew & Bahn, 1991) and this contains 
the most comprehensive statement to date on Cognitive Archaeology. Cognitive 
Archaeology, we are told, studies past ways of thought f rom material remains. 
Furthermore, the skepticism of the early New Archaeologists in this regard can be 
answered by Cognitive Archaeology by the development of explicit procedures of 
assessment e.g. the constructing of cognitive maps 12 in order to analyse the 
concepts of eariy societies and the way people thought. Renfrew states that: 
'We start from the assumption that things we find are, in part, the products of human 
thoughts and intentions...They belong, in short, to what the philosopher Karl Popper 
would term "worid 3"' 
(Renfrew and Bahn, 1991: 340) 
Popper's Worid 3, i.e. objective knowledge, and related issues w i l l be discussed in 
chapter five. 
Post-Processual Archaeology became the rival to Processual Archaeology and this 
challenge to archaeological orthodoxy was not without rancour. The rancour was 
directed largely at Michael Shanks andChristopher Tilley. 
Shanks & Tilley's two books, Re-Constructing Archaeology (RCA) and 
Social Theory and Archaeology (STA) both published in 1987, set out their 
criticisms and their answers to orthodox archaeology. They write: 
The past (which others may call the museum, the archive, the library) recedes in an 
indefinite, perhaps infinite series of galleries. Archaeologists wander the winding and 
seemingly endless corridors, forever unlocking doors which appear new, armed with 
different analytical keys, picking over the skeletal remains of past societies, scrutinizing 
the shelves of death or gathering 'truths' from self-referencing site reports. The 
12 Something akin to Cognitive Psychology's mental models seems to be implied here. 
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archaeologist is devoted to the embalmed relics deafeningly silent yet sacred in their 
meaninglessness, devoted to the preserved past. 
(Shanks and Tilley, 1987: 7) 
In this opening passage to RCA Shanks and Tilley are being provocative, rhetorical 
and, in my view, generally right. 
The relationship between past and present, they argue, is no longer seen as self-
evident, and therefore a class of experts is needed to bridge the gulf. I t is the job of 
these 'experts' to (a) observe the traces of the past objectively ; (b) to show how to 
bridge the distance between the traces in the present and their social origin in the 
past; (c) to order what to do about the destruction and disappearance of the traces 
of the past ; and (d) to explain why these problems are worth posing and 
considering anyway. 
Processual Archaeology can be seen, they argue, as embodying a consensus about 
how to observe the traces the past has left behind. We observe the traces of the past 
by survey and excavation ; by detailed 'scientific' examination; and thereby produce 
'high quality' information about the past. 
Processual archaeology, i t is argued, is Topographical thinking. Quoting 
Adomo(1967): 
Topographical thinking, which knows the place of every phenomenon and the essence of 
none, is secretly related to the paranoiac system of delusions which is cut off from 
experience of the object. With the aid of mechanically functioning categories, the world is 
divided in to black and white and thus made ready for the very domination against which 
concepts were once conceived. 1^ 
(Shanks and Tilley, 1987: 9) 
The traces of the past are locked into and possessed by a 'perfect' past, held in 
spatial temporality. Time is reduced to a spatial distance within a system of spatial 
co-ordinates. In this way the past becomes contingent and our relationship to i t is 
accidental and mysterious.(Shanks and Tilley, 1987: 9) 
The challenge of Archaeology is to remove the mystery by setting the traces of the 
past in their place, in the distance. Archaeological inquiry becomes topographical 
1^  Adomo, T.W. (1967) Cultural criticism and society In T. Adomo Prisms Neville Spearman. 
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and domineering, the material traces are ordered, classified, then to be presented 
with identification papers and locked up.(Shanks and Tilley, 1987: 10) 
Time is commodified in the manner of Capitalistic appropriation of labour time 
(the universal equivalent form of value) through the creation of surplus value. Thus 
your time, my time and God's own time is brought into equivalence and emptied of 
subjective content and value for the individual. This is the 'time' of physics which 
recognizes no past, present or future. 
Empty commodified time applies to all events. All events are comparable according to 
such time which maintains that a pot and the spread of farming belong to the same 
calculus, a calculus which is indifferent to them both...The past disintegrates when the 
meaning of an object lies in its assignation to a point in time, such assignation occurs at 
the cost of the integrity of our experiences of the past. It amotmts to a loss of memory, a 
betrayal of the past which is forgotten. As a sequence of 'nows' history exists separately 
from people. It loses its specificity, its coherence and it becomes a problem ; hence the 
paradox of Zeno's race. 
(Shanks and Tilley, 1987: 10) 
The foregoing gives an idea of Shank and Tilley's style and thrust. I wi l l truncate 
their discussion of the ills of modem Archaeology, except to say that 'subjectivity' 
is seen as the main battle ground between themselves and the Processualists. 
Science, i t is said, eschews subjectivity. Moreover, the once popular 'empathetic' 
approach of the old guard, to use Hawkes phrase, is little better, according to those 
of Post-processualist bent. The empathetic approach to the past, while recognizing 
the necessary subjectivity of all human action, falls the other way in accepting the 
fetishized account of the autonomous individual, prevalent in Capitalist societies, 
e.g Margaret Thatcher's claim that there is no such thing as society, only people. 14 
Shanks and Tilley's 1989 paper Archaeology into the 90s a distillation of 
RCA and STA went on to set out a "progressive" programme for the 1990's: In the 
90s we need -
- The refinement and extension of a reflexive and mediatory conceptual apparatus. 
- A continuing investigation of the relation of theory to practice. 
14 Likewise, there is no such thing as a traffic jam, there are only cars which can't move ! 
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- A rediscovery and refinement of the subjective, rooting archaeology in an examination 
of basic and ordinary experiences of the past: the development of a politics of subjective 
identity and its relation to the past. 
- Experimentation with fresh ways of producing the past and relating it to the present, in 
the contexts of excavation strategies, museum displays, and writing texts. 
- Detailed critical analysis of the nature of archaeological discourses and their relations to 
a capitalist present. 
- The full realization of archaeology as a strategic intervention in the present through a 
focus on (i) archaeology itself as constituting a micropolitical field; (ii) an adequate 
theorization of the relation between material culture and social structures both within 
contemporary society and in the past; (iii) using the difference of the past to challenge 
established economic and social strategies, categorizations, epistemologies, rationalities, 
modes of living , and relating to others. 
(Shanks and Tilley, 1989: 6-7) 
Given the explicitly political nature of this programme and its ambitions for 
archaeology as a discipline, it is little wonder that it has generated both debate and 
hostility. This programme for archaeology is seen by many and acknowledged by 
its authors to be in part a reaction to the political shift to the right in the 80s and the 
attending financial squeeze on the discipline as a whole. Nevertheless, it mirrors 
doubts and anxieties felt by many, their specific critiques of aspects of 
archaeological theory and practice are accepted (if with qualification) by even their 
more distinguished institutional critics. 
What marks off Post-processual Archaeology in general from what has gone 
before is its eclecticism. Every shade of 'Continental Philosophy' has been adopted 
at one time or another to produce a melange of theorizing. Lying behind this 
movement in Archaeology are those commentators (e.g. Lyotard) who claim the 
collapse of Modernity into the Postmodern condition. 
Modernity, it is said, unites all by cutting across all boundaries of ethnicity, class, 
religion, gender, ideology and nationality, but it does so paradoxically. It is a unity 
of disunity whereby we live in a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, 
struggle and contradiction, ambiguity and anguish, a world in which, as Marx said, 
'all that is solid melts into air'. (Callinicos, 1989: 31) 
Modernism reacts to this anarchy by looking back nostalgically to a time when we 
still had a sense of totality. Postmodernism celebrates the anarchy, there is no truth 
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to be found only different styles and interpretations in an endless and meaningless 
process. 'Multivocality' is now the slogan of the politically correct in archaeology. 
The central thrust of post-processual theory has been the adoption of the metaphor 
of the text; material culture is a text to be interpreted Philosophical authority comes 
from Paul Ricoeur, Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault. 
Ricoeur argues that language can be analysed not simply as a system of signs or 
types of sentence, but also as extended sequences of written discourse. This move, 
however, brings to the fore the problematic question of the 'work' which according 
to Ricoeur shows three distinctive features. First, a work is a structured totality the 
understanding of which cannot be reduced to the understanding of the composing 
sentences. Second, each work conforms to a certain codification which 
characterizes its composition. This determines its genre. Third, a work is produced 
in a unique configuration expressive of its individual character and this constitutes 
its style. Thus a work is a structured totality subsumed within a genre and 
expresses a particular style. 
As a text, the work is more than simply speech written down. In being inscribed, 
speech is transformed through what Ricoeur calls distanciation i.e. the meaning 
of text goes beyond that intended by the author. The meaning of the text is removed 
from the control of the author and is given to the reader. Features of speech acts 
such as the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionaryl^ acts are exteriorized and 
realized in writing through the use of grammatical and other devices. What a text 
may say matters more than what the author meant to say. Exegesis takes place 
within the circumference of meaning which has broken free of the authors intention. 
This circumference of meaning is referred to as the Hermeneutical circle. Thus the 
free text becomes open to an unlimited number of readers and thereby an unlimited 
number of readings. 
That material culture can be considered a text is based on the notion of meaningful 
action in which, like speech when inscribed, human actions are objectified and 
thereby undergo distanciation. 
First, just as the event of saying is surpassed by the meaning of what is said, the 
event of doing is eclipsed by the significance of what is done. 
Locutionary act - 'saying words': Illocutionary acts = act done in uttering words e.g. making a 
promise : Perlocutionary act - by which we cause effects e.g. causing embarrassment by what we 
say 
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Second, Ricoeur^^ maintains that the action-event has the features of a speech act 
because it has both a prepositional content (the act of doing), which allows it to be 
re-identified as the same action, and an illocutionary force (actions can be threats, 
warnings, expressions of regret, etc.). 
Taken together, the prepositional content and the illocutionary force of the action 
constitute its 'sense-content'. 
Thus Ricoeur argues : ' Like the speech act, the action event (if we may use this 
analogical expression) develops a similar dialectic between its temporal status as an 
appearing and disappearing event, and its logical status as having such-and-such 
identifiable meaning or sense-content.' The meaning or sense-content of an action 
can acquire an autonomy which is comparable to the autonomy of textual meaning. 
Action can become detached from the agent and develop consequences of its own. 
Ricoeur asserts that the meaning of an action is freed from the intentions of the 
acting subject and thus leaves a trace - or puts a mark- on the course of events 
which is human history 
This autonomy has further consequences because just as written discourse is freed 
from the dialogical situation, so an action is freed from the situation performance. 
An action, like a text, is an 'open work' ; it can be interpreted and judged by an 
indefinite range of possible 'readers'. 
The interpretation of action by contemporaries has no particular privilege. 'The 
judges are not the contemporaries,., but history itself. . Thus action, like a text, 
transcends the social conditions of its production. Human action, like written work, 
is freed from the restrictions of ostensive reference. Action, like text, opens up a 
worid.(Moore, 1990: 98) 
I will take these points in turn and try and translate them into more concrete terms. 
The first point basically says the palaeolithic hand axe eclipses the making of the 
hand axe. The process of manufacture as action event is surpassed by its 
distanciated product, the hand axe. 
The second point seems to be saying that the prepositional content of the action 
event can be re-identified as such. Thus the process (prepositional content) of 
constructing a hand axe can be re-identified i.e. "this hand axe was made this way", 
and expresses a function or purpose (illocutionary force) of the hand axe. 
16 Ricoeur, P (1981) Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences Cambridge University Press 
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Just as the meaning or sense-content of an action can acquire an autonomy which is 
comparable to the autonomy of textual meaning. Action can become detached from 
the agent and develop consequences of its own. In less idealist terms ; the hand axe 
can be thrown away in the palaeolithic and picked up in the nineties and used as a 
paper weight, i.e. given a new interpretation. In short the hand axe can be taken to 
be anything that ones imagination can contrive. 
Moore writes: 
An action is understood when it can be explained why the individual acted as they did, 
and this can only be explained when a reason or motive for the action can be adduced. 
Consequentially, an individual can make his or her action intelligible by explaining that 
it was done out of compassion or sorrow or revenge. However, Ricoeur makes it clear 
that there is nothing definite about such an explanation. It is always possible to argue 
about the meaning of an action, to argue for or against a particular interpretation. 
(Moore, 1990: 99) 
Moore goes on to argue that it is not the actuality of past actions that is inscribed in 
material culture, but their meaning. The intentions of individual producers do not 
coincide with what the material culture signifies and material culture is freed from 
ostensive reference and the shared situation of production. 
The attempt by Moore (and others) to use Ricoeur's discussion of textuality and 
discourse as support for the claim that material culture can be considered a text has 
not been very successful. The central problem as I see it is that speech acts, 
objectified by being inscribed in writing, are posited as fragments of a fully 
constituted signifying system. The linguistic signifier and the inscription of the 
symbol poses problems of identification (what is the value of this sign ?) What 
signifies is the system, not the components. Material artifacts as symbols are 
sociological signifiers which signify by stating the case... that this is so. That 
this tie, is an 'old school tie' therefore I am an 'old school boy'; part of an elite. As 
such they pose the problem of recognition. (With what / whom am I dealing ?) 
Ian Hodder has perhaps striven hardest to implement this symbolically (textual) 
contextualized approach to the material record. In Reading the Past (RP) (1986) 
Hodder put forward a critique of archaeological theorizing , concluding that: 
archaeology needs to go back to go forward...it has been found necessary to return to the 
pre-New Ardiaeology, to recover culture-history and recover a coherent philosophical 
approach 
(Hodder, 1986: 100) 
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To date, this has not happened, on either count. Contextual Archaeology was 
proposed by Hodder as a way of capitalizing en gains made by the Precessual 
approach. 
The gains of Precessual Archaeology, in Hedder's view, were the concern taken 
over the problems of inference, sampling and research design. Also, the 
development and application of formal methods of analysis. Hitherto, 
archaeologists have been concerned with two distinct forms of process, that is, 
historical and adaptive. Examples of historical processes are diffusion, migration, 
convergence and divergence. Examples of adaptive processes are population 
changes, resource utilization, social complexity and trade. (Hodder, 1986: 152) 
What contextual archaeology would seek to do is to adequately locate these 
different processes in the historical contexts i.e. holistically, such that no particular 
process is accorded primacy in terms of explanatory force. It is the framework of 
meanings generated by mutually interacting processes that is the key to 
understanding the past. 
Hodder goes on to identify two main types of meaning of concern to the 
archaeologist. The first type of meaning is that derived from the system of 
functional inter-relationships i.e. the functional meaning. The second type of 
meaning is that derived from the structured content of ideas and symbols. (Hodder, 
1986: 121) 
Functional meanings are uncontroversial (an "axe", can ostensively be used as an 
axe) and are the mainstay of all archaeological interpretation. Symbolic meaning, 
Hodder argues, needs to be more than just the kind of inference that is often made 
such that swords in graves symbolize warrior status. Rather, what is required is an 
understanding of how such symbolic configuration played a part in structuring 
society. Not surprisingly, Hodder also wishes to recover the role (activity) of the 
individual in history and that wish re-introduces the problem of intentionality -
beliefs and ideas. 
The Post-Processualists reject New Archaeology and its latter day variant because 
on empirical grounds, they feel the need to embrace a 'normativist' conception of 
the cultural subject. Not, however, as Binford has claimed, because of paradigmatic 
posturing. Wylie (1989) has brought this point out clearly in her paper which 
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examines the current state of the debate between Lewis Binford et. al. and the Post-
processualists such as Ian Hodder. 
Thus she argues that in the first instance they find it prima facie implausible that 
human action could be adequately comprehended in strictly eco-materialistic terms 
given its distinctively intentional nature. This is because Binford's theory cuts 
against both common sense and an extensive tradition in social scientific theory 
which presumes human subjects to be agents. Also normativist critics go on to 
substantiate the intuitions which lead them to question Binford's commitment to an 
ecosystem paradigm. Hodder (1982b), she points out, provides extensive and 
detailed ethnographic documentation for the view that cognitive variables of the 
sort that Binford considers dependent can play a dramatic role in shaping human 
behaviour with regard to material things. And therefore, cognitive variables play a 
role in shaping the archaeological record. Moreover, Hodder shows that the 
interaction between cognitive variables can be quite arbitrary and context-specific. 
Thus it may be impossible to discover any projectible principles of connection 
holding among them that would allow their reliable reconstruction from 
archaeological data. This may even be the case when living contexts in which all 
the interacting variables are directly accessible are considered. 
One of the notable conclusions that Wylie comes to in her examination of the 
claims of both New Archaeologists and the Post-Processualists is that the limits to 
archaeological enquiry cannot be stipulated a priori on the basis of programmatic 
argument and the assertion of paradigmatic commitments as inescapable or self 
evidently correct (Wylie, 1989: 107) Rather, it is an empirical question as to what 
we can say about the workings of past cultures. 
The current debate thus suggests that actualistic research should be treated, not as a 
means of imderwriting predetermined ambitions, but as a means of realistically defining 
and delimiting these ambitions. Indeed, it demonstrates that actualistic research can 
determine, in concrete terms, what specific aspects of the past we can profitably 
investigate, given the nature of the specific record and subject in question 
(Wylie, 1989: 107) 
1.4 Archaeology: Its Future 
Some consideration of where archaeology is going in the future is appropriate here. 
W.A. McDonald, a veteran American classicist wrote a retrospective paper in 1991 
for Antiquity, the premier British archaeological journal. McDonald expressed 
deep worries about the current situation. He identifies six areas of concern (a) a lack 
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of collegiality within the discipline arising from a lack of shared primary goals; (b) 
out-dated perceptions of archaeology prevalent in the general public; (c) an 
ambivalent attitude in the discipline to the world market in illicitly excavated 
antiquities ; (d) the lack of clarity or understanding demonstrated by many 
professional archaeologists about the nature of inter-disciplinary research ; (e) the 
disappointing results of inter-disciplinary work done so far with others in the social 
and behavioural sciences ; and (f) the relationship and attitude of archaeology to 
special interest or minority groups. McDonald's worries are, I would say, well 
founded, though his favoured remedy of a new international body that w i l l 
represent fairly the interests of all constituencies and take the lead in speaking and 
acting for what should be a united world community of archaeology, is, to say the 
least, not on the horizon. 
1.5 Summary & Conclusions 
It is clear that archaeology has developed and changed - from treasure hunting to 
post structuralism - coming full circle in the manner of a spiral. 
From Pitt-Rivers who focused on the intentionality expressed in material artefacts, 
archaeology has gone on to embrace notions of objectivity and deterministic 
accounts ; to replace intentionality with process. Archaeology, in moving from the 
psychology of material culture to the sociology of material culture has flipped from 
one 'one-sided' view to another. Human action is at the same time irreducibly social 
whilst being paradigmatically individual. To understand the content and trajectory 
of history it is necessary to see the individual as emblematic of the social context; 
the individual both exemplify the structure of the social and are the source of its 
transformation. 
Now in the nineties, archaeology is confronted once more with the thorny problem 
of human intentionality. The time is ripe to attempt a unification of intentionality 
and process. The rest of this thesis will be concerned with the relation between 
intentionality and process and what interpreting the past through archaeological 
and historical approaches requires. 
In the next chapter I will turn to what I have chosen to call, the Psychological 
Environment 1^ (i.e. Social life and human action). 
17 The term is taken from Kurt Lewin. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
P E R S P E C T I V E S 
ON 
T H E P S Y C H O L O G I C A L ENVIRONMENT 
2.0 Introduction 
In the first chapter an understanding of human intentional action was seen to be a 
central problem for archaeological interpretation. In this chapter I will review 
perspectives in Social Psychology which deal with how individuals within a social 
matrix perceive, categorize, mentally represent, and make inferences about their 
world. This focus on the interactive relation that humans have with and in their 
physical and social environment thereby foregrounds issues that relate to human 
intention. The nature of human intentional action is taken up by several authors 
reviewed. The interactive relationship of humans and their environment is seen here 
as fundamental to an understanding of human psychological / social development. 
2.1 The Human Umwelt & Gibson's Affordances 
The Umwelt of a species is taken to be that part of the material world that is 
available as a living space to each member of the species by virtue of their specific 
modes of adaptation e.g. perceptual and manipulative capacities.(Harre, 1990: 
301) 
Rom Harrd (1990), in his essay Exploring the Human Umwelt is 
concerned to develop a unified account of Philosophical Realism and Social 
Psychology informed by social constructionist perspectives. Social constructionist 
approaches promote the concept 'person' i.e. as a moral entity, rather than 
psychological 'subject'. 
The only sustainable realist account for the physical sciences, in Harre's view, is 
to treat the human umwelt as developing historically as we advance in the uses of 
observational and manipulative techniques through and by scientific research. A 
cognate realist stance in respect of social and psychological studies would entail the 
following claims. 
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(1) There is a species-wide and history-long conversation, only partially available to 
individual human beings, as their social Umwelten. But these Umwelten are 
structured for each of us by local moral orders, that is, by tacitly accepted systems 
of rights, duties and obligations. 
(2) In the ultimate stage of the development of the reflexive study of human life we 
pass beyond the investigation of those language games which are transparent to any 
one of us, to the open set of possibilities that are affordances of Conversation. 
(3) The conversation is only so far amenable to the influence of individual 
speakers. (Harrd, 1989: 351) 
Social life is seen to be founded in the fact of conversation. To recognise the 
humanity of an other, is to regard that other as something with which a 
conversation may be had. 
Wittgenstein wrote that 'My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am 
not of the opinion that he has a soul' (Wittgenstein, 1988a: § II iv) 
The quote from Wittgenstein has been interpreted by Peter Winch 1, Raimond 
Gaita (1991) and others as marking a new conception of subjectivity. Gaita quotes 
Peter Winch who claims that we should understand Wittgenstein to mean that an 
attitude towards a soul is a condition rather than a consequence of our ascription 
of mental predicates. Thus Gaita concludes that the almost irresistible and natural 
thought that we react to one another as persons - as to other minds - because we 
know, believe, or conjecture that others have psychological states more or less as 
we do, is turned on its head. 
The point is not merely epistemological. We have two different conceptions of 
subjectivity and of what it is for an other to be someone with whom we can speak. 
(Gaita, 1991: 111) 
What is at issue here is our sense of the reality of another human being and the 
fact that we are affected by others in ways we cannot quite comprehend or avert. 
The point was made by Simone Weil when she wrote of the 'power of refusal' 
exercised by anyone in our vicinity, just by being there ; when we step aside for a 
passer-by on the road, it is not the same as changing direction on reading a road 
sign. Our attitude towards a soul would not extend to a road sign and thereby a 
road sign is not something with which we would have a conversation. 
^Winch, P. (1980) 'Eine Einstellung zur Seele', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 
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In other words only obstacles set a rule or a limit for human action. These are the only 
realities with which it comes into contact. Matter imposes obstacles according to its own 
mechanisms. A man is capable of imposing obstacles by virtue of a power to refuse 
which he sometimes possesses and sometimes not.. . Whenever there is action 
thought reaches right through to a goal.( emphasis added) If there were no 
obstacles the goal would be attained the moment it was conceived... Any thing within the 
field of action which does not constitute an obstacle - as for instance, men deprived of the 
power to refuse - is transparent for thought in the way completely clear glass is for 
sight...When our will finds expression externally to us, through actions carried out by 
others, we do not spend our time or our power of attention on investigating whether they 
have consented to this. That applies to us all. Our attention, being completely absorbed 
in the success of our project, is not claimed by them as long as they are compliant.^ 
(Weil, 1987: Winch, 1989: 106) 
The human umwelt can be regarded then as the ethical and instrumental field of 
action available to individuals as they partake mutually in social life. 
A closely related perspective on the human environment is that of J.J. Gibson. 
Gibson's Ecological psychology is founded on the notion of Affordances ; 
affordances are what the environment provides or furnishes the animal, to its 
advantage or otherwise. Here 'environment' includes both the physical and social. 
Valenti and Good (1991) offer four distinguishing features of Gibson's ecological 
approach to psychology, namely; (1) perception seen as an adaptive process guides 
both biological and socially functional behaviours ; (2) perceptual information is 
revealed in dynamic interactions with environmental surfaces, objects, places, and 
persons ; (3) structured sound and light specify opportunities (affordances) for 
action and interaction ; and (4) evolutionary design, personal history, intentions, 
and current context of the perceiver determine the perceiver's attunement to 
particular affordances of objects, places and persons. (Valenti and Good, 1991: 80) 
The standard analysis of perception holds that meaning is imposed on sensory 
input by mental processes. Gibson rejected this view. For Gibson, perception is not 
2 Weil, S. 'Are we Struggling for Justice' Philosophical Investigation 53 (January 1987) 
trans. Marina Barabus 
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based on stimulation of receptors by physical energies, rather, it is the pick up of 
higher-order information contained in invariances transmitted or reflected by 
ambient light or sound.This information conveys properties such as object size, 
shape, movement and functional significance or meaning of the object for the 
perceiver. With affordances there is a deviation from the strict meaning of an 
objective property in that such properties are not specifiable independent of an 
individual in the way that the property of say 'mass' is. But neither are affordances 
subjective in the sense that they reside in someone's mind. Affordances are 
ecological facts; they are therefore, relational in character. 
Living entities are open systems, which means that their continued existence and 
growth is based on an on-going reciprocal exchange with their surtounds. It is in 
this way that living entities are relational to their environment. Critically, 
affordances for animals are constrained by their bodily scale. To specify something 
about an animal is to imply something about its environment The behaviour of 
animals implicates and delimits their econiche, in this way, affordances express the 
unity of behavioural acts, 'the affordance and the related behaviour together 
specify goal-directed action.' (Heft, 1989: 6) 
Heft goes on to argue that body-scaling per se is less fundamental than the 
recognition that affordances are specifiable as what the individual can do, relative to 
their potentialities for action. In other words the affordances proffered by the 
environment are to be identified in relation to the body as a means of expressing 
various goals or intentions. Or as Merleau-Ponty^ argued: 
The body is the vehicle for being in the world, and having a body is, for a living creature, 
to be intervolved in a definite environment, to identify oneself with a certain project and 
be continually committed to diem. 
(Heft, 1989: 11) 
Heft, after Merleau-Ponty, argues that intentional acts do not exist in the 
individual in the form of schema, rather, intentional acts are always situated. Thus, 
inherent in an act is a reflection of a situation or set of conditions. Also, an intention 
cannot be described in the absence of some foreseeable expression of it in the 
world. Hence intention does not refer to a mental representation, it is not a 
mentalistic notion.(Heft, 1989: 11) 
3 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963) The Phenomenology of Perception trans C. Smith London 
Roudedge and Kegan Paul 
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In Harre's discussion of intention, intention is internal to the concept of 
action.(see below) Intentions refer to possibilities which are only realizable as 
situated behaviour. To summarize then : 
An intentional act is situated with respect to two factors: the fimctional characteristics of 
die environment confronting the individual (i.e. its affordances), and the physical 
characteristics of the individual's body, (e.g., body-scaling). The affordances of the setting 
are, in a sense, the ecological resources for behaviour. The physical characteristics of the 
body establish what can be performed (i.e., what die individual can do) as a function of 
such things as length of reach and stride, breadth of grasp, strength, etc. In combination, 
the affordances of the environment and the characteristics of die body constrain the range 
of intentional acts that can be expressed. 
(Heft, 1989: 12) 
An object may be what it is, and what it affords us rests on what it is, but humans 
also do work on the material world. The material world affords us the opportunity 
to do work upon it and thereby expand the range of possible affordances open to us 
and thereby expand or alter our umwelt. 
The consideration of human labour on the material world has led some researchers 
into studying the relation of culture to social ecological psychology. In moving in 
this direction they are paralleling moves by developmental psychology. As Valenti 
and Good point out, in contemporary Vygotskian approaches to understanding 
cognitive development e.g. Valsiner ^ , there is an emphasis on the sociocultural 
nature of the child's environment and its impact on cognitive development. With 
regard to affordances, Valenti and Good argue that cultural practices by structuring 
the environment can hide some affordances while revealing others, and this 
allows the child to participate in the creation of still other affordances thereby 
providing a range of directions for the development of behavioural competence. 
I will now move on to discuss social constructionist perspectives on cognition. 
4 Valsiner, J. (19S4)Construction of the zone of Proximal Development in adult-child joint action 
: the socialization of Meals In B. Rogoff & J. V. Wertsch (Eds.), Children's learning in the 
"zone of proximal development" San Francisco: Jossey Bass 
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2.2 Cognition & Affordances 
The dominant paradigm in Psychology is regarded to be the characterization of 
cognition as rule-governed symbol manipulation. This view of cognition has been 
under attack, (if that's not too strong a term) by others who favour more social and 
ecologically based approaches. It is also challenged by Connectionism, i.e. non 
rule, non-symbol based distributed representations (see below). 
Reed (1991) maintains that there is gap in both mainstream cognitive and 
ecological psychology where cognition in natural contexts is concerned. In his 
paper. Reed concentrates on the work of Lave (1988)^ and Rogoff (1990)^ 
Reed states that: 
Both these writers treat cognition as a kind of active thinking that emerges out of the kind 
of active perceiving emphasized by Gibson...In contrast to the representational theories 
which predominate in modem cognitive psychology, Rogoff and Lave see cognition as a 
set of activities of the person (e.g. remembering, planning), not things acquired by the 
mind. 
(Reed, 1991: 138) 
Both Lave and Rogoff, in contradistinction to the classic studies by Piaget, do 
not treat formalizable school tasks, logical problems etc, as paradigm examples of 
cognition. Lave and Rogoff take an anthropological approach to cognition, that is, 
they reject the artificial setting of laboratory controlled situations. According to 
Rogoff, we think for the purpose of acting effectively in the pursuit of goals which 
are socially and culturally specified as a means of handling problems. In the 
psychology laboratory. Lave argues, puzzles or problems are simply assumed to be 
objective and factual. 'Problem solvers have no choice but to try and solve 
problems, and i f they choose not to do so, or do not find correct answers, they 
fail. ' (Lave, 1988: 35) 
In her own studies on situated mathematics. Lave reports that people reorganize 
the elements available to them rather than attempting to solve problems as given. 
Adults when faced with mathematical problems isomorphic to calculating tasks 
^ Lave, J. (1988) Cognition in Practice New York: Cambridge University Press 
^ Rogoff, B. (1990) Apprenticeship in Thinking: Cognitive Development in Social 
Contexts New York : Oxford University Press 
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embedded in everyday practices, make more mistakes in the formal representations 
of the task than in the more familiar form. People engage in what she calls gap 
closing procedures (similar to Rogoff's bridging operations). Thus people 
will hunt for information and procedures to solve the current aspect of the problem 
that is judged to be the most immediate, it makes no difference if such procedures 
wil l only yield approximate solutions. Lave has concluded that there is strong 
evidence to show that adults prefer to avoid formal problem solving (e.g. a 
shopper will judge the merits of buying the larger package for a small price increase 
rather than working out the price per unit weight) regardless of the fact that it means 
they must engage in more than one round of thinking through the problem. Lave 
found that one way of avoiding calculation was to discover or invent units that 
allow one to make direct comparisons without any calculation or problem solving. 
This approach to the problems would, in cognitive accounts, be termed Heuristics. 
Rogoff conducted a study on spatial memory involving a group of U.S. school 
children and a group of Mayan children. Toy models of familiar objects were 
arranged in a miniature scenario and then replaced into a larger pool of objects. The 
children were then asked to reconstruct the scenario they had seen. Previous 
research suggested that the Mayan children had poorer memory for lists, but in this 
spatial task they did better than their American counter-parts. Rogoff interprets this 
reversal in performance as being rooted in the distinctly different educational 
environments experienced by the two groups of children. The American children 
were more used to rote learning which did not help them in this case. The Mayan 
children, however, remembered what the scenario looked like rather than recalling 
the constituent items. 
In many i f not all cultures, the learning of skills, particulariy practical skills, is 
structured in the form of apprenticeship - pupil and teacher. Teaching is through 
example and discussion. Reed reports on the work of Forman and Cazden^ who 
claim to show that adolescent peers often have divergent assessments of problems 
to be solved jointly, this divergence is instrumental in the developing of skills, both 
of individual and group, as solutions emerge through discussion, disagreement, 
and consensus. Argumentation then forms the ground on which interactive 
problem solving takes place and is available to individuals to abstract from. 
Reed concludes: 
Forman, E.A., & Cazden, C. B. (1985). Exploring Vygolskian perspectives in education : The 
cognitive value of peer interaction In J.V. Wertsch (Ed.), Culture, Communication, and 
Cognition: Vygotskian perspectives New York: Cambridge University Press 
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cognitive skills emerge as a consequence of an individual's learning to share affordances, 
actions and intentions as a result of learning to coordinate and cooperate in working with 
others. I suggest tiiat in child development diere is a movement from what I have 
elsewhere called "The field of Promoted Action"^ (tasks promoted for and offered to the 
child by caretakers) to "The Field of Free Action" (self-selected tasks ;Reed in press). 
What affordances are encompassed widiin these different action fields varies from place to 
place, time to time, and task to task, but for the successful learning of any given task 
there is a consistent expansion of the field of free action. 
(Reed, 1991: 143) 
The movement from the field of promoted action to the field of free action, to use 
Reed's terminology, leads us on to the question of personhood, or what it is to be 
an agent. The gaining of personhood comes with the ability to give a certain kind of 
account in which every action is displayed as intended and is justified by reference 
to self-authorization, or so Rom Harre has argued. 
2.3 Texts of Identity 
Harrd examines the grammars (logical features) of self-ascription and self-
command. Wittgenstein claimed that there was an asymmetry between the grammar 
of psychological self-ascription and other ascription, of the first and third person 
uses. Thus epistemic claims such as that one 'knows' or 'thinks' or 'doubts' along 
with qualification of such epistemic claims e.g. 'sure' 'certain' and 'perhaps' are 
proper in commentary upon the ascription of psychological states to other people. 
But in the first-person case 1 know that...' does not mark an epistemic claim. For 
instance the claim ' I know that I feel sick' is simply an emphatic way of saying ' I 
feel sick', for how can you doubt what you feel. You may however be uncertain 
that what you say captures what you feel. Whereas, I can doubt what you say -
you feel sick - but not what you feel. The distinction that Wittgenstein made was 
between first-person uses of psychological terms which must be criterionless, and 
ascriptions, second and third person uses based on inductive evidence. Harrd 
writes: 
^ Reed, E. S. (1989) The Intention to use a Specific Affor dance: A conceptual Framework for 
Psychology Invited Lecture: Piaget Society Meeting 
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In my cries, you have criteria for ascription of feelings to me, but these criteria reflect the 
conditions for determination of meaning and not the trudi and falsity of judgement of 
feeling. The judgements are inductive. There is no room for knowledge or certainty where 
there is no place for doubt. This insight, one must remember, is grammatical, not 
empirical. 
(Harre, 1989: 25) 
Harrd then goes on to discuss the grammar of the first-person inflection. The 
grammar of ' I ' in say, ' I will do X,Y & Z' signals not so much the referent who 
wil l do X , Y & Z but the moral agent who has made a set of commitments to the 
content of the utterances appropriate to that agent's moral universe. In communities 
which recognize the autonomous individual, the first-person inflection is used to 
perform a moral act. It is an affirmation of the individual's integrity. Moreover, in 
communities which do not recognize the autonomy of individuals, the grammatical 
first-person still exists, here the residual role seems always to be perceptual. That 
is how the world is from the point of view in space and time of that speaker, but 
still the moral aspect is maintained in the sincerity of the speaker ' Sincerity of he / 
she who sees or hears, rather than the integrity of he / she who promises, is the 
moral status at issue here.'(Harre, 1989: 26) 
The problem of understanding human agency, Harre argues, has thus far been 
couched in terms of finding a special feamre of the mental machinery which serves 
to account for the apparent distinction between human ways of acting and events 
produced by mechanistic determinants. But: 
...if choosing for oneself, sticking to a decision, being onery and cussed, holding out 
against temptation and taking up a regime are things people can do, we had best look 
more closely at what these things are, that is, the conditions under which someone is 
properly said to have kept to a diet or to have made up his or her own mind. 
(Harre, 1989: 29) 
Drawing on John Greenwood, Harre proposes that the analysis of the grammar of 
action is advanced by two root concepts (a) intentions to act, and (b) reasons for 
acting. The point being that the logics, or grammars, of these two concepts are 
quite different. The relation of intentions to actions and the acts they may be used to 
accomplish is conceptual rather than empirical. For instance, the relation between 
the intention and the act is not disturbed by the statement 'the road to hell is paved 
with good intentions.' 
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By reiterating your intention, you give both the answer to what you would have 
done and to what you did do. Thus if you ask me what I propose to do, I will state 
my intentions, and thereby define my proposed act. My intention to act in a given 
matter is independent of how I may actually do so e.g. I may intend to score a 
penalty goal, but miss. 
Reasons, in contradistinction to intentions, are often externally related to actions 
and the acts they accomplish. Thereby reasons often stand in an empirical relation 
to an action and not a conceptual relation. Two cases are cited here; 'having such a 
reason I do so and so' ; 'having done or being about to do, so and so, I give such 
and such a reason'. The first case mimics the structure of causality while the second 
has the form of a narrative. 'In these cases there is a gap between reason and action 
which could be filled by causal laws in the one case and narrative conventions in the 
other'(Harre, 1989: 30). You may ask me why I wish to do such a thing as score 
a penalty goal, and I give you my reason e.g. to win the football match. 
The why of explanation construed as a causal determinant is identified by Harre 
as the source of confusion about causality. He therefore proposes to supplant the 
causal 'why' with the 'why' of authorization. Why score a penalty gaol ? Because 
as team captain, it is right that I should, I am obliged to do so. Here we have the 
inexorability of moral necessity, and not the inevitability of causal necessity. 
Harre concludes then that it is a conceptual point that the intention is ineliminable 
from any account of action e.g. from any account that is connected with a human 
form of life. Furthermore, the point made here requires that at least some aspects of 
folk psychology are fundamental( but see below) 
The meaning of the notion of authorization cannot be accounted for solipsistically, that 
is, just with respect to attributes of notionally isolated individuals. I am authorized to 
undertake something when the judge, the committee, the king, the medical profession or 
all socially defined entities so decree...Instead of asking. What must something be 
to be called an agent ?, we should from now on ask. What sorts of things must people 
do to merit that characterization ? 
(Harre, 1989: 31) 
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Harre's answer to this question was given at the end of the previous section, 
namely, to be counted as an agent, one must be able to give a certain kind of 
account in which every action is displayed as intended, and which is justified by 
reference to self-authorization. In short, they must be held by their social group to 
be a full member of the group who accepts and carries out the full scope of duties 
and obligations that come with such a recognition. 
Being caused to do something and being authorized to do something are ideas 
which belong to different satzsystems, that is, sentence systems with different 
grammars (logical features). Problems arise when one is projected into the other. 
The question of how agency is possible is made intractable by using models of 
discourse based on patterns of causal explanation when endeavouring to account for 
the grammar of authorization explanations. What it is to be an agent is marked by 
our sense of identity and individuality which underlies self authorization. 
In focusing on self-authorization Harre is lead to the nature of the human will . 
The wi l l , taken in the sense of the power to act, fulf i l plans, realize intentions fills 
the conceptual gap that is seen to exist between choosing and doing. This gap is 
taken by Harr^ to be the result of jxjsiting mechanisms for choosing and doing i.e. 
cognitive models and neurotransmissions. 
Closely related to the idea of authorization is that of dictation or the command that 
one might have over another. Harrd writes: 
What if there are no forces of character, of temptation, of attraction and repulsion, of acts, 
but only reflexive versions of the language games of persuasion and command. The 
theoretician's contribution will be to look closely at what is meant by such phrases as 
'the struggle against temptation', 'wrestling with conscience', 'wimpish', sticking to one's 
decisions' and so on ; that is, it will be to describe the grammars, their rules and 
conditions of use...But these metaphors are how we talk about our actions. So they 
contribute to the overall grammar of the concepts of actions and agency. They are the 
texts of Identity, for they create the illusion of the transcendental ego . The project of a 
psychology of action needs to include the disentangling of the pictures that have captured 
the minds of psychologists, which are a legacy of the failure to examine the discourses of 
self-command, self-exhortation (etc.) and so to be subject to their influence. 
(Harre, 1989: 33) 
43 
The central thrust of Harry's argument can be seen as the articulation of an 
alternative mode of explanation. Where non-constructivist psychology explains via 
causality and therefore looks for mechanisms, both abstract and concrete, Harre 
recommends human actions be described in terms of customs and practices 
whereby people are ascribed the skills necessary for performing correctly rather 
than hidden states of mind. 
2.4 Folk Psychology 
Folk psychology, as it is termed, consists in attributing psychological states to 
people and is marked by the attribution of 'beliefs' 'desires' and 'ideas'. People are 
said to have beliefs, ideas, thoughts; people act with the intention to do this or that, 
they display, in other words, intentionality. Folk psychology also holds that 
people's beliefs cause them to do particular actions or act in particular ways. A 
central feature of folk psychology then, is the tendency to attribute to people's 
actions, causes, for which there is little or no clear warrant. 
Some people according to Clark (1990) e.g. Stich (1983) or Churchland (1981), 
seem somewhat scandalized by this situation and advocate what has been termed 
'eliminative materialism'. On this view, our common-sense talk about 
psychological phenomena constitutes a false theory about such phenomena and 
should be replace by the categories (vocabulary) of neuroscience (at the very least). 
Clark (1990), on the other hand, denies that our everyday talk is any kind of 
theory in the requisite sense i.e. scientific theory. If a reduction to the categories of 
neuroscience or further, to those of physics, cannot be made, then the question 
arises as to whether cognitive science can properly claim to be studying mind at all. 
Conversely, i f such a reduction can be made, could or should cognitive science 
force the abandonment of our current way of speaking ie., stop us couching matters 
in term of belief and desires. One notable figure, Fodor has argued that i f 
reducibility to physics is accepted as a constraint on the acceptability of sciences of 
using mental terms, in extremis this would see the end of disciplines such as 
economics, psychology (and archaeology) all the 'human sciences' since they 
would have no basis on which to make generalizations. (Schwartz, 1991: 203) 
According to Clark, our folk psychology explains the movement of others by 
construing it as actions. We do this by subsuming it under the intentional umbrella 
of general psychological laws. For example, if we see a friend moving towards the 
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bar in a public house, our belief-desire description of their movement towards the 
bar is explanatory , it is argued, only i f we tacitly accept a general psychological 
law. This example is given by Clark (1990): 
(x) (p) (q) {[x desires that p) & (x believes that ( q ^ p)) ] ^ ( x will try, all else 
being equal, to bring it about that q)} Substituting for x, p, and q we get, (roughly): 
In all cases, i f our colleague desires a Guinness and believes she can get one at the 
bar, then (all else being equal) she will go to the bar. 
(Clark, 1990: 38) 
Thus the theoretical content, i f such it be, of our folk psychology, is embodied in 
a framework of just such psychological laws. (Which thereby constitute part of the 
framework of historical narrative as currently practiced) 
Clark makes the point that there are two broad kinds of theoretical commitment 
which are not usually consciously articulated. These are (a) those commitments 
which, though once explicit, have now become ingrained in our talk and culture. 
Clark cites sexual taboos and practices; and (b) those commitments which we 
cannot help but make, given our biological nature and the physical environment. 
Here Clark cites the use of texture gradients as indicators of surface orientation. 
Clark lists the following complaints made about folk psychology by Paul 
Churchland and Steven Stich, among others. 
' (1) Folk psychology affords only a local and somewhat species specific understanding. It 
flounders in the face of the young, the mad, and die alien. 
(2) It is stagnant and infertile, exhibiting litde change, improvement, or expansion over 
long periods of time. 
(3) It shows no signs as yet of being neaUy integrated with the body of science. It seems 
sadly disinterested in carving up nature at neurophysiologically respectable roots.' 
(Clark, 1990: 39) 
I f our everyday vocabulary and the way we mobilize it to talk about the doings of 
others was really a theory in the requisite sense then the worries and objections 
raised by Churchland and Stich would have some validity. But as Clark suggests 
there is something very wrong with such a construal. Did our ancestors ever 
speculate and theorize about the best way of explaining human behaviour and come 
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up with the answer that the best explanation could be given in terms of beliefs etc.? 
This is to be doubted. As Clark states: 
' There seem to be all sorts of assumptions here about the role of ordinary ascriptions of 
mental states in our lives. Are such ascriptions really just tools for explaining and 
predicting others' bodily movements ? And even if in some sense it is such a tool, is it 
really trying to fulfil its purpose by tracking states of the head ? Would it even be wise to 
try to explain behaviour in such a way ? If any of these pointed queries draws blood, the 
honour of the folk may be preserved. Instead of losing at protoscience, the folk may turn 
out to be winning at a different game.' 
(Clark, 1990: 42) 
Clark argues that what is called folk psychology would be better termed Naive 
psychology on similar grounds to those proposed by Hayes^ (1979) for naive 
physics. 
Basically, we have the psychological understanding of each other that we have, 
because of the processes of evolution. Clark writes: 
If human beings are effective folk-physicists on this level, it is presumably not a result 
of ordinary campfire speculation. Rather, it is because our cognitive capacities are 
naturally designed to embody, or else quickly yield, a rough and ready grasp of what ever 
physical principles are most important for the success of a mobile, tool using 
animal...Just as the mobile needs to know about support, so must the socially mobile 
know about the mental states (beliefs, desires, motivations) of their peers, for a soimd 
psychological understanding of others must surely make an important contribution to the 
overall fitness of a social animal. 
(Clark, 1987: 145) 
Naive psychology then is seen by Clark to be the bedrock which enables us to 
achieve our most basic goal of understanding the actions of others. This bedrock of 
understanding learned or arrived at by the employment of exceptionally well-tested 
cognitive competencies may not be an infallible guide to the mental life of others, 
but its certainly adequate by evolutionary standards. 
Clark therefore claims that a primary purpose (function) of folk-psychological talk 
is to make intelligible to us the behaviour of fellow agents. Also, it makes their 
^Hayes, P. (1979) The Naive Physics Manifesto. In M.A. Boden (ed.). The Philosophy of 
Artificial IntelUgence Oxford University Press 
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behaviour intelligible and predictable insofar as that behaviour bears or may bear on 
our own needs and interests. 
What folk-psychological talk essentially does is to offer a narrative in which 
intentional states preserve what humanly matters and which is lost with objective 
descriptions.(Bruner, 1990: 350) Narratives are quintessentially about the actions 
of people in particular settings and their actions point to intentional states, that is, 
beliefs, desires, theories or values. The attributation of beliefs etc, to agents is an 
act of interpretation in the service of explaining their actions. In this way we afford 
them reasons for acting in the way they have done. 
Bruner (ibid) raises the problem of what he calls 'hermeneutic composability' with 
regard to narrative construction. Quoting Charles Taylor^O the point is made that in 
establishing a reading of the whole text we appeal to readings of its partial 
expressions, but because we are trying to explicate meanings we can only do so by 
relating the meaning of partial expressions to the meaning of the whole text. In a 
narrative we interpret the parts in the light of a putative story or plot and re-work the 
plot as new elements are introduced in order to maintain coherence and 
intelligibility. By offering a narrative, folk or naive psychology furnishes an 
account of acts which matter to somebody in a non-random way, in a way to be 
negotiated, not dismissed and which has consequences for what is to happen next. 
As Bruner notes, narrative, unlike logic, is not stopped dead in its tracks by 
contradiction. 
Returning briefly to Harre : Harre argues that there is only physiology and 
conversation. (Harre, 1989 : 27) That whatever the physiological processes going 
on in the brain or body, individuals are tied into the community of speakers by the 
acquisition of skills and competences. Nevertheless, since people do lead their 
lives choosing, feeling guilty, acting, believing etc, then shedding these concepts 
from our account of living would not reveal what human life is really about, but 
rather, it would make a way of being that was not recognizably human at all (ibid : 
28) The problem, as Harre sees it, arises out of thinking of hidden state assignment 
(e.g folk psychology) as a technique of physics. ' Only affordances can be assigned 
to the underiying physical reality. Only powers, skills, abilities and capacities can 
be assigned to people as that which makes their conduct as joint producers of 
human conversation possible' (Harre, 1992 : 154) Thus all action which is capable 
1^ 'Interpretation and the Science of Man' in Interpretative Social Science : A Reader ed 
Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan (Berkeley, 1979) 
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of sustaining some psychological phenomenon such as remembering or deciding, is 
joint action since there could be no being which is both atomic and capable of the 
intentional use of symbols. 
The notion of a bedrock (re Clark) on which our understanding of others is based, 
raises the more general question of induction. In other words, how can anyone 
know anything outside themselves or how can any amount of corroborated 
recollection give one a reason for believing in the reality of the past ? The scepticism 
inherent in such questions is turned, according to Wittgenstein, by seeing induction 
and what judgements about the world may be induced, as a product of the form of 
life in which the individual partakes. 
2.5 The 'Problem of Induction' 
The 'problem of induction' which Kant considered to be a philosophical scandal is 
the source of philosophical scepticism. But with our use of inductive reasoning the 
conduct of ordinary life goes very well, despite an apparent lack of logical 
underpinning. The kind of scepticism which challenges our beliefs about the world, 
e.g. that the sun will rise tomorrow, was tackled head on by Wittgenstein. In 
Philosophical Investigations (PI) 
Wittgenstein wrote: 
The character of the belief in the uniformity of nature can perhaps be seen most clearly in 
the case in which we fear what we expect. Nothing could induce me to put may hand in 
the flame - although after all it is only in the past that I have burnt myself (§ 472). The 
belief that fire will bum me is of the same kind as the fear that it will bum me (§473). 
Thus the presupposition of the uniformity of nature constitutes a very deep belief 
in our society (it is supported by our form of life) and underpins a great deal of 
what we are prepared to countenance and thereby influences the way we act. Such 
a belief in the uniformities of nature need not therefore have been shared by others 
in the past, or those who live differently to Westerners today. Though it is difficult 
to believe that the first humans to use fire would not soon learn to keep their fingers 
out of the way. However, as was pointed out in the first chapter, a thorough going 
uniformitarianism only took hold of Western thought in the last century, (see p.5) 
Wittgenstein's point is this; such beliefs as fire will bum me or that a pencil will 
drop if I let go of it, are not reasoned (they are nevertheless reasonable) but rather. 
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are the hinges around which our reasonings revolve. It is the fact that we all have 
and share in such manifestly unassailable beliefs gained by experience that shows 
how we think and reason the way we in fact do. Oilman (1973) argues that the 
possibility of our carrying out empirical and scientific investigations by framing 
explanatory hypotheses and trying to verify (falsify) them, together with 
formulating scientific laws and empirical generalizations and justifying them, 
depends on there being a large number of beliefs which we all take for granted and 
are not prepared to question, and which do not need justification. 
Thus the fact that we acquire such beliefs as a result of experience underlies the 
possibility of thinking and concept formation in general and inductive reasoning 
in particular. 
(Oilman, 1973: 38) 
What keeps these hinges in place is, in part, the attitude that we have been taught to 
take towards them.(Dilman, 1973 : 39) The teaching comes about through repeated 
experience of the world, as with all other animals, and through communication 
using language. When we learn our mother tongue we at the same time learn what 
is to be investigated and what is not. 'Just as in writing we learn a particular basic 
form of letters and then vary it later, so we learn first the stability of things as 
norms, which is then subject to alteration' (Wittgenstein, 1969: §473) 
The belief in the uniformity of nature is taken up in detail by Oilman who states 
that this belief is the belief that everything that has happened or is happening and 
wil l happen in the future, is an instance of some general law to which there are no 
exceptions. The attitude that underlies such a view was expressed by Einstein when 
he remarks that the simplicity of our picture of the world but which at the same time 
embraces more facts than hitherto, reflects in our minds the harmony of the 
universe. The qualification is given by Simone Weil: 
On the scale of our senses there is no appearance of determinism except in the laboratory. 
Ask a meteorologist or a peasant if they see much determinism in storms or rain : look at 
the sea, and see if the shapes of the waves appear to reveal a very rigorous necessity ! 
(Weil, 1968: 68) 
The uniformity of nature is most impressive from the safe distance of the 
physicist's study: but as Steven Toulmin (1955) makes clear 'it is not nature that is 
Uniform, 
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but scientific procedure; and it is uniform only in this, that it is methodical and self-
correcting' (Oilman, 1973 : 55) 
What is being argued by Oilman here is not that there are no uniformities in nature, 
but that what we perceive as uniformity and thereby use to make predictions and 
explanations are relative to our language and systems of classification. The 
possibility of finding such uniformities in nature is rooted in the kind of regularity 
that exists in human affairs which include scientific techniques and theoretical 
speculation. How we reason and investigate the worid cannot, without circularity, 
by explained in terms of features of the world as we picture it. ' I did not get my 
picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness ; nor do I have it because 
I am satisfied of its correctness. No.; it is the inherited (emphasis added) 
background against which I distinguish between true and false. (Wittgenstein, 
1969: §94) 
Our picture of the world arrived at by induction, in a Wittgensteinian account, is 
not the result of assessments we have made about it, rather, it is the ground on 
which our judgements or assessments are made. 
This inherited background which, according to Wittgenstein, grounds our 
distinguishing of true and false, (our agreement in judgements) would be regarded 
in cognitive psychology as default information but it would not be given quite 
the same omnipotent status as that given to it by Wittgenstein. 
So far the account of induction has concentrated on judgements we can make about 
the world given the conceptual and linguistic resources made available to us by the 
social group of which we are a part. Parallel Oistributed Processing (POP) or 
Connectionism as its sometimes called, offers some insight as to the cognitive 
underpinnings to such judgements. 
POP systems represent concepts by a specific pattern of activation strengths across 
a distributed network of simple processors. In such parallel systems, the activation 
of any unit or configuration of units can influence the activation of any others. Thus 
incomplete inputs e.g the image of a house, can generate the recall of other 
pertinent information (concepts) about houses. Some such system is thought to be 
the basis of the brain and underpins the rapid (real-time) cognition of the 
environment in which we constantly move. Such real-time cognition of the 
changing environment is always prone to error and needs continual up dating. This 
then would be induction at its most general level, a level that we share with other 
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animals such as Russell's chicken, (see below) But the point must be made that the 
rapid revision required by real-time cognition which is therefore of necessity, error 
prone, is mis-cast by logical formalisms. 
The reason why induction it is often viewed with suspicion by some e.g. Bertrand 
Russell, is attributed by Oilman to the view that takes deduction as the paradigm 
case of reasoning. 
This craving for consistency offered by deduction has been encouraged, it is 
argued, by abstract thinking typified by mathematics and logic, and has had an 
adverse effect on many philosophers. One example given of this adverse effect is 
Bertrand Russell's story of the chicken who inductively reasoned that when the 
farmer appeared every morning, he (the chicken) got fed. Unfortunately for the 
chicken, one morning he got his neck wrung. Therefore, the chicken's reliance on 
induction was misplaced. 
The problem with this story is that chickens don't infer anything at all. The chicken 
may exhibit the behaviour of one who expects feeding, but we cannot intelligibly 
attribute the kind of knowledge or judgement to a chicken that a human expresses 
when they say 'now I can go on' (Wittgenstein, 1988: § 151) That is, when a 
person can observe a rule, like a rule of inference. 
Inductive inferences furnish us with premises for judgements about things in the 
world and the actions of others. Naive psychology constructs causal theories out of 
such judgements in the form of discursively produced narratives. Constitutive of 
such inferences are the concepts and categories by which we individuate and 
collectivize the material worid. There is therefore an intimate link between discourse 
and categorization. It is in becoming a member of a speaking community that our 
powers of conceptualization are developed and it is in discourse that categories are 
generated. It is to this topic I will now turn. 
2.6 Categorization & Discourse 
From the above discussion of affordances, it may be argued that the world 
objectively constrains the way we would group things by limiting the kinds of 
activity in which we can participate with them. In other words, the categorization of 
things rests on a spectrum of activities including the use of language. What ever the 
properties of the object, it will only be those properties which are made salient by 
51 
activity e.g. discoursing, which gain our attention and lead us to see relations of 
similarity between objects and the properties of objects. Activity is to be taken here 
in its broadest sense. A Bird flies by flapping it wings, as does a Bat ; and 
therefore a Bird's wing is more similar to a Bat's wing than say, an aeroplane 
wing. 
Or again, the symbolic role in initiation ceremonies that pigs play for the Orokaiva 
people of Papua New Ginea rests on a perceived (asserted) similarity between pigs 
and children. The most salient activity which posits this relation of similarity 
between pigs and children, is suckling. Orokaiva women suckle their pigs as well 
as their children. Moreover, the Orokaiva call pigs 'children' of their owners and 
talk of a pig's mother being the person who has brought it up. (Bloch, 1992 : 9) 
In the most general case then, how we categorize things, properties and people 
flows out of the specific matrix of interaction between things and people in the 
course of life's activities. 
As stated above, the power of conceptualization develops with acquisition of 
language. The classical (Aristotelian) account of concepts held that concepts e.g. 
<wing> have an intension, that is the set of attributes that define the concept ; 
and an extension, that is the set of entities which are members of the concept or 
category. The classical view of concepts implies that concepts are arbitrary, that is, 
they depend on the particular set of attributes specified ; and that concepts are 
discrete all-or-none categories.(Stevenson, 1993 : forthcoming) 
The classical view of concepts has been progressively undermined. Firstly there is 
Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance. Wittgenstein used the concept of a 
<game> to illustrate the problems with the classical view. What, he asked, was 
common to all games that they be games ? He concluded that what we find when 
we actually look at games is a complicated network of similarities over-lapping and 
criss-crossing but no essential set of features in virtue of which they are all games. 
Wittgenstein's observations about the family resemblance aspect of concepts led to 
the probabilistic view of concepts i.e. they consist of characteristic features rather 
than defining features. 
The probabilistic view of concepts suggests that concepts have internal structure. 
Eleanor Rosch developed the notion that some of the members of the category 
were more typical of the concept than others, e.g. a Robin is more typical of a 
<bird> than a Penguin, (at least where the average American was concerned.) This 
prototypicality of some members and not others counted against the view that 
concepts are arbitrary. In this case the concept is represented by the prototype. A 
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related but different account is given by the notion of exemplars, in this case the 
concept is represented not by a summary representation but by specific examples, 
(see Smith & M e d i n l l ) Neither prototype nor exemplar based characterizations of 
concepts are held to be sufficient for understanding the nature of concepts. 
(Stevenson, 1993 : forthcoming) 
Turning now to a 'discursive' view of categorization, Edwards (1991) remarks that 
the main thrust of recent developments in psychology has been along the lines of 
emphasizing the basis of linguistic categorization in the nature of bodily and 
perceptual experience including its metaphorical extensions, e.g. Lakoff.12 in this 
kind of work, experientially rooted 'cognitive models' form the basis upon which 
categories are comprehended and used. Edwards appreciates the important insights 
that this work has provided but nevertheless feels that this emphasis creates a 
distortion of our understanding of human categorization by removing it from the 
context of social action. While recognizing the importance of perceptual experience 
in the semantics of categories, Edwards states : 
I argue that the explanatory status of that experiential basis is subject to 
principles of discursive construction and deployment. By examining categorization as a 
social practice, the explanatory significance of individual cognition and perception is 
recognized but diminished, becoming part of a range of topics, devices and resources that 
participants can use in the performance of communicative acts. 
(Edwards, 1991: 516) 
Citing Lakoff's "demolition" of the classical view of categories (see above) 
Edwards states that in so far as Lakoffs work on the experiential basis of category 
formation deals with the semantic content of categories, this work is not obviously 
in conflict with discursive and rhetorical psychology, e.g. Billigl3 in other words 
people draw upon knowledge of the organization of categories to produce 
intelligible conversation. 
Edwards states that it is tempting to put the two approaches together since the 
discursive (rhetorical) approach says little about how words come to have 
11 Smith, E . E . & Medin, D. L . (1981) Categories and Concepts Harvard University Press 
12 Lakoff, G. (1987) Women Fire and Dangerous Things University of Chicago Press 
13 Billig, M. (1989) Arguing and Thinking : A Rhetorical approach to Social 
Psychology Cambridge University Press 
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systematic semantic properties; the cognitive approach fails to 'explicate how actual 
categorizations, things that are said, function as actions fitted for their occasions' 
(Edwards, 1991: 517) 
Edwards holds that the discursive approach requires categories to be flexible in 
that they refer indexically in indefinitely many specific ways governed by the 
context of situated use. In Potter and Wetherell's (1987)14 terms, categories are 
the ' building blocks of our many versions of the worid. [and] have to be moulded 
in discourse for use in different accounts. (Edwards, 1991: 517) 
According to Edwards, the cognitive approach treats discourse as simply a 
realization of, and thereby evidence of, underiying processes and structures of 
knowledge which in turn are derived from innate structures, e.g. perception and 
action. Furthermore discourse is assumed, it is claimed, by the cognitive approach 
to be driven by cognition, discourse is seen then as a process of assembling 
categorizations for making sense of experience.(Edwards, 1991: 517) The emphasis 
is placed on the psychological origin and cross-cultural universal properties of 
linguistic categories along with their mental representations. Culture is therefore 
seen as a kind of socially shared cognitive organization. 
In contradistinction to the cognitive view, the discursive approach treats talk and 
texts not as representations of pre-formed cognitions, even culturally provided 
ones, but as forms of social action. Categorization according to Edwards is 
something we do, (author's italics) in talk, in order to accomplish social actions 
such as persuasion, denial, refutation, accusation, etc. 
.. From this perspective, we would expect language's 'resources' not to come ready-made 
from a process in which people are trying their best to understand the world (whether as 
individuals or together), but rather, or at least additionally, to be shaped for their fimction 
in talk, for the business of doing situated social actions. 
(Edwards, 1991: 517) 
Edwards argues that we should not start with the abstracted content of categories 
and then theorize about how they are used, rather we should start with situated 
14 Potter, J. & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond 
attitudes and behaviour. London: Sage 
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usage in order to explicate what is being done. This recommended approach has a 
number of implications. These implications are reported below. 
(1) We are always dealing empirically with indexicality, with a specific thing, 
event, property, or group of things being referenced, not the entire possible set. 
(2) Categorization wil l always be encountered as part of an utterance, text, 
argument, description, account, etc. 
(3) It is therefore encountered as part of the accomplishment of some social action : 
a reporting, blaming, defence, justification, excuse, etc. 
(4) Situated categorizations therefore perform moral (author's italics) work on the 
world described, and indexically, on the current interaction and participants who are 
producing and receiving the description.(cf. Edwards & Potter, in Press) 15 
(5) It seems reasonable to assume that this is what linguistic categories are for, to 
do these kinds of things in talk. 
(6) Category terms (their semantic content etc.) might fruitfully be examined, 
therefore, in terms of the kinds of discursive work they are functionally designed 
for, rather than how well they correspond to cognitively natural or perceptually 
derived organization of experience.(ibid 518) 
Unfortunately Edwards does not make clear anywhere in this paper just what he 
means by saying that situated categories do moral work (see 4) but I think he has in 
mind the position taken by Rom Harre on the nature of agency, (see above) 
Briefly, we gain the status of personhood i.e. self-authorizing speakers who can 
'speak for themselves' by being judged a full member of the community who takes 
up and discharges the moral duties and obligations of the community. By talking 
over the heads of children, very old people and the disabled we are, to all intents 
and purposes, denying their status as persons, and in the act of that denial, we re-
categorize them. 
In point (6) Edwards makes the claim that it would be fruitful to examine categories 
from a functional perspective, perhaps so, but the way he puts it undermines his 
own position in that, i f categories "even culturally provided ones" (see quote above) 
are built and re-formed in the very act of discoursing, then they cannot be 
"functionally designed" ahead of that discourse but only historically afforded. 
15 Edwards, D. & Potter, J. (in Press) Discursive Psychology London: Sage 
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Edwards states that it is possible to distinguish two types of categorization (a) 
semantic and (b) propositional but I would add a third (c) the categorizations 
afforded us by perception and action. Semantic categories issue from the way that 
words label and meanings embody categorization whilst propositional 
categorization issues from the way we combine words in propositions such as 
'Socrates is mortal': This distinction could be made in terms of simple and complex 
concepts. Complexity in concepts is defined by Keller and Lehman (1991) as 
'specifically, i f a particular concept definition requires more formal mechanisms in 
its representation than does some other concept, then the former is more complex 
than the latter' (Keller, et al., 1991: 272) 
Perceptual and active categorization is described by Simone Weill^ who argues that 
our perception of the external world constitutes an essential relation which consists 
in a reaction or reflex. In her excellent metaphor, we engage in a 'dance of 
perception' and this dance is the source of our perceiving. Thus she writes: 
If we examine the relations between reactions and stimuli, we see that the latter are 
limitless in number, while the former are limited. The salivary gland, for example, 
always secretes saliva, whatever the food is. It is as if it were able to discern the general 
character of food throughout an infinite variety of foods....So, by means of our reactions 
we generalize stimuli....It is in this way that the body classifies things in the world 
before there is any thought. (Example: the chick leaving the egg distinguishes between 
what is to be pecked and what not.) so, from the very fact we have a body, the world is 
ordered for it, it is arranged in order in relation to the bodies reactions. 
(Weil, 1959 :Winch, 1989: 43) 
Edwards makes the point that cognitive and rhetorical approaches to 
categorization tend to pass each other by as their relative strengths appear to be in 
different realms. Cognitive approaches explore the meanings of semantic 
categories, while rhetorical or discursive approaches concentrate on the rhetoric of 
social stereotyping. 17 
Edwards cites Lakoff's notion of Idealized Cognitive Models (ICM's) by which 
we make sense of the text in terms of typical kinds of things people are thought to 
do, but argues that it is not simply that talk realizes the structure of an underiying 
16 Weil ,S (1959) Le9ons de philosophie 
17 e.g Billig (1989) However the distinction between the concems of cognitive approaches and 
disciu-sive ones is by no means as clear cut as Edwards would make out. 
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cognitive model e.g. an ICM. Talk is taken by Edwards to be the way that the ICM 
is referenced so that the speaker is able to say something. Normative assumptions 
about the topic in question form the backdrop or context for particular statements 
Thus Edwards writes: 
Indeed, the status of such Models as "idealized" allows them to operate normatively in 
just this way. But it is only by studying how such normative assumptions are orientated 
to in talk, in the adoption of Rhetorical positions, that we can make sense of how 
particular categorizations are constructed on occasions, so that idealized cognitive models 
do not slip into becoming models of cognition. 
(Edwards, 1991: 525) 
Edwards, however, still maintains that prototype theory can be seen as meeting 
discursive psychology half way, in that it portrays word meanings in a way that 
lends them to situated rhetorical practices. 
2.7 Summary 
In this chapter I have ranged over a number of topics, all of which stress, to 
greater or lesser degree, the dynamic environment in which the human psyche and 
society develops. 
The thrust of the chapter is towards a focus on situated human action. Harr6 
emphasises seeing people not as subjects but as moral agents whose actions are 
embedded in moral orders, local systems of obligation and duty with associated 
valuation criteria. Understanding this social matrix of duty etc, requires the analysis 
of the grammar of activity and discourses of self and command. 
Social constructionist accounts of psychological development place the emphasis 
on conversation as the primary human reality. Gibsonian affordances offer an 
account of how we directly perceive information (not only) from the physical 
world but also from the social world. Together they make up the human Umwelt 
which is a dynamic and historically given reality directly constituted by the very 
nature of our species. Reed draws attention to the view of cognitive development 
which holds that the activities afforded by our Umwelt form the ground on which 
cognitive development takes place. 
Clark defends our use of folk-psychology as being shaped by evolution and 
therefore necessarily adequate to our existential needs. Oilman's Wittgensteinian 
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treatment of the 'problem of induction' suggests that formal logic and the promotion 
of deduction as the paradigmatic form of reasoning cannot be sustained. Deduction 
is internal to language and formal logic is abstracted out of language. Induction, 
however, reflects the openness of life where continued existence and growth is 
based on an on-going reciprocal exchange with one's surrounds. Finally, Edwards 
explores the process of categorization in light of the fundamental role of discourse 
in our lives. 
In the next chapter I will review aspects of cognition and Artificial Intelligence. I 
will also report on some of the Expert Systems work currently being undertaken in 
Archaeology. 
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CHAPTER T H R E E 
ASPECTS O F COGNITION 
& 
A R T I F I C I A L I N T E L L I G E N C E 
3.0 Introduction 
In the second chapter I reviewed perspectives in psychology and philosophy which 
may be seen as focusing on human praxis. In this chapter I wil l discuss 
perspectives in psychology which are more formalistic in their approach to the 
conception of mind, knowledge and belief. These formalistic approaches underpin 
the work in Artificial Intelligence (AI). Also, I will review work in AI which seems 
to offer a new way of approaching (dealing with) archaeological problems and 
examples of current AI applications in Archaeology 
3.1 Mental Models 
The theory of mental models entails the view that in interacting with each other and 
the physical environment we form internal mental models of ourselves and the 
things which we encounter. There are four different things to be considered here 
(a) the target system ; (b) the conceptual model of that target system ; (c) the user's 
mental model ; and (d) the scientist's conceptualization of that mental model. 
Norman (1983) writes: 
The system that the person is learning or using is, by definition, the target system. A 
conceptual model is invented to provide an appropriate representation of the target 
system, appropriate in the sense of being accurate, consistent, and complete. Conceptual 
models are invented by teachers, designers, scientist, and engineers. 
(Norman, 1983: 7) 
The target system is something in the world which we perceive and construct a 
mental model of. Such models are naturally evolving, that is, by interacting with 
the world, the model is formed and reformed. It is a central axiom of mental model 
theory that the model must be functional, that is operable ; it need not be a perfectly 
accurate representation of the world. The mental model will be constrained by the 
user's technical background, previous experiences with similar systems (situations) 
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and the structure of the human information processing system. (Norman, 1983: 
8) 
Norman makes a number of general observations about mental models such as that 
(a) they are incomplete; (b) there are limitations on peoples ability to 'run' their 
models; (c) Mental models are unstable, details are forgotten with time ; (d) Mental 
models are not cleariy circumscribed and overiap; (e) Mental models are often self 
contradictory or 'unscientific': and (f) Models are parsimonious - people will often 
engage in excess physical activity rather than mentally plan out with a view to 
curtailing such excesses. 
In modeling a Mental model the researcher must clearly distinguish his or her own 
conceptualization of the subject's mental model. That is, distinguish his or her 
meta-model from the subject's model and the subject's model from the target 
system. Norman cites three functional factors which apply to both the mental model 
and the researcher's meta-model. The three functional factors cited are (a) belief 
system ; (b) observability ; and (c) predictive power. 
The belief system is constituted by a person's mental model (s) which reflect his 
or her beliefs about the physical system. These beliefs are acquired either through 
observation, instruction, or inference. The researcher's conceptual model of the 
person's mental model should contain a model of the the relevant parts of the 
person's belief system. 
The functional factor of observability dictates that there should be a correspondence 
between the parameters and states of the mental model that are accessible to the 
person and the aspects and states of the physical system that the person can 
observe. With the researchers conceptual model of the mental model, this means 
that there should be a correspondence between parameters and observable states and 
the observable aspects and states of the target. 
Since the purpose of a mental model is to allow the person to understand and to 
anticipate the behaviour of a physical system e.g. the worid before them, the model 
must have predictive power, either by applying rules of inference or by procedural 
derivation. Thus it should be possible for people to 'run' their models mentally. 
This in turn means that the conceptual mental model must also include a model of 
the relevant human information-processing and knowledge structures that make it 
possible for the person to use a mental model to predict and understand the physical 
system. (Norman, 1983: 12) 
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Conceptual or meta-models are devised as tools for teaching and understanding in 
general. Mental models are what people have in their heads and are used to guide 
action in the world. 
3.2 A Cognitive Account of Thouglit & Thinking 
There are different conceptions of what mind may or may not be. However, in 
cognitive psychology the emphasis tends to be on how we implement what we 
know, rather than what we know and how we acquired such knowledge. 
(Anderson, 1989: 313) 
Anderson points out that the turn away from Behaviourism towards cognitive 
psychology brought with it a concern for computational rigour and with Newell and 
Simon's work on problem solving, a mapping from goals and knowledge to 
behaviour was accomplished. Behaviourists argued that there was no such thing as 
abstract knowledge, meaning that when we speak of someone having certain 
knowledge we mean that the person has certain behavioural potentials. 
Unfortunately, (in Anderson's view) this attitude led to a prohibition on discussing 
mental structures, thus Anderson remarks, a basically correct observation about 
there being no knowledge in the abstract was taken to an unfortunate extreme. 
3.21 Thought 
It would be uncontroversial to say that when we think, we derive conclusions 
from what we already know by making inductive and deductive inferences. 
Deductive inferences are logical in that they necessarily follow from the stated 
premises which contain explicit information. Inductive inferences are non-logical 
in that they do not logically follow from the premises. While this distinction can be 
and is made between these two forms of inference, both may be said to feature in 
human cognition since it is by induction that we generate new knowledge and 
furnish premises for deduction. The veracity of any conclusion derived by 
deduction stands or falls with the veracity of the inductively-derived premises. 
Deductive inferences are said to exhibit logical form which guarantees the validity 
of the conclusion relative to the premises, i f not the actual state of the world. 
Deduction makes explicit information that is implicit in the premises : thus 
61 
All A are B 
All B are C 
Therefore A l l A are C 
An inductive inference may give rise to new knowledge i f the conclusion is 
substantiated by means external to the principle premises: thus 
Frank was seen in a red car 
A red car was reported stolen 
Therefore Frank stole a red car. 
While the conclusion may seem plausible, it is not strictly warranted, rather, it 
implies background knowledge about Frank's attitude to personal property. In 
making an inductive inference we reason from a piece of information, which may 
be complex or multifaceted, to a conclusion which is independent of it. 
Furthermore, this independent conclusion may take the form of a prediction or a 
generalization made about either past, present, or future states of affairs, (see 
chapter two) 
3.22 Deduction 
The logical form of a deductive inference is a matter of grammar, i.e. the position 
and role of certain words within the premises and conclusion. Central here is the 
role of logical quantifiers e.g. 'Al l ' and 'some', and connectives e.g. 'and', 'or' 
which give the logical form of the premises. Stevenson writes: 
...in both fonns of thinking, a conclusion which was not explicitly stated must be 
inferred. The two types of thinking differ in the nature of the inference. Deductions 
depend on the niles of logic. As long as the rules have been correctly followed, a 
deductive argument guarantees that the conclusion is correct. But with induction, 
no such guarantee is possible. Inductions are best guesses or hunches based on whatever 
information is available...The inferences that are made are conclusions about the state of 
the world. By contrast, deduction does not involve learning something new, since the 
conclusion that is arrived at by deduction is already contained in the premises and 
needs only to be made explicit. 
(Stevenson, 1993: forthcoming) 
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According to Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991) reasoning begins with a definite 
starting point, a set of observations or premises. Furthermore, there are three main 
varieties of reasoning, these are (a) calculation ; (b) deduction ; and (c) induction. 
Taken together with association and creation, these underlie all thought. Deductions 
are involved in formulating plans, evaluating actions etc, 'a world without 
deduction would be a world without science, technology, laws, social conventions, 
and culture.' (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991: 3) 
In cognitive science a distinction is made between the 'computational level' and the 
'algorithmic level' of a theory. The computational level characterizes what is being 
computed, why it is computed and what constraints operate. The algorithmic level 
specifies how the computation is carried out. These two levels of theory mirror 
Chomsky's notion of Competence and Performance, respectively, with regards to 
language. 
Deduction at the computational level is composed of the way people take a set of 
observations, memories, statements, beliefs etc, and produce a novel conclusion 
that follows from them (see above). Often, the starting point is a perceived state of 
affairs i.e. premises, and the conclusion issues in a course of action. A nineteenth 
century view of deduction known as Psychologism held that deductive logic is 
simply a generalization of those inferences that people have judged to be valid. 
Whereas the German logician Frege argued that it concerns objective relations 
between propositions. 
It has been a matter of contention whether or not people are naturally rational i.e. 
have logical competence. Johnson-Laird & Byrne for example, argue that people 
are rational in principle but fallible in practice. But what is it, to be rational in 
principle? Johnson-Laird & Byrne argue that there is a central core of rationality, 
common to all societies. The Semantic principle of validity is cited as this core of 
rational inference. Thus in any language, i f the premises are true they will yield a 
true conclusion. Johnson-Laird & Byrne go on to state that logical reasoning 
divorced from the practical contexts (which is made possible by formal rules) is, or 
appears to be, dependent on schooling and literacy. They conclude The common 
denominator of rationality is the search for counter-examples : anything else is 
logical icing on the cake' (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991: 209) 
This would seem to be broadly in agreement with Dilman's Wittgensteinian 
position. Dilman writes: 
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So if by a piu-ely deductive procedure a contradiction were derived from the rules in 
accordance with which we reason, this need not show that there is anything wrong with 
the rules. As Wittgenstein put it: "The sign-post is in order - if, imder the normal 
circumstances, it fulfils its purpose". The point is that you cannot talk of whether or not 
the sign-post is in order in separation from the circumstances in which it is used and what 
role it plays there 
(Oilman, 1973: 206) 
The interesting question, to my mind, is not whether all people past and present 
reason the same way, or even, i f all 'humans' are capable of reasoning the same 
way, since, there is no a priori reason to think that they could not. Rather, the 
interesting question is what circumstances lead us to reason the way that we do now 
or have done in the past, or might do in the future. 
At the algorithmic level, deduction has been characterized in three ways, (a) that 
deduction is the application of a set of formal rules; (b) that deduction involves the 
application of content-specific rules; and (c) deduction involves the semantic 
procedures that search for interpretations (or mental models) of the premises that are 
counter-examples to conclusions. (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991: 23) 
The formal rules of logic include such rules as Modus ponens 
Modus pones takes the form : If p then q 
P 
Therefore, q. 
Where p and q are variables that denote any prop>osition. 
Content specific rules are the basis of most Expert Systems in which meaning 
postulates (e.g. premises which express a consequence by virtue of what they 
mean) capture a body of knowledge. Within the Expert System, these meaning 
postulates are made to function as rules of inference. 
It has been suggested that the mind uses content-specific rules to encode general 
knowledge, particularly where reasoning is seen to be based on memories of 
particular experiences. This is known as case-based reasoning. Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne point out that this view of reasoning fails to explain how people are able to 
make valid deductions that do not depend on their specific experiences. Johnson-
Laird & Byrne favour the third option of semantic search or mental models, they 
write: 
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Neither formal rules nor content-specific rules appear to give complete explanations of the 
mechanism imderlying deduction. On the one hand, the content of premises can exert a 
profound effect on the conclusions that people draw, and so a uniform procedure for 
extracting logical form and applying formal rules to it may not account for all aspects of 
performance. On the other hand, ordinary individuals are able to make valid deductions 
that depend solely on connectives and quantifiers, and so rules with specific content would 
have to rely on some (yet to be formulated) account of purely logical competence. One 
way out of this dilemma is provided by a third sort of algorithmic theory, which depends 
on semantic procedures. 
(Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991: 35) 
Jonathan St B. T. Evans asks, however, 'why should people not reason using 
mental models and schema and heuristics ?'(Evans, 1992: 240) 
Evans goes on to question why Johnson-Laird & Byrne have not applied mental 
models to induction, only deduction. Evans accepts the claims that the strength of 
mental models lies in its ability to explain how people can deduce conclusions on 
relatively simple problems of an arbitrary nature where prior experience cannot be 
usefully applied. But, as Evans says, not much real worid reasoning is like this. 
Deduction, i f it does anything, serves to develop the implicit knowledge that we 
have gained in order that we can apply it in a flexible way in many different 
situations. Evans writes: 
One of the acknowledged mysteries of reasoning research is that of why human beings 
who are so manifestiy intelligent in general should appear so biased and error-prone when 
confronted with explicit reasoning tasks in the laboratory. The answer may be that 
comparatively little real-world intelligence requires explicit reasoning ; that mostly 
involves the automatic induction and application of knowledge based schemas. If so, 
reasoning research in its present form would seem to diminish in importance. However, 
the boimded rationality argument is answered. If people do not use explidt reasoning 
processes in complex real-world situations, then the proposed criticisms of current 
theories of explidt reasoning evaporate. 
(Evans, 1992: 240) 
The notion of 'bounded rationality' mentioned by Evans in the quote above makes 
the point that human reasoning, construed as computational processing, is 
constrained to the actual time-scales exhibited by humans when reasoning. Some 
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computational processes are more complex than others and therefore require more 
computational resources in terms of memory and operations performed. Complexity 
is measured by treating it as a mathematical function relating the length of an input -
n i.e. the amount of information which the process must take into account, to the 
amount of computational resources consumed. The point being that any process 
which requires exponentially increasing resources i.e. 2" is regarded as 
computationally intractable. Oaksford and Chater (1992) write: 
Spontaneous, real-world risky decisions, even of moderate complexity, are not made using 
Bayesian inference, because they could not be. Since the mind / brain is a limited 
information processor, the processes of risky decision-making cannot be based upon 
optimal, algorithmic procedures. This means that the only rationality to which we can 
aspire, as individual decision-makers, is one bounded by our limited computational 
resources. 
(Oaksford and Chater, 1992: 226) 
To return to mental models, according to Johnson-Laird & Byrne's theory of 
mental models, deduction depends on three stages of thought. Firstly, it is 
necessary to comprehend the premises, that is, extract the information given and 
express it in the form of an internal model of the state of affairs indicated by the 
premises. Secondly, a parsimonious description of the model is formulated. 
Thirdly, an attempt to falsify the favoured model is made by comparison with 
possible alternative models. I will not go into the detailed exposition that Johnson-
Laird & Byrne give as to how well their 'mental models' can account for 
experimental findings of people's deductive performance. But I will make the 
following comments. 
The first stage of constructing a model seems reasonable, and here Johnson-Laird 
& Byrne offer a view of propositions with a distinguished pedigree. 
In the late 19th century, physical theories were likened to models or pictures of the 
world, and Heinrich Hertz gave this paradigmatic view : 
Various models [Bilder ] of the same objects are possible, and these models may differ in 
various respects. We should at once denote as inadmissible all models which implicitly 
contradict the laws of our thought. Hence we postulate that in the first place all our 
models shall be logically permissible...We shall denote as incorrect any permissible 
models, if their essential relations contradict the relations of external things, i.e. if they 
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do not satisfy our first fundamental requirement. Hence we postulate that in the second 
place our models shall be correct. But two permissible and correct models of the same 
external object may yet differ in respect of appropriateness. Of two models of the same 
object that is the more appropriate which includes in it more of the essential 
relations of the object - the one we may call the more distinct. Of two models of equal 
distinctness the more appropriate in the one which contains, in addition to the essential 
characteristics, the smaller number of superfluous or empty relations : - the simpler of the 
two. Empty relations cannot be altogether avoided : they enter into the model because 
they are simply models, - models produced by our mind and necessarily affected 
by the characteristics of its mode of modelling diem. 
^ (Janik and Toulmin, 1973: 140) 
Thus logical consistency, correspondence with the empirical data and simplicity 
(elegance) of presentation are the three criteria, according to Hertz, by which a 
model (representation) is to be judged. When Hertz talks about the laws of our 
thought, and models being logically permissible, we can perhaps suppose that he 
means - conforms to a grammar that the physical worid imposes on its constituents. 
Certainly, the notion of a physical grammar determining how the world must be put 
together was taken up by Wittgenstein to ground his 'picture theory of language' 
and the influence of Hertz and Boltzmann on Wittgenstein is now well 
established.(Janik and Toulmin, 1973) 
Wittgenstein states in the Tractatus ' We make ourselves pictures of facts. (§ 2.1) 
The picture presents the facts in logical space, the existence and non - existence of 
atomic facts (§2.2) That the elements of the picture are combined with one another 
in a definite way, represents that the things are so combined with one another. This 
connection of the elements of the picture is called its structure, and the possibility of 
this structure is called the form of the representation of the picture' § 2.15) 
Toulmin and Janik point out that Wittgenstein's use of Bilder and Darstellungen is 
the same as Hertz. With Hertz the sense of Bilder as model connotes the 
constructive activity of building a model rather than passively receiving a 
picture or image. Hence they write: 
Just as we understand Hertz's account of theoretical mechanics best if we translate his 
word Bild as "model", so also with the Tractatus; for example, Wittgenstein's notion 
that a gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound waves, are 
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related to one another by virtue of a common abbildenden internen Beziechung (4.014) is 
best understood in terms of a common "model" rather than "picture" 
(Janik and Toulmin, 1973: 183) 
Just as with Hertz, 'representations' in the Tractatus take the form of 
Darstellungen i.e., they are logical constructs and not representations of sensory 
experience, not Vorstellungen. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) argued that it is 
necessary to treat this raw sense given data as structured sensory representations or 
Vorstellungen. Thought and language are built into these representations from 
the start thus the limits and boundaries of reason are given by the limits and 
boundaries of representation and language. (Janik and Toulmin, 1973) Thus the 
term Darstellungen denotes 'models' in the sense of mathematical models, 
portraits (though not photographs), and architects' blueprints and archaeological 
site plans. 
Written sentences (propositions) are then representations of situations composed 
of facts. Propositional sentences are not complete representations but consist only 
in what is essential to them i.e., objects (facts) designated by names plus the 
logical relations (quantifiers and connectives) that hold between. The elements of 
models are related to each other in determinate ways that mirror the determinate 
structure of that part of the world to which they stand as models. What in a 
proposition is shown by the model is its sense ; it is the sense of the proposition 
that is shown by the configuration of the model. 
Of course, as Wittgenstein went on to argue, the sense of any proposition is 
determined by the relations that pertain to it within the whole language and how the 
language is woven into the life of the community whose language it is. The relation 
of propositions to facts could be shown and thereby be seen, but, there was no 
question of asserting or proving it to be so. The nature of models is such that they 
could not model anything that was not factual, that is, judgements of value are 
beyond their scope. Thus Janik and Toulmin write: 
' Propositions were capable of modeling and, so, describing reality ; but they could not 
simultaneously describe how they described it, without becoming self-referential and 
consequentially meaningless. Wittgenstein's models showed the limits of what they were 
capable of saying: they modelled the way things were in the world, and accordingly made 
scientific knowledge of phenomena possible, but they could do nothing more' 
(Janik and Toulmin, 1973: 190) 
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There is then, it can be argued, more than a passing resemblance between 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne's mental models and Wittgenstein's picture theory of 
language. Thus Johnson-Laird & Byrne's claim in Deduction that the theory of 
mental models can be fully instantiated on a computer (thereby countering the claim 
that mental models trade on the visual metaphor) is similar to a claim that has been 
made for the picture theory of language, thus 'the Tractatus gives a perfect 
description of a universe as it exists in the digital computer as the function of the 
computer is based essentially and exclusively on true protocol sentences and their 
logical interconnections.'(Zemanek, 1978: 117) 
The account of mental models given by Johnson-Laird & Byrne seems most akin 
to Darstellungen since their models maintain the same information conveyed by the 
premises but are expressed more parsimoniously (Johnson-Laird and Byrne 1991: 
194) i.e. they are produced by reflective thought. Norman however, states that 
'people's mental models are apt to be deficient in a number of ways, perhaps 
including contradictory, erroneous, and unnecessary concepts.'(Norman 1983: 14) 
What seems to be needed is the conscious building of Darstellungen for the 
purposes of reliable deduction. 
3.3 Representation of Knovcledge 
Representations in A I work fall into two distinct categories, (a) Programming 
languages like LISP or PROLOG which use ordinary language forms e.g. words to 
encode actual meanings but which manipulate and organize words and phrases 
either by the predicate calculus or semantic networks. I will discuss these two 
forms shortly. Or (b) by parallel distributed processing e.g. neural nets modelled on 
the synapses of the brain. Neural nets will not be discussed as our main focus on 
A I is on Expert Systems applications. 
I will take PROLOG as my main example of a representational language suitable for 
Expert Systems work. 
PROLOG is a computer programming language that is used for solving problems 
that involve objects and the relationships between objects. To that extent the 
'picture theory of language' and mental models can be represented in PROLOG. 
A program written in PROLOG consists of (a) declaring some facts about objects 
and their relationships ; (b) defining some rules about objects and their 
relationships, and (c) asking questions about objects and their relationships. 
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A fact such as 'Jan likes apples' would be represented by the form: likes(Jan, 
apples) where likes is the predicate, Jan is the subject of the predicate and apples 
are the objects which Jan likes. Facts such as this one are the building blocks of the 
Knowledge Base and are represented by the Predicate (argument) form. 
A rule is used when you want to say that a fact depends on a group of other facts, 
and takes the form of an If / Then clause. In PROLOG a rule consists of a head 
and a body which are connected by the ':-' symbol which denotes if. A rule is a 
general statement about objects and their relationships, e.g. likes (Jan, David) :-
likes (David,Jan) the rule given would be an example of a content-specific rule 
mentioned earlier. Rules instantiated within an Expert System are also known as 
production rules since they produce an action when the if clause is matched. 
It is neither pertinent nor necessary to go into the mechanics of PROLOG any more 
than I have done except to say that together, facts and rules can be built into a 
system which can reason inferentially and then go on to up-date or alter its own 
knowledge base. It is this capacity that underpins Expert systems. 
An alternative way of representing knowledge and the relations that pertain 
between facts (objects) is semantic networks. An alternate name would be 
structured object representation. 
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l?oma7) Po ttery j 
classes of 
Fine Wares 
have the type 
Fig 3 Part of a Semantic net for the Roman Pottery known as Samian 
In the above net there are three concepts, Roman Pottery, fine ware, and 
Samian. Where <fine ware> marks a qualitative category in which <Samian> 
would be an exemplar of <Roman pottery> which falls under this qualitative 
category. In the net, the nodes (concepts) are joined by arcs which specify a 
relationship between the concepts. The semantic net is a graph which statically 
represents some knowledge of the world. Semantic nets can support inferences and 
can also be computationally realised by implementation in LISP, however as 
Bench-Capon (1990) writes: 
If we allow many link types, and one of the attractions of semantic nets is the 
opportunity to do this, we will need to write many different procedures to follow them. 
The inference mechanism within semantic nets is thus more diverse and complicated than 
is the case with production rules, where a imiform inference mechanism can be employed, 
the diversity of inferences appropriate to different sorts of relations being catered for by 
the fact that permitted inferences are expressed in the rules. 
(Bench-Capon, 1990: 84) 
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The aim of knowledge representation is to capture within the representation a 
perspicuous picture of some part of the world and the relationship between its 
elements. To do this the representation must be (a) metaphysically adequate, that is, 
there must be no contradiction between the facts that one wishes to represent and 
the subsequent representation ; (b) epistemically adequate, that is, it must be able to 
adequately express the facts to be represented. ; (c) it must exhibit heuristic 
adequacy, that is, support the reasoning processes required to solve the given 
problems.; (d) the representation must be computationally tractable. Furthermore, a 
knowledge representation should meet standards of expressiveness in that not only 
should it be able to say what one means, but it should do so without ambiguity. It 
should represent in a uniform manner, and use a notation thats convenient in a 
relevant way and be referentially transparent with regards to its statements. A 
representation is referentially transparent i f equivalent expressions can always 
be substituted for one another whilst preserving the truth value of the statements in 
which they occur.(Bench-Capon, 1990: 18) 
3.31 Representation of Belief 
The computational representation of belief is very much like that of knowledge in 
terms of its formalism and manipulation, i.e. PROLOG or Semantic nets can be 
used for belief representation. 
Knowledge representation is concerned with representing knowledge of the 
application environment and knowledge of the intended audience on a computer. It 
may be better termed 'information representation' or 'data representation' 
(Rapaport, 1986: 372 ) With belief representation, what is represented is objects of 
thought ; that may be objects, (material) properties, situations and propositions. 
Rapaport states that: 
The distinction between knowledge, in particular, and beliefs or thought, in general, is an 
important one, for one can think about things that do not exist and one can believe 
propositions that are, in fact false...But one caimot know a false proposition. Yet, if an 
AI system is to simulate (or perhaps be) a mind or merely interact with humans, it must 
be provided with ways of representing nonexistents and falsehoods. 
(Rapaport, 1986: 373) 
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An A I system which models beliefs is a representation and reasoning system 
whose data base contains information about the worid and about the beliefs of 
cognitive agents. The data base is composed of 'beliefs' that the system has about 
the world and the beliefs of the agent about the world. When we reason about what 
other people are doing or have done, we hold beliefs about what they believe, 
which may be about what some third person believes. What we would have here 
are a set of nested beliefs. 
When a particular belief is seen or thought to partake in causal relations regarding 
some action done by an agent, what is most important is both what the agent 
believes and how the agent believes it. Hence there is an interest in a third-person 
characterization of the agent's belief and a first-person characterization of belief. 
These two characterizations are termed de re and de dicto belief representations 
(respectively). 
Thus an AI system that is capable of explaining or recommending behaviour must be able 
to distinguish between these two kinds of belief reports by having two distinct means of 
representing them. Moreover, with the possible exception of the system's own beliefs, 
the belief space of an agent ay represented by the system will contain not the agent's 
(own) representations of the objects of his beliefs, but the system's representations of the 
agent's representation of them. And, in the case of nested beliefs, the objects of an agent's 
beliefs would be represented not as the agent represents them, but as another agent would 
represent (report) them. 
(Rapaport, 1986: 375-6) 
With regards to de re and de dicto reports, Rapaport states that the canonical forms 
are the following. 
(a) Any sentence of the form : A believes that P is the canonical representation of a 
de dicto report. 
(b) Any sentence of the form : A believes of X that P is the canonical form of a 
de re report, where X names or describes the objectum. 
The notion of Mental spaces (or belief space in this case) is central to the 
modelling of an agent's beliefs.The theory of Mental spaces has been developed by 
G. Fauconnier.( 1985)1 John Dinsmore (1987) has built on Fauconnier's work. 
iFauconnier, G. Mental Spaces: Aspects of meaning construction in natural 
language Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press 
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describing it as providing 'a theory of human knowledge representation and 
linguistic processing that provides a simple and uniform account of a wide variety 
of problems.'(Dinsmore, 1987: 1) 
Mental spaces are domains used for consolidating certain kinds of information. 
Within such domains or spaces, objects may be represented as existing and 
relations may be represented as held between those objects. Spaces are evoked and 
accumulate information during the processing of discourses. Linguistic structures 
(space builders) e.g. 'Fred believes...' evokes the creation of a space in which is 
organized the information about what 'Fred believes'. Objects in one space can be 
connected to objects in another space such that a description of object a i f 
connected to object b can be used to refer to b. Also there is a principle of space 
optimization which facilitates the inheritance of information by one space from 
another. A Mentor relationship is used to capture the strong dependence of hope 
spaces on belief spaces. Dinsmore's interest in Mental spaces lies in showing how 
mental spaces support efficient reasoning. Dinsmore writes: 
The thesis of this paper is that mental spaces are functionally motivated in their support 
of a general reasoning technique that will be called simulative reasoning. Simulative 
reasoning requires a partitioning of knowledge into distinct spaces and additionally 
assumes that the contents of each space effectively simulate or model a possible reality, 
or part of a possible reality, and therefore represent a meaningful domain over which 
normal reasoning processes work...for instance, a belief space is frequently used to 
consolidate the set of propositions some person believes to be true. As Creary (1979) 
points out, once a separate knowledge base has been set up for a particular person and 
propositions explicitly known to be believed by that person are added to that knowledge 
base, the system can simulate the diinking of the agent by using its own reasoning 
facilities to derive further beliefs of the agent. 
(Dinsmore, 1987 : 3) 
The further beliefs of the agent are to be located in the presuppositions entailed by 
the constituent propositions espoused by the agent. Presuppositions are parts of the 
content of sentences that are taken as given or irrefutable in the utterances of 
sentences, e.g. ' The king of France is Bald ' presupposes a King of France. 
Dinsmore raises the problem of 'Projection' regarding presuppositions. The 
projection problem is that of predicting the presuppositions of complex sentences as 
a function of their structure and of the presuppositional constructions that they 
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embed. Dinsmore claims that the theory of mental spaces can give an account of 
the projection problem. The claim is that simple presuppositions associated with 
presuppositional constructions are uniformly satisfied locally in the relevant spaces; 
thus ' The restriction on legal contexts and distributive constraint entail a set of 
explicit predictions of the presuppositions of complex sentences not otherwise 
available.'(Dinsmore, 1987: 18) The restriction on legal contexts is that any context 
of a proposition is entailment-preserving. Distributive constraint constrains 
knowledge partitioning between spaces. 
Ballim, Wilks & Bamden (1991) have constructed a system called ViewGen 
which represents the beliefs of agents as explicit, partitioned proposition sets 
known as environments. ViewGen creates these environments into which 
appropriate beliefs can be segregated so that parsing and reasoning can be done in 
that limited environment. 
|—Jim's-father- MaleCJim's-father) 
TalKJim's-father) 
Eye colour(Jim"s-father) = Blue 
I— Frank 
Male(Frank) 
Tall(Frank) 
Eye colour(Frank) = Green 
• Frank-as-Jim "s-faiher • 
Male(Frank-as-Jim "s-father) 
TallCFrank-as-Jim "s-father) 
Eye colour(Frank-as-Jim"s-father) = Green 
I— Mary 
co-r ef (<Frank ^  Jim 's-faiher > /rank-as-Jim "s-father) 
system 
Fig 4 Forming the 'Frank-as-Jim's-father' environment 
In the illustration above, ViewGen constructs an intensional object O called 
'Frank-as-Jim's-father' inside Mary's view point which corresponds both to the 
system's Frank object and to the system's Jim's father object (topic environment). 
Mary's view (beliefs) of Frank is that he is (a) Jim's father ; (b) Male ; (c) Tall ; 
and (d) has Green eyes. 
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Ballim et al write: 
It is natural in a system of partitioned environment notation to treat environments as 
intensional objects: to treat the Jim-object, pushed down into the Frank-object, as not 
just yielding by computation an enviroimient that is Frank's-view of Jim, but also as a 
sort of intensional object we might call Jim-for-Frank 
(Ballim, 1991: 147) 
ViewGen ascribes beliefs to agents (Mary) on the evidence of a discourse (e.g. 
Mary was listening to what Frank was saying to the boy), context, and prior 
information. They state 'Ascriptional reasoning is profoundly dependent on 
communicative context, general information the system has about the world, and 
special information the system has about the agent at hand.'(Ballim et al., 1991: 
134) 
Ballim et al explicitly acknowledge the closeness of their work to that of 
Fauconnier and Johnson-Laird & Byrne's mental models; but perhaps the most 
interesting aspect of ViewGen is its handling of metaphor. They write: 
The crucial idea here has been the application of a precise notion of computational belief 
ascription to metaphor, and transferring properties (expressed as belief propositions) by 
our standard algorithm in order to create a metaphorical point of view of an 
entity...Specifically, in a belief-ascription activity one uses one's current belief state 
about the topic Tas the vehicle of a metaphor, the target being the other agent's belief 
state. In Brief: One uses one's own state of mind as a metaphor for other people's 
(Ballim, et al., 1991: 165) 
ViewGen uses the notion of default reasoning to ascribe beliefs to other agents 
unless there is evidence to prevent the ascription. Ballim et.al. claim a pragmatic 
approach to propositional attitudes, and an interest in common sense plausible 
reasoning schemas about propositional attitudes. They also argue that metaphors for 
the mind, which, are commonly used by people in ordinary discourse, must take a 
central role in representational approaches to propositional attitudes, e.g ViewGen 
exploits the mind-as-container metaphor. 
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3.4 Problem Solving : Artificial Intelligence 
Life is a challenge, whether it is getting out of bed (on time) or writing a thesis, it 
all requires the organization of appropriate information, and this organizational task 
is the backdrop of one's existence. Of course there is a difference between getting 
out of bed as such, and writing a thesis, but it is a matter of degree rather than kind 
in as much as one is a prerequisite of the other. 
The problems of life are many and so are the strategies employed to solve them, 
but a number of general principles can be set out. One such general strategy that has 
been recognized is simply to split the problem up in to discrete and manageable 
chunks. However, the time comes when one must tailor the approach to the task or 
problem and this fact underlies the emergence of what is termed expertise and its 
concomitant distinction of novice and expert. 
Problem solving (strategies) have played a central role in the development of A I 
research. The practical / commercial outcome of this work being Expert Systems. 
In A I work, problem solving is equated with information processing. In A I , a 
characterization of information processing is abstracted out of our existential 
problems for the purposes of analysis and operationalization on computers. The 
main feature of this characterization is the distinction between well-defined 
problems and ill-defined problems. A well-defined problem would be one that lent 
itself to sub-division and clear formularization, those that don't, are ill-defined e.g. 
writing a thesis. I l l defined problems demand creativity for their solution. For 
instance, no one yet has developed an algorithm for writing a Ph.D thesis, but 
grand master chess algorithms are available. 
Formularization of a problem requires the breaking down of the final goal state 
which marks the complete solution, into a series of sub-goals which form a path 
from defining the problem to its solution. Each sub-goal marks a condition or set of 
conditions that must be met before any further progression can be made. The heart 
of this approach lies in production rules which are executed in sequence. The 
following production rule is taken from Stevenson (1993) and concerns the goal of 
shopping. 
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I F the goal is to go shopping Goal 
and there is a shopping list Precondition 
and I have my car keys Precondition 
and I am in the car Precondition 
Then Drive to the supermarket Action 
Each precondition can be the goal in yet more production rules. The number of 
rules necessary will vary with the problem. 
Allen Newell and Herbert Simon (1990) who pioneered problem solving 
techniques in A I , formulated the Heuristic Searcli Hypothesis which states: 
The solutions to problems are represented as symbol structures. A physical-symbol 
system exercises its intelligence in problem-solving by search - that is, by generating and 
progressively modifying symbol strucmres until it produces a solution structure, [they go 
on] Symbol systems are collections of patterns and processes, the latter being capable of 
producing, destroying, and modifying the former. The most important properties of 
patterns are that they can designate objects, processes, or other patterns, and that when 
they designate processes, they can be interpreted. Interpretation means carrying out the 
designated process. The two most significant classes of symbol systems with which we 
are acquainted are humans and computers 
(Newell and Simon, 1990: 119,130) 
How a problem is defined and represented affects the overall tractability of the 
problem for either a human or a computer. In other words, there is a meta-problem 
of perspicuous problem definition and description. 
The role of analogical thinking in problem definition is important. In making an 
analogical connection between an old (solved) problem and a new (unsolved) 
problem, a model of the new problem is constructed out of the old. Stevenson 
(1993) identifies four processes of analogy, they are: 
(1) Interpretation and Representation of the target problem 
(2) The retrieval or selection of a plausibly useful source analogue 
(3) Mapping elements of the source analogue onto the target problem 
(4) The transfer of Inferences from the source to the target domain. 
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Number (1) is central to language comprehension and is therefore not specific to 
analogy. Numbers (2) and (3) are considered to be the key issues in analogical 
thinking. It is the new problem that is responsible for the triggering of the retrieval 
mechanism and mapping brings together the old and new problem in search of 
meaningful correspondences between them. The transfer of inferences is borne on 
the back of the mapping. 
Concluding her discussion of problem solving and analogy as presented by the 
information processing view, Stevenson states that: 
..it seems likely that the conscious, strategic search proposed by the information 
processors operates on retrieved knowledge. Simply retrieving and mapping a source 
analogue may not be sufficient to solve a problem. A conscious search through the 
problem space would be necessary to evaluate the outcome of inferred analogical 
knowledge, for example. It may also be needed to evaluate the outcome of an action 
triggered by a production rule. 
(Stevenson, 1993: forthcoming) 
3.41 Intelligent Tutoring Systems 
With Intelligent Tutoring systems (ITS) problem-solving as a practical activity 
comes to the fore and, thereby, it presents the sharpest test of theories of reasoning 
and problem solving developed by A l . Also, ITS's make stringent demands of 
knowledge representation since they suppose a number of different expert skills. 
There are two main representational concerns entailed by ITS ; (a) the 
representation of knowledge of the domain being taught; and (b) the representation 
of the knowledge about tutorial and diagnostic strategies. Because of the problems 
raised by these two aspects of knowledge representation, Johnston (1991) reports 
that few systems as yet have well developed representations of both. 
Knowledge acquisition techniques in ITS differ somewhat from those found in 
standard Expert Systems work, in that ITS developers interview people with 
varying degrees of expertise. The reason for this is to develop a progression of 
models and representations which span the gap between the novice and the expert. 
Also, it helps to identify what aspects of the domain are critical for instruction. 
Some researchers feel that it's important to use instructors, if there are any, because 
they have the ability to articulate their reasoning processes, often they are much 
better than 'Ivory Tower' experts. Johnston reports that a useful technique is 
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getting the domain experts to collaborate by setting each other problems to solve. 
Johnston writes: 
This approach has the advantage of making evident what kinds of tasks are considered easy 
or difficult by the experts. For a given problem solution trace, they also asked the experts 
to suggest alternative actions which one might take. Although this does not result in a 
complete model of the problem space, it can produce a skeleton of such a space in a 
matter of a few hours. 
(Johnston, 1991: 130) 
Differential modelling is the way by which an account may be given of how a 
student acquires knowledge from a teacher, how the teacher recognizes what 
knowledge the student lacks and how a tutoring system can acquire knowledge 
from human experts. Differential modelling requires the building of an expert 
system that compares a problem solving trace performed by an expert system with 
one performed by a human. The differential modeller analyzes the differences in 
problem solving behaviour and attempts to account for the difference in terms of 
knowledge components that should be added or deleted from the expert system's 
knowledge base. When the human is a student, the system determines what 
knowledge the student lacks. I f the human is an expert, the system determines what 
it lacks and the human has - which it can then add to its knowledge base. It should 
be stressed at this point that such systems are still in the early stages of development 
and their effectiveness has not yet been determined. Evaluation of such systems is 
becoming a topic of concern since it is simply not good enough for a tutoring 
system to demonstrate some advanced capability. An evaluation should measure 
such things as training effectiveness and user acceptance, also, it must evaluate 
whether the tutoring system accurately assesses student errors and performs the 
proper tutorial actions. 
3.5 Archaeology's Current Use of AI 
Work on expert systems geared to archaeological applications is growing ; thus we 
find Gardin ( 1989), Gallay (1989) and Stutt and Shennan (1990) are attempting 
to use expert systems to investigate and control the inferential structure of 
archaeological reasoning and argumentation. 
Klein (1991) offers a discussion on building a computationally-plausible 
knowledge system of the upper palaeolithic based on appositional transformation 
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operators which relate the input and output states of behaviour rules by analogical 
transformations. 
Oberlin, et al. (1991) have developed an A l system for identifying mythological 
scenes on Greek vases. In this system the narrative scene is decomposed in to 
Minimal Formal Units (MFI) e.g. 'human' with 'lion skin' together with 'club' 
equals the mythological figure of Herakles. 
Biskowski (1990) is attempting to model in expert systems cultural change as a 
result of human cognitive processes; while Lagrange and Vitali (1990) have 
developed an expert system for provenancing archaeological ceramics using 
chemical, minerological and data analysis information. 
Finally, Doran (1987) has drawn attention to A l and expert systems for 
archaeological purposes. Doran makes the following claims about A l techniques; 
they 
(a) provide potentially powerful means of experimenting with and therefore developing 
and testing sociocultural theory by way of computational modeling. 
(b) provide a conceptual repertoire within which to embed sociocultural theory. 
(c) clarify the role and potential of multivariate statistical analysis within archaeological 
data interpretation. 
(d) provide practical tools to aid data interpretation. 
(Doran, 1987: 74) 
Doran also goes on to recommend that no student of archaeology should be left 
unaware of the potentialities of expert systems and A l in general. While I can 
concur with Doran here, Doran's work with expert systems and the work cited 
above suggest that problems already exist with such projects. I do not mean here, 
strictly technical problems - programming, systems design etc - for they will 
always be encountered. 
The overarching problem that I see is the unresolved question of the relationship of 
the archaeologists to the past embodied in the material traces. Thus unresolved 
problems in interpretation, say, with regard to mythical scenes on vases, are 
passed over in silence but they cannot be resolved merely by constructing an 
impoverished formalized description of that scene. 
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To take Oberlin's study as an example ; in the study of mythical scenes presented 
by Oberlin et al, each pictorial representation of mythical figures is decomposed into 
Minimal Formal Units each of which as an analytic unit, is manipulable by the 
system. It is out of mfu's that new scenes can be reconstructed and matched against 
a pre-defined construction (scenes). The example used earlier was that of the figure, 
Herakles, who is defined as having a club and lion skin. This is all well and good, 
and interesting, but what archaeological or historical end is this system meant to 
serve? We are told by the authors that: 
Although the ways of representing a scene like the Judgment of Paris may differ on 
several points, an expert in mythology is generally able to identify it without any 
difficulty.For other scenes, the identification problem may be more troublesome, to the 
point that opinions may diverge among experts. Since these divergences are generally not 
concerned with the semantic interpretation of the scenes, they will not affect our work. 
For our purposes, the objective is to recognize what is happening in the scene and 
eventually to discover who the actors are 
(Oberlin et al., 1991: 19) 
The authors go on to say that while the concepts and references involved in 
mythology may be very subtle and difficult to model, the accuracy and regularity of 
identification will give a valuable control on inference process. This claim is empty. 
As Bruner (1991) pointed out: in establishing a reading of the whole text we appeal 
to readings of its partial expressions, but because we are trying to explicate 
meanings we can only do so by relating the meaning of partial expressions to the 
meaning of the whole text. In a narrative we interpret the parts in the light of a 
putative story or plot and by re-work the plot as new elements are introduced in 
order to maintain coherence and intelligibility. Herakles can be equated with a club 
and lion skin in a scene on a vase because the scene can be fitted into a narrative 
story, the content of which is pre-established elsewhere. The figures in the scene 
stand in specific relations and thereby index the scene to a given external narrative. 
But such a system as devised by Oberlin et. al. can only analyse the internal 
relations of a representation, and perhaps be made to yield meaning and reference 
relative to a particular version of a myth. But the system can say nothing about the 
veracity of its identifications beyond that which is allowed by the version of the 
myth it instantiates. The version of the myth is decided by other means. And of 
course, there are no actors to identify that are not already determined. Control of 
inference is total, and therefore tautologous. 
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In contrast to the above is the small scale study of Samian pottery carried out by 
Mullaney (1992) here at the Department of Psychology, University of Durham. 
The aim of the study was to show how an expert system could be used to 
provenance the Roman Pottery called Terra Sigillata, but more commonly, 
Samian. 
Samian is not unlike the Greek vases discussed above in that it carries friezes 
composed of scenes from myths as well as other less structured compositions. 
Unlike the Greek painted vases, Samian is mass produced from moulds and is near 
ubiquitous on Roman sites. Its archaeological importance lies in this fact, as it can 
be used in some cases, to closely date sites, (closely, in archaeological terms e.g. 
20 yrs) 
To ascertain the broad chronological band within which the specimen may fall, its 
geographical origin is determined from the fabric description, colour, form (cup, 
type of bowl etc,) and compositional details of the friezes. Thus a knowledge base 
was constructed out of the above information groups. The compositional details of 
the friezes could have been decomposed in the manner adopted by Oberiin et.al. and 
for the same reasons, i.e. re-identifying indexical figure types. 
The study of Samian undertaken by Mullaney was a teaching assignment aimed at 
demonstrating the basics of Expert systems construction, even so, the system built 
could assign correct dates to prototypical descriptions of the main types of Samian. 
The salient difference between Samian and Greek vases is that Samian is mass 
produced. The figure types may be identified as mythical characters but that is 
beside the point, once an adequate representation of a frieze from one vessel is 
constructed, that representation will match all the friezes on vessels made from the 
same mould. In other words, each vessel carries what in biological terms (from 
cladistics) are 'shared derived characteristics'. It is the shared derived characteristics 
which ground the archaeological impwrtance of Samian and make an Expert system 
ideal for large scale searching and matching. In this case a well- defined problem 
was solved by a simple system directly geared to its resolution. 
Archaeologists seem to think, or make the claim, that A l will solve their research 
problems regardless of the fact that they have conducted little or no work in 
establishing the scope and character of the representational systems they propose to 
use. Nor do they admit to the fact that understanding and modelling human action 
is still a highly problematic area. In Doran's case, he is trying to model a 
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Sociocultural system with a Programmed multiactor System. But the real 
complexity of such a system is abolished by drastic abstraction and curtailment of 
details. Doran states that the amount of detail incorporated (in one of his prograims) 
seems unnecessarily great i f attention is restricted (in another program) to broad 
questions of sociocultural system dynamics. It would seem then that one can have a 
dynamic sociocultural system without people actually doing things like 
manufacturing or going about their ordinary business. Needless to say, 
archaeological evidence is largely evidence of people manufacturing and going 
about their ordinary business. But then , as Doran points out, 'in social science and 
A I work, the concept of actor is defined merely (emphasis added) by the ability to 
act in a purposeful manner.'(Doran, 1987: 79) 
In Biskowski's paper Cultural Change, the Prehistoric Mind and 
Archaeological Simulations the concept of mind or cognition leaves much to 
be desired. Biskowski and I share the view that cognitive processes are important 
to understanding past human activity. Also, expert systems and AI in general can be 
employed to model such processes and thereby provide a means by which explicit 
control over the exercise can be achieved. In short, the requirements of authentic 
modeling constrain vagueness of formulation and fudging in general. 
However Biskowski says that 'since culture ultimately resides in the minds of 
individuals, reasonable explanations of cultural change must in some way address 
those features of human cognition which may inhibit or enhance the spread of 
culture.'(Biskowski, 1990: 32) What does Biskowski mean by saying that culture 
inhabits the individual mind ? Since culture is never defined by Biskowski, one 
must suppose he means attitudes and beliefs etc. 
Biskowski is quite clear about what is and what is not the object of the exercise. It 
is not to demonstrate that one model or another is better at modelling past cognitive 
processes regarding specific cultural change. Rather, it is to test traditional accounts 
against unambiguous models of decision-making and information exchange. It is 
hoped that by so doing, insight will be gained as to the amount of influence on 
cultural development that is exercised by cognition. 
According to Biskowski, modeling the effects of cognition on cultural change 
involves (at least) (a) modelling the cognitive processes of important actors ; (b) 
modelling how they reason ; (c) modelling the mechanisms which may change how 
different actors reason about the world - including how the knowledge they possess 
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via acculturation and personal experience limits or enhances their receptivity to new 
ideas. ; and (d) modelling how the way that an actor reasons about the world affects 
that actor's life and the transmission of that actor's ideas to others and future 
generations.(Biskowski, 1990: 24) 
I wil l not discuss the details of Biskowski's simulations, the main point I wished 
to illustrate here is that a less than clear and coherent exposition of mind, cognition 
and culture, apparent in this paper and the work it refers to, is obscured by the 
application of technology and what it seems, at first brush, to offer. While 
Biskowski appreciates that a simplistic and impoverished notion of cognition is to 
be found in many archaeological texts, the debates about cognition taking place 
within cognitive science and social psychology seem to have made no impact on 
him. Doran's paper is even more alarming, he uses the word cognition once, and 
the archaeological questions raised seem to be mere pretexts for modelling systems 
per se. 
Biskowski makes the general point that archaeologists, in so far as they consider 
cognition or reasoning at all, make two general assumptions (a) that people obey the 
dictat's of economic rationalism, and (b) they will adopt successful subsistence 
strategies when they become apparent. Against this simplistic view of human 
action, archaeologists are able to detect gross changes in climate, resource 
availability, population size, subsistence techniques, settlement organization, 
apparent economic differentiation and exchange patterns. Thus although it is 
possible to produce plausible explanations of cultural change that do not include the 
role of cognition, such explanations will always be in doubt until such time as it can 
be shown that cognition is not a major factor that needs to be considered. 
The work that has been done on the role of cognition, however, tends to show that 
it is, in fact, a key influence, e.g. Reynolds^ 
A rather different set of concerns are dealt with by Stutt and Shennan. These two 
enthusiasts for A l techniques have set their sights on the general process of 
argumentation in Archaeology. Furthermore, they perceive a link with Ian Hodder 
who has lately been arguing for a more open presentation of archaeological reports. 
Hodder writes: 
2 Reynolds, R.G. (1986) 'An Adaptive Computer Model of the Evolution of Plant Collecting and 
Early Agriculture in the Eastern Valley of Oaxaca'. In Flannery, K., (ed.), Guila Naquitz : 
Archaic Foraging and Early Agriculture in Oaxaca, Mexico 439-500 Academic Press 
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While a site report today still often has a main author, there are usually numerous other 
contributors and specialists...But there is rarely any debate or uncertainty in the text, and 
dialogue among the collective rarely surfaces on the pagc.Our decisions about what 
happened at a site change as we dig and analyse the finds. The supposed 'final' 
interpretation results from a series of contingent factors, and most excavators know that 
then- 'final' accoimt might well have been different if they could have excavated more or 
obtained more analytical results. But in the report, the dialogue and contingency are 
written out. After the excavation is finished and a 'final' interpretation is reached, we work 
backwards and reorganize our data so that they are coherent. We publish this constructed 
account as if it simply describes what was diere. 
(Hodder, 1989: 271) 
Stutt and Shennan envisage a system based on hypertext, along with supporting 
A l techniques. They are not very forthcoming on this particular aspect of their 
work. They do however discuss in detail the problem of modelling argumentation. 
It is not to clear how much of a demand there is for this kind of open debate and 
report writing within the archaeological community at large since much of the kudos 
to be had, is derived from authoring excavation reports and launching bold new 
hypotheses therein. Nevertheless, Stutt and Shennan claim that their system, or 
something along its lines, will provide a means of storing and testing complex 
arguments that will stimulate archaeologists to produce new arguments. 
This review of work that seeks to use A l for archaeological purposes is not meant 
to be exhaustive, but it suggests something about the current situation. As Marx 
wrote, history repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. 
Since, as was shown in the first chapter, interpreting the past by means of the 
archaeological record has been shown to be deeply problematical, with little or no 
consensus about where to go next, the use of A l techniques will simply become a 
device for propping up yet more claims to scientific rigour and objectivity. Just as 
multivariate analysis by computer (statistics in general) was going to solve all the 
problems of classification and typology, so now A l will make good the promise, 
only more so. On the present showing, this is to be doubted. 
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3.6 Summary 
In this chapter I have looked at aspects of cognition such as deduction from a 
formalist perspective. I have also reviewed work on artificial intelligence which 
may be used in modelling belief systems - collective and individual, physical 
artefacts and cultural dynamics. Also, I have drawn attention to intelligent tutoring 
systems based on expert systems. 
The key issue or motif of the chapter is problem-solving, but I have concluded that 
much of the current work in archaeology that seeks to use A I techniques has not 
addressed the nature of archaeological interpretation and the relation between 
intentionality and process. Nor has their been any discussion of relevant topics such 
as the nature of mind, cognition, or the social aspect of cognition which would 
serve to constrain or guide the kind of archaeological task attempted using such 
techniques. 
In the next chapter I will review Edelman's work on the biological basis of 
consciousness ; Dennett's Multiple Drafts theory of consciousness, Bridgeman's 
'Plans' account of consciousness and Brooks's work in robotics as a prolegomena 
to a study of R.G. Collingwood's writings on mind and history. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
T H E MATTER OF MIND 
4.0 Introduction 
In the second chapter, attention was drawn to Rom Harre's Wittgensteinian claim 
that there are only two domains that count, that of the physiological and that of the 
conversational or linguistic. According to Harre, there is no mind in the sense of an 
entity existing in the worid. Rather, there are closely related terms (and the concepts 
they denote) in our vocabulary which pick out aspects of human actions. These 
actions are grounded in physiological phenomena and the terms used construe the 
actions in a way as to suggest that they interrelate and interact in the same way as 
physical entities and thereby can be understood in terms of the physical model of 
causality. For Harr^, this confusion, as he sees it, is due to the lack of attention 
paid to the grammar of our 'mentalistic' terms. 
What Collingwood propounded throughout his writings was an analysis of the 
leading concepts and terms found in everyday language which are used to talk 
about people's mental life. Indeed, Collingwood denied that mind is either an 
epiphenomenon of organic and psychic function or an entity which has escaped or 
supervenes upon organic nature. Thus he wrote: 
Even to say that the mind is one thing and the object another may mislead. The mind is 
specifically that which knows the object; and to call it a "thing" already suggests 
conceiving it as an object one of whose qualities is that it knows other objects - as this 
table is an object one of whose qualities is that it holds my paper - or worse still, as a 
machine which turns out a kind of work called thinking... The mind seems to be not so 
much that which thinks as the thinking itself ; it is not an active thing so much 
as an activity. 
(Collingwood, 1916: 100) 
If , then, the mind is not so much that which thinks, but the thinking itself ; not so 
much an active thing, but rather, an activity. What then is this activity called 
thinking ? 
One answer to this question is that thinking is the exercise of general cognitive 
processes such as inductionand deduction. ( see chapter three) 
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But this answer implies that such 'processes' can be divorced from the existential 
context in which they feature, and that is a claim that Collingwood would deny, or 
at least, qualify. The qualification that Collingwood would make is that although 
processes like induction and deduction may be profitably abstracted for the 
purposes of studying human cognition, it can never give the fu l l picture. 
Vandenburg (1991) expresses the point when he writes: 
Concepts, meanings, and social custom involve more than cognitive imderstanding ; they 
also involve personal relationships with others, and it is through shared meanings and 
beliefs that children remain close to trusted caregivers. The power of beliefs is derived 
from their existential implications. Beliefs can be defined as fervent hopes. They are 
efforts to establish some sense of stability, and they serve as a buttress against 
existentialuncertainty 
(Vandenberg, 1991: 1284) 
Historical studies are about understanding people and require insight into both 
their cognitive and existential condition. 
As wi l l be shown later in the chapter, for Collingwood, there is an absolute 
continuity between thought and action. What is more, all thought exists for the 
sake of action. Put an other way, a thought and its correlative action are the same 
phenomenon viewed from different perspectives. Thinking, on this account, draws 
attention to the fact that thinking (in the usual sense) arises out of some rather 
fundamental 'non-symbolic' process. How this comes about is one of the big 
questions. 
4.1 Edelman's Biological Theory of Consciousness 
With regards to the biological basis of thought and consciousness, we may look 
briefly at the work of Gerald M. Edelman (1989). Smoliar (1991) has reviewed 
Edelman's The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of 
Consciousness and provides us with a summary and guide. Before starting, the 
point must be made that Edelman's theories are speculative to a greater or lesser 
degree. 
Firstly, Edelman's studies on the nature of mind take as a founding assumption 
that cognition and consciousness rest on the orderings and processes in the physical 
world. Edelman differs from those working in physiology in that he regards it 
wrong to concentrate on the behaviour of individual cells, rather, it is populations 
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of cells that matter here. The analogy between the computer's transistor and the 
brain's neural cell is rejected. Nor does the genetic code provide a specific 'wiring 
diagram' it simply allows for the creation of a space of options within which a 
selection wil l take place.'Consequentially, at the level of neurones, it is very 
unlikely that any two individuals will be identically wired, even if they are clones of 
the same genetic code' (Smoliar, 1991: 287) 
Furthermore: 
As a result of evolution and through interaction between sensory and motor systems, 
many of these repertoires (of variant functioning neural circuits) are arranged in maps. 
Such maps are connected by parallel and reciprocal connections that provide the basis of 
the third tenet of the theory - the occurrence of reentrant signaling during behaviour, some 
groups in local maps are competitively selected over others. 
(Smoliar, 1991: 298) 
It is the maps referred to in the quote that provide the bridge between the 
physiological and the psycliological. These maps are established through the 
strengths of connections between different groups of elements resulting from 
primary and secondary selection, e.g. primary morphogenesis and subsequent post-
natal behaviours. 
Edelman has sought to show how this bridge may be constructed from modelling 
neural (group) networks in 'Darwinian automata'. The details of this modelling will 
not be given here, however the automata are designed to show how selection can 
give rise to perceptual categorizations. A machine or primitive organism that can 
achieve this level of categorization need not necessarily be said to have a mind. For 
mind, we require consciousness and according to Edelman, a scientific theory of 
consciousness must be able to (a) propose explicit neural models that explain how 
consciousness can arise, (b) relate these models to the emergence of consciousness 
during evolution and development, (c) relate these models to concept formation, 
memory, and language, and (d) describe stringent tests for the models in terms of 
known neurobiological facts. 
In moving from Darwinian automata to consciousness, the following issues need 
explicating; memory, ordering, concepts, "presyntax", primary consciousness and 
language. 
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With the theory of neutonal group selection (TNGS) memory in global mappings 
is not a store of fixed or coded attributes that can be called up and assembled in 
replicative fashion as with a computer. Rather, memory is the result of a continual 
recategorization, which given its nature, must be procedural and involved in 
continual motor activity and repeated rehearsal. The recategorization aspect 
emphasises the dynamic nature of the process. Moving on to the role of 
categorization and memory in learning, Edelman states that: 
Perceptual categorization and memory are therefore considered to be necessary for learning 
but obviously are not sufficient for it. The sufficient condition is provided by the synaptic 
linkage of particular global mappings to the activity of hedonic centres and to the limbic 
system in a fashion that will satisfy homeostatic, appetitive and consummatory needs 
(Smoliar, 1991: 305) 
As Smoliar remarks, learning is a consequence of interactions between the 
dynamics of memory and those of the pleasure-pain responses of the limbic system; 
and Edelman summarizes 'values constrain behaviour, action modulates it, and 
memory alters it and is altered in its turn.'(ibid p.305) 
Ordering is bound up with memory as its temporal dimension; I will not deal with 
this aspect apart from noting the comment from Smoliar that 'the brain deals with 
patterns (authors italics) of movement (in the form of gestures), rather than 
individual movements. 
In artificial intelligence there is a tendency, claims Smoliar, to view concepts as 
building blocks of knowledge representation, constructed out of linguistic 
primitives. 
Edelman rejects any assumption that language is a prerequisite for concepts. The 
very opposite in fact. Language is founded on concepts. Concepts here are a further 
extension to the brain's ability to form generalizations. 'The dynamics of 
recategorization extend this capability for generalization, since recategorization 
enables associations to be formed among those activation patterns.'(Smoliar, 1991: 
306) 
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Since ordering extends perceptual categorization to motor activityl, the power of 
generalization can accommodate not only what is perceived, but also what actions 
are taken and how actions interact with perception. Edelman's concepts are the 
categories that are formed when the brain 'bootstraps' its own categorization 
processes - selective attention in Collingwood's terms. 
Presyntax is Edelman's term for structural relations between concepts (so 
construed) and it is this presyntax that underpins the ability to analogize, and make 
inferences. It is here that thought (proper) arises. Quoting Marvin Minsky^: 
For generations, scientists and philosophers have tried to explain ordinary reasoning in 
terms of logical principles - with virtually no success. I suspect this enterprise failed 
because it was looking in the wrong direction : common sense works so well not because 
it is an approximation of logic; logic is only a small part of our great accimiulation of 
different, useful ways to chain things together. Many thinkers have assumed that logical 
necessity lies at the heart of our reasoning. But for the purposes of psychology, we'd do 
better to set aside the dubious ideal of fauldess deduction and try, instead, to understand 
how people actually deal with what is usual or typical. To do this, we often think in 
terms of causes, similarities, and dependencies. What do all of these forms of thinking 
share ? They all use different ways to make chains. 
(Smoliar, 1991: 308) 
Presyntax then would be Edelman's terms for the capacity to make the sort of 
chains that lie at the heart of Minsky's model of reasoning. 
Thus far, memory, ordering and concepts have been bootstrapped out of the 
fundamental mechanism for perceptual categorization. Presyntax expresses the 
structural relations between the products of this bootstrapping. Primary 
consciousness expresses the relationship between the agent so construed and the 
environment, and may be viewed as a network of devices, each of which performs 
categorizations on a different set of input signals. 
The network is seen as consisting of the following: 
(1) At the lowest level, there is a device for perceptual categorization - C(W), which 
operates on signals from the Worid as perceived by the different sense organs. 
^To achieve pCTceptual categorization with respect to motor behaviour, categorization must depend 
on the succession of joint and muscle responses and of gestures which are themselves smoothly 
linked and successive. See Smoliar p. 305 
2 Minsky, M. The Society of Minds (Simon and Schuster, New York 1986) 
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(2) Similar to C(W), there is a device for Introspective categorization, C(I), which 
operates on interoceptive signals, such as those from the autonomic nervous system 
and endocrine system. 
(3) Categorization may then be performed on signals which embody the activation 
states of both C(W) and C(I) as the agent experiences the world. Such 
categorizations may involve both comparison of the signals from two sources and 
comparison of present signals with past signals, which reveal categories of 
interaction. Edelman call this categorization device C(W)*C(I). 
(4) A final level of categorization is applied to the output of C(W)*C(I). The device 
which performs recategorizations of the signals received from C(W)*C(I) as time 
progresses is called C{C(W)*C(I)} 
(5) In addition to performing recategorizations on C(W)*C(I), C{C(W)*C(I)} also 
maintains a reentrant exchange of signals with C(W). This is the basis of primary 
consciousness in Edelman's model. Through this reentrant connection, the agent's 
perception of the world (i.e.. the ability to perform perceptual categorizations on 
signals from the world) is affected not only by perceptual experience but also by 
relations between those experiences and introspections from which that agent may 
attach values to those experiences. Thus we now have the makings of an agent that 
should stand some chance of actually managing in its world. (Smoliar, 1991: 309) 
I wil l pass over the question of mental images and move on to language and higher-
order consciousness. 
For language to arise out of biological systems, in Edelman's view, the preceding 
capabilities must be present. The capability for language is achieved through four 
premises, namely, (a) concepts which are necessary but not sufficient for 
semantics; (b) phonology and syntax are essentially more sophisticated ordering 
capabilities; (c) the development of phonological capabilities leads to the acquisition 
of sufficient ordering to form words and sentences. Syntax follows on; and (d) 
categorization and ordering may now be applied to these resulting abilities, leading 
to the ability to process the constructs of language at the levels of morphemes, 
words and sentences. The agent now has the ability to use language. 
Finally, linguistic ability gives rise to our reasoning and the use of symbols for 
representation, which grounds the ability to plan and model. Edelman and 
Collingwood both see consciousness arising directly out of physical existence 
through categorization which expresses values at each level. Collingwood through 
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an analysis of our everyday mental terms and concepts ; Edelman through neural 
modelling. 
Leaving Edelman, I will now turn to Dennett & Kinsboume's (1992) theory of 
Multiple Drafts of Consciousness. 
4.2 Dennett's Multiple Drafts 
In their target paper^ Dennett and Kinsboume are primarily concerned with the 
subjective experience of time in the light of two competing models of 
consciousness. 
One model being Cartesian materialism which posits a central locus in the brain 
(traditionally the pineal gland), the point in the brain where it all comes together. A 
material theatre in which the stream of consciousness is the show. This form of 
Cartesianism discards the mind - body dualism originally proposed by Descartes. 
The other model, proposed by Dennett & Kinsbourne is that of Multiple drafts. 
This model is grounded on the view that perceptual operations (all thought and 
action) are accomplished by multitrack processes of interpretation and elaboration 
(Edelman's devices) that occur over a time scale in the millisecond range. During 
the processing, additions, emendations and overwriting of the content can occur 
and in various orders. Furthermore, feature detections or discriminations have to be 
made only once. Thus: 
That is, once a localized, specialized "observation" has been made, the information 
content thus fixed does not have to be sent somewhere else to be rediscriminated by some 
"master" discriminator. In other words, it does not lead to a re -presentation of the already 
discriminated feature for the benefit of the audience in the Cartesian Theatre. 
(Dennett and Kinsboume, 1992: 185) 
Hence drafts of experience can be revised at great speed, and none is more 
'correct' than the others. Each draft reflects the situation at the time it is generated. 
The spatially and temporally distributed content fixations are precisely located in 
both space and time, the onset of content fixation does not mark the onset of 
awareness of their content. Dennett et al are basically arguing that the time scale 
3 Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1992) 15, 183-247 
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both space and time, the onset of content fixation does not mark the onset of 
awareness of their content. Dennett et al are basically arguing that the time scale 
over which these drafts are composed sets the lower limit to what time scale can be 
humanly meaningful. 
Dennett & Kinsbourne list the main points at which the the two models of 
consciousness conflict. These points are; 
(1) Localized discrimination's are not precursors of re-presentations of the 
discriminated content for consideration by a more central discriminator. 
(2) The objective temporal properties of the discriminatory states may be 
determined, but they do not determine temporal properties of subjective 
experience. 
(3) the "stream of consciousness" is not a single definitive narrative. It is a parallel 
stream of conflicting and continuously revised content, no one narrative thread of 
which can be singled out as canonical - as the true version of conscious experience. 
(Dennett and Kinsboume, 1992: 187) 
Dennett & Kinsboume therefore make the claim that the fundamental implication of 
the Multiple Drafts model is that it is always possible to "draw a line" in the stream 
of processing in the brain but there are no functional differences that could support 
the claim that any one stage of composition, reordering or emendations to the 
content is post-experiential memory-contaminated (meaning that consciousness 
does not f i l l in the 'picture' after the perceived event). The distinction lapses at close 
quarters. 
4.3 Bridgeman's 'Plans' 
Bridgeman (1992) puts forward the thesis that consciousness equates with the 
operation of a plan-executing mechanism which enables behaviour to be driven by 
plans rather than immediate environmental contingencies. This mechanism 
'unpacks' a single internally held idea into a series of actions. But there is also 
the proposal that language uses this mechanism for communication, unpacking an 
idea into a series of articulatory acts. 
Bridgeman draws a distinction between 'action plans' and 'linguistic action plans' 
in that 'An action plan becomes conscious only in the process of its execution. 
What is unique about the linguistic action plan is that whereas the processes that 
generate speech remain unconscious, the linguistic sequence can be fed back into 
95 
the neurological system that normally monitors external events connected with 
executing a plan.' (Bridgeman, 1992 ) 
According to Bridgeman there must be, 'neurological devices to (1) make plans, 
(2) store them, (3) execute them, and (4) monitor them In order to control 
behaviour, the currently active plan must have access to memory and attention. It 
must link these functions with perception in order to guide action according to a 
combination of the internally held plan and the external realities of the perceptual 
worid.'(Bridgeman, 1992) 
Language comprehension uses the plan-monitoring mechanism to pack a series of 
linguistic events into an idea. Recursive processing results from monitoring one's 
own speech. Neurophysiologically, the planning mechanism is identified with 
higher-order motor control. Bridgeman writes: 
The appearance of language as a communicative act generated by the planning mechanism 
brought with it some immediate and very powerful advantages. Not the least of these is 
that one also hears one's own speech, so that the plan-monitoring mechanism has 
immediate access to the plan-executing mechanism's products. In the process of 
development the loop can become internal, as pointed out by Vygotskii (1962) in his 
analysis of the importance of internal speech in human thinking. The whole planning 
process is made recursive, and the enormous power of himian thought becomes available 
with a relatively minor change in a mechanism that all primates share. Again, this 
process allows quick evolution of a seemingly complex addition to the himian brain. 
(Bridgeman, 1992) 
4.4 Brooks's Mobots 
I wi l l now report on work in Artificial Intelligence (AI) research directed at 
robotics, which in its own way, echoes Edelman. 
Brooks (1991) argues that A I has foundered on the issue of representation. 
Brook's takes the position that rather than decomposing an intelligent system into 
independent information processes which interface via representations, the 
intelligent system should be decomposed into independent physical, but parallel 
activity producers which all interface directly with the worid through perception and 
action as opposed to each other, or at least, not very much with each other. There is 
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Brook's work with robots (mobots) has lead him to suggest that representations 
(in a strong sense) are unnecessary for much, i f not all intelligent action. 
The idea is to first build a very simple autonomous system, and test it in the real 
world...It senses objects in its immediate vicinity and moves away from them, halting if 
it senses something in its path. It is still necessary to build diis system by decomposing 
it into parts, but there need be no clear distinction between a "perception subsystem", a 
"central system" and an "action" system. In fact, there may well be two independent 
channels connecting sensing to action (one for initiating motion, and one for emergency 
halt), so there is no single place where "perception" delivers a representation of the world 
in the traditional sense. 
(Brooks, 1991: 147) 
Brooks has constructed his robots in such a way that each task-achieving 
behaviour operates independently of the others ' out of the local chaos of their 
interactions there emerges, in the eye of the beholder, a coherent pattern of 
behaviour.'(ibid 149) 
Each activity-producing system is termed a layer, each individual layer delivers a 
description of the world so that with multiple layers the 'world' gets blurred as 
there is no identifiable place where the 'output' of perception can be found. Brooks 
makes the following claims : (a) simple activities can instil the 'Creature' (robot) 
with reactions to dangerous or important changes in its environment. This is with-
out representations and the need to reason about them.(b) It is by having multiple 
parallel activities without a central representation, that total collapse of the system is 
avoided when confronted with a change in the environment. Brooks places great 
emphasis on 'debugging' each layer by exposure to a real and relevant environment 
before incorporation into a Creature. 
(c) Each layer has its own implicit purpose or goal. The key to a successful 
Creature is in its ability to use the world as its model via constant and active 
perception and response. The preconditions for each goal is continuously matched 
against the real worid. (d)The purpose of the Creature are implicit in its higher-level 
purposes, goals or layers. There need be no explicit representation of goals that 
some central or distributed process selects from to decide what is most appropriate 
for the Creature to do next. 
The work and claims made by Brooks have been the subject of a critique by David 
Kirch (1991), and it is Kirch's critique of Brooks that I will now consider. 
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Kirch starts by making the point that human activities fall along a continuum ; at 
one end there are situationally determined activities such as walking, avoiding 
collisions, tying shoelaces. At the other end there are cerebral activities such as 
chess, mathematical problem solving and discursive activities. Kirch focuses on 
the claim made by Brooks that the majority of intelligent activity is concept free. 
Kirch does not see representation as the main issue raised by mobotic research, 
rather, it is the place of conceptualization in intelligent activity. 
As Kirch goes on to point out, the concept of representation remains a sore spot in 
foundational studies of mind 'no one is quite sure what the analysis of "state X 
represents the information that p is H" should be.' (Kirch, 1991: 162) 
Kirch maintains that Brooks's Creatures are riddled with wires that carry 
messages which covary with equivalence classes of earlier signals, (for instance, 
an edge covaries with an equivalence class of pixel configurations) and which often 
covary with properties in the environment. Kirch's point is that i f covariation is 
sufficient for representation, then Brooks too, accepts the need for representations. 
A symbolic representation, however, is defined by Kirch as one which can be 
combined and manipulated. Hence we get the notion of syntax added to 
representation. Kirch writes: 
To get systematic generation of representations it is necessary to have a notation that is 
sufficientiy modular that individual elements of the notation can be combined to make 
molecular expressions. In the this way, ever more complex structure can be constructed 
and used by a finite system. Semantic discipline is maintained on these symbol 
structures by enforcing Frege's requirement that however complex the symbol, its 
meaning is a fraction of the meaning of its parts and their syntactic arrangement. 
(Kirch, 1991: 163) 
I f an agent has symbolic representation as defined above then it may be assumed 
that they have concepts. To have a concept, says Kirch, is to have a capacity for 
finding invarience across a range of contexts and reifying that invariance so that it 
can combine with other appropriate invariances. As Kirch argues, it is because we 
have concepts that we can make judgements of identity, and reidentify across time. 
Kirch is basically arguing that both connectionist and symbolic representations are 
needed. Symbolic connectionism, as it is now termed ' combines standard symbolic 
representation with connectionist parallel constraint satisfaction procedures. Rule 
based processes (that is, production rules) construct symbolic propositional 
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representations while parallel processes produce an interpretation of the input' 
(Stevenson 1993: forthcoming) 
The question that arises for Kirch out of Brooks claims is, at what point in a theory 
of action must we advert to concepts ? Also, which activities presuppose intelligent 
manipulation of concepts, and which do not ? In short, what is the role of thought 
in action ? 
In the view of received wisdom (Kirch's term) about action, action is 
distinguished from mere movement in that an action is something that the agent is 
aware of and can be brought under a description which constitutes its identity e.g. 
waving good-bye. What marks the difference between raising one's arm and 
waving it about and 'waving good-bye' is the intention of the person to do such a 
thing within a particular social context. 'For an agent to have an intention...it is not 
necessary that he or she be aware of the action's description or that he or she 
consciously think before acting...Yet, any reasonable account of their practice must 
refer to their concepts, ideas, presuppositions, beliefs etc.'(Kirch, 1991: 165) The 
received view then bequeaths the legacy of unconscious beliefs, desires and rational 
explanations to A I research. It is this which is the source of Brooks reaction against 
representation, in Kirch's view that is. 
Kirch discusses the strong points of Brooks's position as an alternative theory of 
action, particular reference can be made to the notion of egocentric space as 
opposed to public space. Egocentric space is the world viewed from the 
perspective of the agent and the description yielded will be different from that given 
by an outside observer of the same world but with the agent in it. We can reference 
this point back to Collingwood's contention that action cannot be simply described 
by an observer, but must have reference to the way action is described by the agent. 
The heart of Brooks approach lies at the issue of control and decisions: 
It is standard in decision theory to treat perception as a bounded resource that must be 
guided in order to be used to the fuUest. The problem which decision-theoretic accoimts 
encounter, however, is that to know what question it is best to ask next, or which test it 
is best to perform next, the agent must know all the sources of information available 
now and in the future, their consequences, utilities etc. To achieve optimality is clearly 
impossible in practice, for it requires knowing where you are most likely to get the 
information you want before you know exactly which decisions you must make. 
(Kirch, 1991: 170) 
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The central problem that Kirch sees with Brooks's work is that the world of human 
beings regularly falls short of total situation determinedness.'Most of our life is 
spent managing locally constrained choice.It is at this management level that we can 
best appreciate the virtue of concepts and representations'(ibid 174) 
Kirch's defence of representations and concepts is (a) at the perceptual level, 
concepts unify perceptions into equivalent classes, (b) at the 'conceptual' level 
concepts license inferences about entities which are the subject of predication. The 
sharing of predicates by related entities allows the inheritance of truths about one 
entity to another entity and thus ground presuppositions held by the agent, (c) at the 
linguistic level a concept is the meaning of a term that denotes it. 
One of the most important uses of concepts, argues Kirch, is to organize memory 
since concepts facilitate recall 
In action management, an effective creature will benefit from its performance in the past. 
It will remember dangers, failures, helpful tricks, useful sub-goals. It may recall 
imexpected consequences of its previous performances. These memory accesses need not 
be conscious...But this information is primed in the sense that retrieving that related 
information in the near future takes less time tiian had the topic never been discussed. 
(Kirch, 1991: 175) 
From work cited above, we are beginning to see the connection between mind and 
body. I will now go on to examine, a somewhat older account of mind and body, 
but no less relevant for this thesis. 
4.5 Collingwood's Dialectic of Mind. 
Perhaps the fullest treatment of Collingwood's account of mind, and here the 
point is that what CoUingwood meant by 'mind' is by no means obvious or straight 
foreword, is given by Lewis O. Mink in Mind History and Dialectic. 
For the purposes of this chapter I will summarise the account of Collingwood's 
dialectic of mind given by Mink . According to Mink there are three themes that 
constantly recur throughout Collingwood's work, and these three themes serve as 
landmarks by which to measure the continuity of Collingwood's thought. The 
themes are (a) the idea of philosophy as self-reflecting ; (b) the idea of a dialectical 
series ; and (c) the idea of the continuity of thought and action.(Mink, 1969: 
79) With regards to (c) the opening sentence of Speculum mentis states 'All 
100 
thought exists for the sake of action' and it is the relationship between thought and 
action that this chapter principally seeks to address. 
In summarising Mink's account of Collingwood, I have appropriated Mink's 
diagram in which he tried to set out in visual form the complicated dimensions and 
relations of Collingwood's theory of mind. As Mink himself remarks, visual 
models are not very suitable for representing dialectical relations 'but how could 
one represent in spatial properties that relation of concepts which " fuses difference 
of degree and difference of kind, relation of distinction and relation of opposition ?" 
' (Mink, 1969: 82) The description of Collingwood's theory of mind given here 
owes a great deal to Mink, since, as he points out, it appears nowhere in particular 
in Collingwood's corpus but is spread throughout his entire works. 
As can be seen from the diagram (see below), Collingwood distinguishes four 
levels of consciousness. The first level is our consciousness of our bodily 
processes, the undifferentiated sensuous emotional flux which is not an effect or 
concomitant of processes in the sensory-motor, or general metabolic functions, it is 
those functions or processes. Mind, for Collingwood, is a whole-body 
phenomenon. Pure feelings are momentary, and therefore transient, as well as 
being unlocalized and undifferentiated; felt, but not observed. We are conscious of 
such processes because enough of a trace of them survives in the higher form of 
consciousness. In being aware of them, in terms of practical consciousness 
they evoke the vague senses e.g. irritation or well-being. The awareness of such 
feelings marks a rudimentary sense of self and environment and this distinction 
brings forth the second level in practical consciousness, that of appetite. 
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Appetite is the awareness that I want something, don't have it, but can't say what 
it is. Well-being or unease are thus specified as satisfaction or dissatisfaction as the 
consciousness of well-being or unease. When one identifies an object or state 
which seems to be the object of appetite, practical consciousness has moved to the 
third level, that of desire. At the level of appetite ' I want something' at the level of 
desire ' I know I want something' and can specify something specific that will 
possibly satisfy the desire. At the level of desire we get a level of questioning, that 
is explicit thought - 'Which do I really desire' this or that ? 
In moving to the fourth level of practical consciousness i.e. Will , the rudimentary 
choice that is already there in desire as the awareness of having a choice or option 
is not yet consciousness of oneself making a choice.' No moment of thought is 
conceivable which is not also a volition, and no moment of will is possible which is 
not also an act of knowledge' (Collingwood, 1916: 31) 
When one thing is chosen in preference to an other, then does Desire become 
action. Also, it is at the level of Will that Value becomes explicit and by this 
alone, can criticism and the mollification of desire become possible. Here we get the 
important point that Collingwood gives us that at the level of Will or explicit choice, 
the objects of choice are not things but actions. Collingwood writes"^: 
If I will to think, there are not two elements in this act but one. When I will to walk, I 
do not separately experience an internal resolve on the one hand and a movement of my 
legs on the other ; the act of will is the volimtary moving of the legs...what we turn into 
a separate organ and "the will" is only the fact of free activity, the volimtary doing of this 
thing or that. 
(Collingwood, 1916: 31,33) 
As Mink points out ; Buridan's ass cannot decide between equal piles of hay 
because it cannot move to the level of Will. It must remain at the third level. We on 
the other hand can choose, i f sometimes with the aid of psychological tools e.g. 
tossing a coin. 
4 Likewise, Wittgenstein writes: When I raise my arm 'voluntarily' I do not use any instrument to 
bring the movement about. My wish is not such an instrument either..."Willing, if it is not to be 
a sort of wishing, must be the action itself It cannot be allowed to stop short of the action' If it is 
the action, then it is so in the ordinary sense of the word ; so it is speaking, writing, walking, 
lifting a thing, imagining something. But it is also trying, attempting, making an effort, - to 
speak, to write, to lift a thing, to imagine something etc,. (Philosophical Investigations § 614-5) 
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Following Lewin 5 who argued that in humans, 'the conflict between motives 
occurs at the stage of decision making rather than in the execution of an action' 
(Kozulin 1990: 145) Vygotsky undertook studies on decision making (designed to 
counter the model of competing reflexes for decision making) which suggest that 
a psychological tool as a sign-mediator acts to form a functional barrier between the 
sensory and motor parts of behaviour. The paradox of the will...is that the wilful 
act is implemented by an automatic action which itself is beyond the wi l l ' 
(Vygotsky 1983: 280) 
The mediators help to separate the decision part, which is conscious and wilful 
from the implementation part, which is automatic and determinate. Thus: 
Using an artificial mediator the child wilfully created a new situation in which his choice 
became linked to a deliberately selected stimulus : " Free will, as the experiments show, 
is exercised not by the freedom from motives, but by the child's comprehension of a 
situation and by the realization of the necessity of a choice determined by the motive ; as 
the philosophical maxim has it, freedom is in the comprehension of necessity" 
(Kozulin, 1990: 146) 
Returning to Collingwood : the central point of Collingwood's view is that each 
level of practical consciousness is dialectically related to the preceding one which 
may develop out of it whilst at the same time carrying over aspects of the foregoing 
levels. Consciousness here displays what Collingwood termed a 'Scale of Forms' 
In general terms, the scale of forms marks an overiap. 
Thus the overlap is essentially not, as we took it to be in our first rough survey of the 
ground, an overlap of extension between classes, but an overlap of the intension between 
concepts, each in its degree a specification of the generic essence, but each embodying it 
more adequately than the one below. 
(Collingwood, 1970: 91) 
I wil l cut short the discussion of the dialectical development that leads to Will 
through appetite and desire via Pleasure / Pain : Satisfaction / Dissatisfaction : 
Happiness /Unhappiness and move to the relation of Will to Good/ Evil. 
Collingwood maintains (in Mink's account) that the activity of choice does not 
presuppose but is identical with the judgement of value ; in choosing 'that' one 
comes to think it good. The act of choice and the judgement of value are the same 
5 Lewin, K. (1926) Vorsatz, Wile, und Bedurfnis Beriin: Springer 
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thing. 'Good' is not property a predicate of things or states, but of actions, since 
only actions are the proper objects of choice, capricious or rational. An action may 
be called good only with respect to the larger whole for whose sake it is done. Mink 
makes the point that the question can be raised here as to what is 'Good' of this 
'Larger Whole'. The question might be seen as a fatal objection to defining good 
relationally. But, Mink maintains that this objection to Collingwood's, so far 
provisioneil account, precipitates a dialectic of the idea of good in which the 
dialectical relationship between appetite, desire , will (also satisfaction, happiness) 
and good is recapitulated. In this recapitulation we get a second-level satisfaction, a 
third-level consciousness of satisfaction and now a fourth-level theory of 
satisfaction. 
Such a theory is possible and even inevitable once the fourth-level is reached, but it is 
nevertheless imstable. Its principle is the principle of utility: the attempt to define "good" 
as the instrumental value of means to ends. It is unstable because the "ends" are found to 
recede and turn out themselves to be only instrumental rather than consimunatory; and as 
ends recede, the derivative value of means evanesces...In his (Collingwood's) view, the 
natural logic of thought, once the principle of utility has proved imstable, is to move 
from the relation of incomplete and complete acts to the relation between a particular act 
and the schema or abstract idea which it exemplifies . By this move the principle of 
utility is transformed into the principle of right; goodness then is seen as belonging 
derivatively to particular acts in virtue of their conformity to general commands or rules. 
But "the good itself escapes once more," because neither die act nor the rule is good per 
se. The act is good only derivatively as conforming to the rule; the rule on the other hand 
is abstract and cannot be willed in itself: it is as impossible to will a law without willing 
instances of it as it is to will an end without willing the means 
(Mink, 1969: 89) 
In this quote we have the central issues which underlie the questions of human 
behaviour and agency. As Mink goes on to make clear, Collingwood's thesis 
maintains that the moral characteristics of action cannot be separated from the way 
the agent thinks of the action and the extent to which the action is what it is as part 
of intentional activity. Thus Mink writes: 
The third form of goodness therefore includes the other two forms; it combines the 
means-ends analysis of a situation with the act-rule analysis of a situation but transforms 
both from the stand-point of a consciousness for which the logical disparateness of means 
from ends and act from rule has disappeared... within such an action, one might say, it is 
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possible to distinguish rule from act, or means from end, only in retrospect ...The third 
form of goodness is itself a historical enactment. 
(Mink, 1969: 90) 
As Utilitarianism is the theoiy of rational (economic) choice and the Principle of 
Right is the theory of poHticai/judicial activity, both have their uses but they are not 
moral principles as such, although both have been included in ethical theory. 
CoUingwood's third form of goodness, his ethics, affirms that an intentional action 
is always at the same time a choice that one makes for oneself. Agents do not act 
merely because of what they are, but also to become what they are not. Such self-
creative choosing is not a fact to which the agent can become aware, rather, it is a 
situation which comes into being and is constituted when consciously affirmed. 
Mink states that here Collingwood comes closest to the view of human nature 
expressed by modern existentialism but is more dialectically radical in that 
consciousness is not cut off from the causal nexus of nature. 
Collingwood's fourth-level consciousness emerges from the natural worid but is 
still attached through bodily processes. Consciousness at the lower levels reflects 
the world; at higher levels, consciousness transforms and expands it. The human 
world at the lower levels contains only behaviour and as such is describable by an 
observer. At the fourth-level there is also action. Here action is constituted and 
recognized by rational consciousness. Here an action cannot be described simply as 
it appears to observers but requires essential reference to the way it is conceived by 
the agent. This point has begun to be appreciated by those working in robotics. 
Thus far 1 have discussed only the left-hand part of the diagram, that is, practical 
consciousness. I will now turn to the levels of Cognitive Consciousness. 
Cognition and the levels of consciousness with which it is associated in 
Collingwood's scheme of things, also stand in a dialectical order of development. 
Again there are four levels, the first-level is not in any way in consciousness' view, 
so to speak. At this level, cognition would be constituted by the biochemical and 
motor activity of the body, the activity of the neurophysiological system, in other 
words. 
In the development of practical consciousness from feeling to rational choice, 
thought, understood as activity, develops via the making of distinctions within what 
at the next level down was an undifferentiated field (level 1-2) or the unifying of 
elements which at the lower level are discrete (level 2-3). Thought is held by 
Collingwood to be present in all conscious activity which is aware (even dimly) of a 
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contrast between what is immediately present and what is not. Thought, then, 
appears at the level of appetite in which consciousness is altered through an 
orientation towards an unrealized future. Thought is an unrealized future 
unimagined or conceived but felt 'as a feeling-tone suffusing the present'. Thought 
as knowledge only appears at the level of desire. With desire there is both explicit 
recollection and imagination with satisfaction being regarded as a future state the 
want of which impels action; desire marks the appearance of human rationality. 
Thought at the level of will is able to criticize desire; desire knows what it wants but 
not what it does not want. 
The comparison between what is desired and what is not is an activity of the fourth-
level; moreover, it is a kind of thinking which may actually modify desire. The 
comparison between what is desired and what is not further makes it possible to recognize 
a distinction between what is apparentiy desired and what is desired; desire, because it is a 
form of thought, can be mistaken. Finally, only at the level of rational choice does 
thought become fully explicit in its ordinary sense of inferential reasoning. 
(Mink, 1969: 93) 
To recapitulate : beyond appetite, at the level of desire we get an affirmation, 
namely, what I want is A. Then we get a negative element via reflection -1 want A, 
but not B. This leads on to the conviction (i.e. capricious choice) that I really 
want A rather than B which is equivalent to A is good a judgement which, by 
reflecting upon it, can be backed up with reasons. Rational choice is the re-
affirmation of A is good along with the reasons for it being so. 'For 
Collingwood, knowledge, as Socrates says in the Meno is "opinion fastened by a 
chain": at the level of desire opinion becomes conviction as a result of critical 
comparison, at the level of will as a result of inferential reasoning.' (Mink, 1969: 
94) 
Mink points out that a criticism of Collingwood's construal of knowledge can be 
made if one assumes that Collingwood is saying that the feeling of assurance is the 
infallible mark of knowledge. He is not. Collingwood does not set out criteria by 
which knowledge is distinguished from error, rather, he wishes to show that 
knowing as an activity results from reflection on opinion. Also it is a way of 
making the point that the development from feeling to reason carries with it the 
'emotional charge' which although controlled by the forms thought, is still present 
even when making inferences. 
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It may be seen from the diagram that Collingwood marks the second-level of 
cognitive consciousness 'conceptual thinking'; here his terminology is at variance 
with normal usage. In Collingwood's terms conceptual thinking may be equated 
with selective attention through which discriminations are made within the 
undifferentiated here-and-now of the first-level sensuous-emotional flux. 
Conceptual thinking here is what in The Principles of Art Collingwood called 
imagination. Imagination, as in everyday language, carries a double reference, 
namely, (a) the activity of practical consciousness, and (b) the products of that 
activity. The products of imagination are objects of contemplation to theoretical 
consciousness. 
But this is theoretical consciousness in its most embryonic form and its objects are not 
categorically different from feeling but aieparts of the mass of feelings, which become 
discriminable parts only as they are demarcated and selected by acts of attention... In 
general, the "concepts" of "conceptual thinking" are not the concepts which we would 
naturally adduce in illustration: our fourth-level minds naturally fasten in reflection on 
third-level concepts. Second-level concepts are not even, as we normally suppose concepts 
to be, general; an example of a second-level concept is not the concept of redness, but this 
particular red, separated by attention from an attendant flux of feeling...Collingwood is 
giving a generic account of higher level functions; he is defining the concept of 
"concept"( and simultaneously exhibiting its connections with the definitions of other 
concepts, such as "thinking", "consciousness", "knowledge" and "abstraction") exactly as 
prescribed in the Essay on Philosophical Method 
(Mink, 1969: 95) 
Propositional thinking occurs in the delineation of desires and exhibits the form of 
question and answer. The primary questions of propositional thinking are practical; 
which do I want A or B; but the answers to these kinds of questions are statements 
which may be true or false. Truth and falsehood like Good and Evil emerge at the 
level of propositional thinking and were absent at the level of conceptual thinking. 
Furthermore, even though propositional thinking emerges at the third-level giving 
rise to truth and falsity, propositions about truth, just as with knowledge 
(declarative) belong to the fourth-level. 
Rational thinking results from the reflection on propositional thinking and it too 
takes the form of question and answer. Rational thinking distinguishes between the 
"that" and the "why" it is therefore the thinking which gives rise to a consciousness 
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which thinks one thing i.e. a proposition because it thinks another which stands to 
the first as a reason or ground. 
Although there is no higher level of consciousness, there is however a sub dialectic 
of kinds of reasons (teleological, law, historical) which can figure in explanations 
and justification of actions. 
Mink makes the point that in this scheme of Collingwood's there is no separation, 
as in traditional rationalism, between reason and emotion. Thus a fundamental fact 
of ethics is the possibility of consciousness of self, but this self is not something 
which is simply there and can be disclosed, rather, it comes into being in the 
process of moving from barely conscious activity to that of fully conscious action. 
I wil l have to truncate the discussion somewhat and pass over much of the 
discussion of Imagination as given in The Principles of A r t ; it is out of this 
discussion that Mink was able to fix the third level of cognition as Perception. 
Whereas imagination sorts, arranges and stores and transforms, a bridge to 
intellection is required, for imagination cannot deal with relations. As desire asks 
"which do I want, and answers X and not Y" ; third-level cognitive 
consciousness asks " Is that A, an X or a Y". I will now move on to Empirical 
Thought and Thought about Thought 
Empirical thinking i.e. scientific enquiry is held by Collingwood to be a more 
elaborate and coherent version of common-sense experience. Empirical thinking 
consists in the detection and construction of relations and networks of relations 
among the complex objects of third-level consciousness. Here relations may be held 
to subsist in perception but for empirical thinking. Thinking about thinking has as 
its objects, the relations among acts of thinking. Just as capricious choice is not 
accompanied by the explicit awareness of choosing, likewise empirical thinking is 
not accompanied by the explicit awareness of reasoning. And like rational choice, 
only thought about thought can affirm a proposition since it has reasons and is 
aware of those reasons. 
It is thus only at this higher level of intellect that principles of inference can be 
formulated and reflected upon.. This level of thought, Collingwood insists, is both 
normative and descriptive: both at once and inseparably so. It is "criteriological" or 
concerned with standards of inference which thought imposes on itself ..but these 
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standards are attained only by reflecting on the experience of the activity of thinking.lt follows that 
principles of inference are subject to diange if and as the experience of thinking changes; and in 
fact ColUngwood enacted this consequence in the practice of his own professional work. He not 
only held that the "principles of history" result from reflecting on the experience of historical 
thinking, but in The Idea of History he wrote a history of the idea of history, i.e. of the 
changes of those principles over time. 
(Mink, 1969: 105) 
Collingwood's general theory of levels of consciousness has, claims Mink, a 
powerful methodological imperative, namely, 'look for the connections among 
apparently unrelated mental functions as occurrences at different levels of 
consciousness of the same fundamental activity.'(ibid 106) 
Another way of putting it is to see it as a programme for analyzing many general 
concepts into species of the concept at different levels of consciousness. 
This scale of forms of concepts is illustrated by Mink thus: we can suppose the 
form of the concept of a <triangle> as held by a pigeon trained to react to 
equilateral triangles but who will also react to a scalene triangle. This would be 
second-level. 
The concept of <triangle> at the third-level is exemplified by that of the 
descriptions of the shapes used by the psychologist doing the training. At the 
fourth-level, the <triangle> will be exemplified by the Euclidian and non Euclidian 
theorems. A fourth-level definition of <triangle> is intelligible only to someone 
who has attained the fourth-level through the lower-levels, but it can be understood 
apart from explicit reference to those levels. But according to Collingwood, a 
fourth-level definition of <Knowledge> cannot be understood other than as a 
development of the scale of forms of the concept. Here we have a distinction 
between in the first case of the triangle, a scientific concept; and in the second case, 
a philosophical concept.'One might well say that a complete theory of mind would 
include a dialectical account of every self-instancing concept as well as among the 
"levels" of each' (Mink, 1969: 107) 
It would not be possible then to define such a self-instancing concept apart from 
giving an exposition of the generic features (products and relations) of the concept. 
Mink takes abstraction as one such (important) concept, as an illustration of the 
dialectical elucidation of thought. Abstraction in this sense is a primary act of 
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consciousness and on Collingwood's account, has three main characteristics; 
selectivity, indeterminacy and self-determination. 
Abstraction as a process, requires the selective attention of consciousness towards 
an object in such a way as to highlight some features of the object while ignoring 
others. Such attended features can be named and be themselves made the objects of 
other and repeated acts of consciousness with no repetition of the primary 
presentation of the object. The first-order objects of any act of consciousness are 
activities of a lower level. These activities are transient, one cannot retrieve or 
repeat the total perceptual consciousness of a moment. But by attending to certain 
features we bring forth second-order objects which can be retrieved later and 
compared. At this level they are still indeterminate in all respects apart from those 
by which they have been constituted. Lastly, in abstracting such features, 
consciousness performs a free act thereby determining the contrastive aspects of 
features phenomenologically given. 
By naming (to be taken in an extended sense, in that Collingwood considered a 
gesture an act of naming) we express our becoming conscious of our own activities; 
and to that extent our language determines the limits of abstraction i.e. 'we can 
attend only to those distinguishable features of experience for which we have 
names' (Mink, 1969: 108) The qualification here would be that it does so only to 
the extent that we permit it to do so. The culprit in Collingwood's view is our 
laziness not the irresistible power of language. 
In his view common language is a habit of consciousness and by no means a bad one 
insofar it is the mediimi of social life. But habits are compulsory only when we are not 
conscious of them, and they can on suitable occasions by superseded to the extent that we 
are conscious of them. Even at the lowest level at which abstraction occurs, "attention "is 
in no sense a response to stimulus. It takes no orders from sensation. Consciousness, 
master in its own house, dominates feeling. 
(Mink, 1969: 108) 
A full exposition of Collingwood's dialectic of mind (as compiled by Mink) would 
be too long, but the foregoing should provide enough of the most important details 
to grasp the essence of it. 
Collingwood's account of mind does not constitute a 'discovery' of levels of 
consciousness ; the dialectic of mind is a way of schematizing certain general 
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conceptions in order that they may be applicable to details of experience and 
forestall errors. Here Collingwood is calling for a genealogy of ideas which 
reminds us that rational consciousness (mind) is neither (a) an epiphenomenon of 
'non-rational' organic and psychic function, or (b) an entity which has 'escaped' or 
supervenes upon the organic nature we share with all other sentient beings. The 
dialectic of each concept expresses its own cautions and reminders. For instance, 
the dialectic of abstraction reminds us that, although it issues in the construction of 
formal systems and models, the process by which these constructions are achieved 
includes steps which are arbitrary e.g. acts of selective division of experience which 
could have been otherwise and have lead to a different development of thought. 
For Collingwood, every stage of enquiry yields results which are about 
experience and nothing else. But here experience includes both knower and known 
and is both theoretical and practical; which is to say that through the process of 
inquiry the self creates itself while at the same time coming to know the world in 
ever more complex ways, this process is both correlative and interdependent. 
In this, Collingwood can be seen as an empiricist. However most empirical 
theories of knowledge start with what Collingwood would regard as second or third 
level consciousness and separate cognitive and practical consciousness. By holding 
that sensory 'data' is already 'facta', that is, already a product of consciousness and 
is therefore abstracted from forms of experience but not separable from experience, 
Collingwood is much closer to pragmatism than traditional empiricism. While being 
a radical empiricist, Collingwood is also a radical idealist in that he sees the 
originative powers of thought as being coeval with the most basic forms of 
experience. Collingwood was, and has subsequently been described as an 'Idealist' 
and this description of him was one he strenuously denied. The dialectic of mind 
may be seen then as Collingwood's attempt to transcend the realist - idealist divide. 
At the bottom of the diagrammatic sketch there is drawn a horizontal line pointing 
to History. This was meant by Mink to mark the point where philosophy as the 
highest stage of mind becomes coextensive with history in Collingwood's scheme. 
It is the theory of Absolute and Relative Presuppositions which underiay the claim 
that metaphysics is the asking and answering of historical questions about the 
presuppositions that people have made or do make in the course of 'scientific 
thought'. The theory of Absolute and Relative presuppositions together with the 
preliminary study of the 'logic' of question and answer constitute the final stage in 
the dialectic of mind. 
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4.6 Summary : 
In this chapter I have reviewed work which attempts to understand consciousness 
as (a) an emergent property of perceptual categorization (re Edelman) ; (b) the 
continuous re-writing (re-constitution) of a perceptual narrative (re Dennett); (c) the 
operation of a central plan-executing mechanism (re Bridgeman). I have also 
reviewed work in robotics which has given rise to a debate on the question of 
mental representation and concepts, re Brooks and Kirch. Finally I have looked at 
Collingwood's writings on mind as elucidated by Mink. 
In the sixth chapter, I will use the work of Edelman, Dennett, Bridgeman, and 
Brooks on the physical basis of human perception and categorization along with 
the the perspectives on the psychological environment outlined in the second 
chapter; together they will guide our discussion of the social aspects of human 
perception and categorization. 
The reason why I have focussed on Collingwood's writings on mind in this 
chapter is because it grounds his view of history. History is mind's self 
knowledge. In taking this view of history, Collingwood provides a linkage 
between diverse issues in philosophy and psychology and historical study. 
In the next and penultimate chapter I will go on to discuss Collingwood's logic 
of question and answer, his doctrine of re-enactment of past thought (with Mink's 
emendations) and his notion of the double genesis of consciousness i.e. individual 
experience and the historically given situation of the agent. The logic (dialectic) of 
question and answer leads us to belief representation as implemented by ViewGen. 
The doctrine of re-enactment sets out a coherent account of historical study: the 
work on ViewGen, Mental spaces etc, offers a direct implementation of 
Collingwood's requirement for re-enactment, and thereby undermines past 
objections to it. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THOUGHT & HISTORY 
Belief & Action 
5.0 Introduction: 
In this chapter I will discuss Collingwood's logic of question and answer; his 
doctrine of re-enactment of past thought (with Mink's emendations) and his notion 
of the double genesis of consciousness i.e.,individual experience and the 
historically given situation of the agent. The logic (dialectic) of question and answer 
leads us to belief representation as implemented by ViewGen. The doctrine of re-
enactment as set out is taken here as ta coherent account of historical study : the 
work on ViewGen, Mental spaces, etc, offers a direct implementation of 
Collingwood's requirement for re-enactment, and thereby undermines past 
objections to it. 
Next I discuss work in archaeology that attempts to model human action, together 
with criticisms levelled at this model and, tangentially, at Collingwood. Against this 
criticism from Julian Thomas, Collingwood is defended. 
Finally I discuss the nature of beliefs and the role they play (if any) in causal 
reasoning. Particular attention is given to religious or ritualistic practices and 
beliefs. 
5.1 Historical Knowledge as the Re-enactment of Past Thought. 
According to Collingwood, our knowledge of the past is not knowledge of the 
past as of an actual object, and therefore, not true knowledge; it is only the 
reconstruction of an ideal object in the interest of knowing the present. 
The purpose of history is to enable us to know (and therefore to act relatively to) the 
present and that is the truth, for Collingwood, contained in the pragmatic view of 
history. But the knowledge of the past must not be misconceived as knowledge of 
one object, the past, which when achieved serves as means to the knowledge of 
another object, the present. That, for Collingwood, is the error of the pragmatic 
view. The past and the present are not two objects : the past is an element in the 
present, and in studying the past we are actually coming to know the present, not 
coming to know the something else which will lead us to know or to maintain the 
present. The principle, expressed by the ideality of the past, explains both why we 
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cannot and why we need not know the past as it actually happened. We cannot, 
because there is nothing to know ; nothing exists to be studied ; there are no past 
facts except so far as we reconstruct them in historical thought. The purpose of 
history is to grasp the present,' and therefore any past fact which has left no visible 
trace on the present is not, need not be, and cannot be a real problem to historical 
thought.'(van derDussen, 1981: 142)1 
What Collingwood is basically claiming is that (a) 'historical truth' as an account 
of happenings untainted by human perception and categorization, is incoherent. As 
Paul Roth put i t ' there exists a worid not of our making, but any subdivision of it 
into specific events is our doing, not nature's.' (Roth, 1991: 185) And (b) 
Historical knowledge is knowledge of the present from a developmental 
perspective. 
History, as the knowledge of the past as an ideal aspect of the present, is the 
knowledge of past thought (action) and therefore history is mind's self knowledge. 
Collingwood states that events in history have two distinct but inseparable aspects, 
an internal aspect, the thought of the historical agent; and an external aspect, the 
action of the historical agent. Historical events are constituted in the co-extensive 
relation between thought and action. The past, however, only achieves actuahty 
as thought, that is, the interpreting thought of the historian. The past can only be 
said to exist in so far as it is re-enacted in the thought of the historian. Present day 
Post-processualist archaeologists hold that the past only exists in the archaeological 
texts. Collingwood writes: 
Does this, dien, prove that history is an illusion and to pursue it is folly ? No; 
because the past has no actual existence, it is an ideal element in the present, and can 
therefore be studied in the same general way and to the same extent to which any 
abstraction may be studied. The present is die past transformed. In knowing the present 
we are knowing that into which the past has changed. The past has become the present, 
and therefore if we ask where the past is to be found in living and concrete actuality, the 
answer is, in the present. But whereas the past exists actually as the present, it exists 
ideally as the past - as what is was before it turned into the present. 
(van der Dussen, 1981: 142) 
1 Unpublished manuscript 
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Munz (1985) tells us that the ability to study the past {res gestae) depends on the 
historian having available to his or her mind a set of general laws, generalizations 
and concrete universals. (By concrete universals we will take Munz to mean that the 
historian must have to hand examples of historically instantiated universal 
categories, e.g. the Greek city state as the concrete universal of the abstract 
universal -The State.) The matter does not end there, the historian must be able to 
mobilize such items in such a way as to give both an intelligible account and thereby 
a relevant account in light of present concerns. 
It is here that Collingwood's logic of 'Question & Answer' comes to the fore. But 
this logic, as Mink shows, is basically Hermeneutics. That is, it is not a logical 
system of interrogative and indicative sentences, but stages in the process of 
inquiry or of active thought in general. With Socrates, Bacon, Descartes, and Kant 
as his authorities, Collingwood states that he found it necessary to restate the 
classical expressions of a principle in logic which held that: 
... a body of knowledge consists not of 'propositions', 'statements', 'judgements', or what 
ever names logicians use in order to designate assertive acts of thought (or what in those 
acts is asserted: for 'knowledge' means both the activity of knowing and what is known), 
but these together with the questions they are meant to answer; and that a logic in which 
the answers are attended to and the questions neglected is a false logic. 
(Collingwood, 1987: 30) 
Collingwood, as Mink shows, erred in his own characterization of the nature of 
question and answer. Collingwood first developed the notion of Question and 
Answer in an unpublished book Truth & Contradiction in 1917.2 xhe reason 
for this, Mink suggests, was Collingwood's concern to refute the then dominant 
doctrine of logical positivism, in its own terms. Rather than a logic, it is a dialectic 
of question and answer. As with the generic character of dialectical processes, the 
relation between question and answer or question and presupposition occurs in a 
process which is prospectively open but retrospectively determinate. As 
Collingwood wrote in Speculum mentis: 
A crude empiricism imagines., that to know and to assert are identical. But it is only 
when the knower looks back over his shoulder at the road he has travelled, that he 
2 The publisher did not think it was the right moment to publish a book on logic. Collingwood 
destroyed the manuscript after writing An Autobiography 
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identifies knowledge with assertion. Knowledge as past fact, as somediing dead and done 
with...and those who treat it as an affair of encyclopedias and text books may be forgiven 
for thinking that it is an assertion and nothing else. But those who look upon it as an 
affair of discovery and exploration have never fallen in to that error. People who are 
acquainted with knowledge at first hand have always known that assertions are only 
answers to questions. 
(Collingwood, 1924: 77) 
Mink summarizes the special features of the question / answer complex, which are 
reported below. 
(1) Given a certain question, the answer to it must be discovered, not just inferred. 
The question determines what will count as an answer, but which of the 
alternative answers would count as the "right" one must be settled by other 
criteria. 
(2) Given a certain answer or proposition, the question which it answers can be 
inferentially reconstructed from the proposition together with other evidence about 
the process of inquiry in which it occurs. Taken as having a specific meaning, the 
proposition is an answer to a unique question ; but the interpretation of meaning 
and the reconstruction of the question are themselves parts of a single process and 
cannot be determined independently of each other. 
(3) Thus the possibility of answers, seen from the stand-point of the question, is 
multivalent; but the reconstruction of the question, seen from the standpoint of a 
given answer, is univalent. Analogous features hold for the relation between 
question and presupposition. 
(4) Given that a certain presupposition is made, any of a number of questions may 
arise, none of which would arise in the absence of the presupposition. At the same 
time, none must, or automatically will arise. 
(5) Given that a certain question arises, there is an indefinite number of 
presuppositions which are jointly necessary to the question's arising, but there is 
one presupposition which uniquely, taken together with the others, is sufficient. 
This is its "logical efficacy". (Mink, 1969: 133) 
Taken prima facie (4) and (5) are contradictory, with (4) no presupposition entails 
the asking of any question, and with (5) the asking of a question is entailed by a 
unique presupposition. The contradiction is resolved by taking the subject at issue 
as the dialectic of a question and answer process and not a question and answer 
complex. The difference is not unlike the difference between inference and 
implication. With inference we have a process i.e. something done by someone, but 
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with implication there is a relation i.e. something exists whether or not it is 
recognized. Mink writes: 
Now one cannot describe a situation in which someone validly draws an inference unless 
one supposes that there is an implication which is correcdy traced out in die process of 
drawing the inference. But on the other hand there are obviously many cases in which, 
although a certain implication plainly exists, it is drawn incorrectiy or not at all: we see 
other people - and they see us - failing to "get the point". It is of course logically 
impossible to see oneself failing to get the point, because one would have to get it order 
to do so. 
(Mink, 1969: 133) 
However we often recognize that we did fail to get the point, but after we have 
done so; when we have drawn the inference from the implication that was always 
there. Before getting the point, there is nothing that can make us do so. The logical 
efficacy of a presupposition then is not the 'cause' of a question arising 'but the 
property that accrues to presuppositions in retrospective reconstruction. In the 
same way that the reconstruction of the steps by which a solution was reached has 
the lucidity which did not characterize the confusions and false starts of the 
problem-solving process itself.' (Mink, 1969: 134) 
The logic of question & answer is a tool of interpretive inquiry, it does not of itself 
yield answers but guides the search for intelligible and relevant answers given the 
evidential base. For instance, we may argue that the hunter-gatherer is not 
confronted by the 'eternal problem of obtaining food' a vacuous formulation, but 
rather the concrete problem of 'digging up this root' or 'spearing this / that fish'. 
The Mesolithic leister ( a two pronged spear ) is an answer to the problem of 
fishing, the answer to the question, 'how do I get a fish for lunch?' Collingwood 
has in the past been dismissed for claiming that one needs to be able to get to the 
thoughts of people in the past. This task has been held to be per impossibile . But 
all that Collingwood really wishes to do is state explicitly the thoughts, including 
presuppositions, in the form of questions to which the material culture, and the 
processes that go into their formation, constitute intelligible answers. 
The dialectic of question and answer applies to relations between question and 
answer which are context-dependent and thereby calls attention to the the fact we 
understand and use such context-dependency. This understanding cannot be 
exhausted by any formal analysis. 
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The logic of question & answer stands as a prolegomena to Collingwood's 
theory of Absolute & Relative Presuppositions. 
When ever anybody states a thought in words, there are a great many more thoughts in 
his mind than are expressed in his statement. Among these there are some which stand in 
a peculiar relation to the thought he has stated : they are not merely its context, they are 
its presuppositions ^ 
(Collingwood, 1979: 21) 
The progression from question and answer can be best demonstrated by quoting 
the propositions that Collingwood formally set down in his chapter 'On 
Presupposing' in Essay on Metaphysics. 
Prop 1: Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question 
Prop 2: Every question involves a presupposition 
Prop 3 :The logical efficacy of a supposition does not depend on the truth of what is 
supposed, or even on its being thought true, but only on its being supposed. 
Prop 4 :A presupposition is either relative or absolute. 
Def: By a relative presupposition I mean one which stands relatively to one question 
as its presupposition and relative to another as its answer. 
An absolute presupposition is one which stands to all questions to which it is 
related, as a presupposition, never as an answer. 
Prop 5 : Absolute presuppositions are not propositions. 
As far as Absolute presuppositions are concerned. Mink argues that they are best 
seen as forming historically situated systems of a priori concepts (just as the later 
Wittgenstein argued that it was not the 'mind' but common language which 
incorporates a conceptual system which is acquired through learning the language). 
Thus language determines apriori what is conceivable. So Collingwood's 
absolute presuppositions provide the general structure of experience as a set of 
unquestionable beliefs about the worid. 
In a similar vein M. Meyer, professor of philosophy and rhetoric at the University 
of Brussels, has lately come to focus on the question-answer pair, as he puts it. 
Meyer holds that the question is the starting point of language and speech.'^  
^ I will take up this point later in the chapter, but from a different perspective. 
4 Meyer quotes the very same philosophical authorities for his theory of 'ftoblematology' as does 
Collingwood for his logic of question & answer 
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Whenever we speak or write on any issue, we have as a purpose a need to solve a problem 
that takes the form of a direct or implied question. In our daily lives we are repeatedly 
confronted with a challenge of responding to sudi problems as the need to accomplish a 
task, perform an act, or surmoimt a difficulty. Since discourse, in Meyer's opinion, raises, 
evokes, suggests or indicates a question, we may perceive language as a way of 
responding to problems, of discussing, of naming issues, if need be, and in any event, of 
posing solutions where communication is die mediod of resolution. 
(Golden and Jamison, 1990: 330) 
Like Collingwood before him, Meyer criticizes analytical philosophy for not 
recognizing propositions as answers to questions. The parallels do not stop there, 
Meyer goes on to make the distinction between 'problematological' answers which 
are partial and tentative ; and apocritical answers which claim a resolution of the 
problem and therefore do not express a question. Thus problematological answers 
are nothing other than relative presuppositions and apocritical answers are absolute 
presuppositions. 
Meyer's account of the question-answer pair is an advance on Collingwood's 
because he more clearly brings out the nature of apocritical answers or absolute 
presuppositions. Thus apocritical answer are 'answers in general', 'truths logically 
ordered' or 'solutions in the questioning system'. But perhaps the most important 
aspect that Meyer identifies is the situating of the question-answer pair in practical 
discourse. Apocritical answers, Meyer tells us, cover over the enquiry and suppress 
the problematological by not mentioning the problems that they solve.(Golden and 
Jamison, 1990: 343) 
To return to Mink's account of Collingwood; the relationship of the theory of 
absolute presuppositions to the dialectic of mind lies in what Mink refers to as the 
double genesis of fourth-level acts of consciousness. The double genesis arises 
from (a) the individual's acts of consciousness; and (b) the historically prior 
rational activities which feed into the life of reason and will. Thus the origins of 
fourth-level acts of consciousness are from below i.e. acts of consciousness of the 
individual, and from behind comes the 'energy and formal definiteness but also 
the strains and limitations of a particular question and answer process reflecting a 
particular conceptual system or constellation of absolute presuppositions.' (Mink, 
1969: 154) 
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This principle of double genesis can account for certain major differences among 
the interpretations of intellectual history in general. The history of philosophy can 
be read as a series of systems or of intellectual problems and their solutions 
completely unrelated to human experiences e.g. wars, or as a series of 
rationalizations of underlying processes of social change. The former, is the 
horizontal dimension, the later, the vertical dimension. The principle of double 
genesis suggest that both may be right in what they assert but they are wrong in 
what they deny. 
Finally it must be made clear as to the importance of absolute presupposition to 
historical study. Mink writes: 
In this respect, dieory of absolute presuppositions is a kind of transcendental deduction of 
the leading principle of the Geistwissenschaften : diat there are discernible patterns of 
imagination, belief and action in historical epochs, and that the analogies among artistic 
style, philosophical theories, religious beliefs and social and political institutions...while 
tiiey are neither adventitious nor causally explicable, are intelligible as exhibiting the 
complex structure of constellations of absolute presuppositions implicit at those times in 
men's interpretation of the world and of diemselves. The vertical and horizontal relations 
of absolute presuppositions constitute respectively die armature of historical reality and 
the dynamic of historical change. The logic of diought, dialectically interpreted, is die 
secret of history itself. 
(Mink, 1969: 156) 
Collingwood's approach to the past, as we have seen, was to maintain that the past 
does not exist independently of people thinking historically. Thinking historically 
means reconstructing the questions to which one's evidence, material or textual, 
may stand as answers. 
Karl Popper has drawn attention to the fact that there seems to be a close 
resemblance between Collingwood's claim that it is necessary to re-enact past 
thought and his own (problem) situation-analysis. Popper is concerned to show 
they are different despite the resemblance and that he gives the right account and 
Collingwood the wrong account. Popper has been concerned to explain how one 
might arrive at objective knowledge and avoid the problem of relativism due to the 
predilections of the researcher, (see quote below) There are, claims Popper, three 
worlds ; the first worid is that of physical matter - the material world. The second is 
the subjective - mental world ; the third is the objective world of the contents of 
thought. The objectivity of thought-content draws authority from Gottlob Frege 
who argued that mathematical and logical objects were distinct from the physical 
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symbols or the subjective ideas attending the symbols. Frege's objects which 
inhabit the third realm he called Gedanken and which closely correspond to what in 
English are referred to as propositions. (Skagestad, 1975: 44) 
Thought-contents do not reside in anybody's mind and can be shared in 
intersubjective communication. Knowledge is to be found in the third world. 
'Problem-situations are now something acknowledged as really existing, not 
something merely representing the researchers point of view.' (Skagestad, 1975: 
44) 
As Skagestad points out, the implication for the history of thought is this - theories 
arise out of problems as rational responses to them and the problems arise out of 
the state of the discussion.^ Thus to show why a particular theory arose involves 
showing how it relates to a specific problem and to the state of discussion that gave 
rise to the problem. 
History .then, is sui generis in the sense that its subject matter differs from that of the 
natural sciences ; history is concerned with rational beings, having thoughts, posing and 
solving problems, drawing inferences, and so forth. These thought, problems, etc, are 
members of the third world, and it is their third-world relations that the historian is 
interested in establishing, by the rational reconstruction of problem-situations or states of 
discussion ; " My thesis [Popper's DW] is that the main aim of all historical 
understanding is the hypothetical reconstruction of historical problem-situations ." 
(Skagestad, 1975: 44-5) 
Popper claims he differs with Collingwood in that what Collingwood thinks is 
essential is not the analysis of the situation itself but the historian's mental process 
of re-enactment. But as Skagestad shows : 
To take Popper's example : Galileo's problem may be formulated : "What causes the 
tides ?', and the historian's problem may be formulated : "What was Galileo's problem? 
But, in the latter formulation, the phrase 'Galileo's problem' is simply shorthand for 
"What causes the tides7, and posing the question "What was Galileo's problem?' involves, 
a fortiori, posing the question "What causes the tides?' The rational reconstruction of 
^ Again, with Popper, as with Meyer we get a reference to discourse, this time couched in terms 
of a 'state of discussion' 
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Galileo's problem, i.e. the search for the presuppositions on which Galileo's answer was a 
rational one, necessarily involves a serious attempt at solving Galileo's problem. This is 
essentially Collingwood's position ; evidently, it can be stated without any reference to 
the reproduction of psychological processes. 
(Skagestad, 1975: 55) 
Saari (1984) has set out what is involved in the activity of re-enactment as follows: 
(1) Reconstructing the epistemic and motivational premises from which the agent's 
deed followed as a practical inference. He (Collingwood) shows that a deed was the 
appropriate thing to do in that historical situation relative to the premises of his or 
her action. 
(2) Re-arguing the agent's arguments, i.e. the historian goes through exactly the 
same process of argument through which the agent arrived at his or her decision to 
perform the deed in the historical situation in question. 
(3) Interpreting critically the evidence and filling in the gaps in the evidence 
inferentially in such a way that the historian is able to construct a coherent and 
convincing picture of what happened. (Saari, 1984: 109) 
It is the contention of this thesis that the work on computational belief ascription 
(Ballim et.al.). mental spaces and simulative reasoning (Fauconnier, Dinsmore) and 
related work, substantially consists in the computational realisation of the re-
enactment approach. ViewGen, would seem to do just what Collingwood 
recommends. Indeed, as quoted in chapter three, Ballim et al say that one uses 
one's own state of mind as a metaphor for other people's. When interpreting an 
utterance (in this case, a distanciated material trace) the system must ascribe a 
speech act (action event) to that agent. This ascription is a matter of ascribing 
specific intentions, beliefs, desires, expectations etc. (Ballim,Wilks, and Bamden, 
1991: 134) Or again, in Norman's terms, re-enactment results in the construction 
of a conceptual model of a mental model, (see chapter three) The crucial point is 
how re-enactment is applied to what is being construed as evidence (but see below). 
Such approaches are then, potentially available for the purposes of historians and 
archaeologists. 
Collingwood argued that historical construction must not be merely plausible but 
must be a necessary account and involve nothing that is not necessitated by the 
evidence. Thus when the historian 'knows what happened' he already knows why 
it happened. In line with the logic of question and answer, the view that there is 
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continuity of thought and action expressed in the slogan 'an action is the unity of 
the outside and inside of an event', Collingwood denies that our knowledge of what 
was done could possibly be complete apart from our knowledge of why it was 
done. 
Take the example of Hadrian's Wall : What was Hadrian doing when he had a 
wall built across Britain ? An abstract and partial description of what he was doing 
would be 'building a wall'. But the question calls for a more complete 
description. To the extent that a description is incomplete, it will seem to call for an 
explanation which will be unforthcoming; to the extent that the phenomenon is 
described correctly, the description leaves no questions unanswered 
which arise from the description itself. Furthermore, (this point is central to 
the thesis) the dialectic of question and answer may be seen as an account of what 
Newell and Simon (1990) termed 'Heuristic Search' (see chapter three p.78). 
Newell and Simon argue that problem solving by search generates and 
progressively modifies symbol structures (in this case questions) until it produces a 
solution structure. The solution structure is attained when, as stated above, the 
description leaves no questions unanswered which arise from the description itself. 
Hence the correct description of an action can show the unity of its inside and 
outside, ( unity in the sense that convex/ concave have) thus to know one, is to 
know the other. Mink writes: 
It is not Collingwood's view that we first establish a description of someone's behaviour 
and then use this description to confirm or disconfirm various hypotheses about what 
"thoughts" inside his head were the "mental causes" of that behaviour. It is not his view 
that some actions have mental causes and other do not; thoughts do not cause actions but 
are expressed as aspects of activity and in no other way. It is for this reason that the 
correct or complete description of an action aheady says everything about the 
thoughtfulness of that action that can be said. The "thought of an agent" is describable 
because it is observable ; "re-enactment" is not a privileged way of gaining access to 
otherwise unobservable mental processes, but rather a necessary part of the observation 
and description of actions. 
(Mink, 1969: 190) 
History as re-enactment by question and answer exploits the asymmetry of the 
dialectical process. It is like the retracing of the logic of a random conversation. 
Seeing in retrospect what relevant associations are to be found in moving from 
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subject to subject 'the logic of question and answer does not tell us how to conduct 
the conversation but how to reconstruct it.' (Mink, 1969: 192) 
In reconstructing a past conversation the question arises as to how we can know 
whether or not we are in fact sharing the same mode of reasoning as the original 
participants in the discourse. In addressing a similar doubt, Ballim et.al. write: 
No finite set of dialogue observations could ever establish conclusively that another 
believer was using modus ponens. That being so, concentration on such issues that are 
not susceptible to proof seems, to us, only to delay the central issue, which is how to 
infer heuristically the actual beliefs of others. 
(Ballim, Wilks, and Bamden, 1991: 134) 
The job of the historian or archaeologist is not to reduplicate the past i.e. build a 
faithful representation of it, but to ask questions and answer them. Representations 
e.g. those built by ViewGen, are exploratory guides to the construction of a 
description of a situation, not ends in themselves. Thus there can be no limit to the 
number and kind of questions to be asked nor to the amount and kind of relevant 
evidence. Inquiry is itself an historical process. 
In order to demonstrate Collingwood's own treatment of the archaeological 
evidence I will now turn to his account of why Hadrian's wall was built, and in 
what way. 
A major focus of Collingwood's archaeological work was provided by the Roman 
Wall which runs from Wallsend-on-Tyne in the east to Bowness-on-Solway in the 
west i.e. Hadrian's Wall. 
The purpose of the Roman wall up and until 1921, had been thought of as akin to 
defensive town walls. Collingwood changed that view with a reconsideration that 
exemplified his notion of what historical understanding requires. Firstly, 
Collingwood argued that the construction of the wall made it quite unsuitable as a 
platform from which to fight off an invading force. Especially given what was 
known about Roman methods of fighting i.e. hand-to-hand in accordance with pre-
set routines on command. On analogy with the German limes ,6 Collingwood 
argued that the wall was primarily a marker of Roman jurisdiction and a lookout 
6 Limes is the term for the cleared land flanking a Roman military road, some of which marked 
the de facto frontier between Roman held territory and that of the indigenous population. Fixed 
frontier positions came later. 
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point. The forts along its length housed troops who would intercept enemy forces 
on the ground to the North of the Wall with the wall protecting their rear and flanks. 
In consequence of taking this view based on a thinking-through of Roman military 
tactics and fighting methods as well as the existence of models to which this view 
could be assimilated e.g. the German limes, Collingwood went on to postulate the 
existence of signal-stations to the west of the Bowness end of the wall e.g. along 
the coast of the Solway. Thus the possibility of a flanking movement by crossing 
the Solway firth by boat was covered. Three forts were already known on this 
coast. A four day expedition by Collingwood and two assistants located a probable 
10 sites of towers and 3 fortlets. Subsequent field work uncovered evenly spaced 
Roman structures running for twenty-six miles of the coast. 
Collingwood's presumption of a frontier system on the Cumberiand coast was an 
example of conditional inference. His conception of the wall's purpose, led him to 
locate his model of the wall in a form that was consistent with the topographical 
context of a coast line. When faced with man-made objects, it is necessary he 
asserted to ' ask what it was for, and whether the purpose embodied in it was 
successfully or unsuccessfully embodied.' (Couse, 1990: 66) These are historical 
questions and not to be answered by guesses but by the historical evidence. What 
needed to be thought through was what the authors of the physical evidence, 
artefacts or texts, had in mind when they gave rise to such material. It is necessary 
to infer from the circumstantial evidence provided by both forms of evidence, the 
physical remains and testimony where it exists. 
As far as Collingwood and the notion of psychological environment is concerned, 
Collingwood writes: 
In realizing its own rationality, mind also realizes the presence in itself of elements that 
are not rational...They are the blind forces and activities in us which are part of himian 
life as it consciously experiences itself, but are not parts of the historical process; 
sensation as distinct from thought, feelings as distinct from conceptions, appetite as 
distinct from will. Their importance to us consists in the fact that they form the 
proximate environment in which our reason lives, as our physiological organism is the 
proximate enviroimient in which they live. 
(Collingwood, 1936: 33) 
Collingwood excludes the 'blind forces' of emotion (feelings) and natural 
appetites from the subject matter of history, although he fully recognizes their 
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intimate role in human activities; what is important is the way such 'blind forces' in 
human life participate in the development of social customs and are sanctioned by 
convention and morality. (Collingwood, 1936: 16) 
5.11 Summary & Conclusions 
History in Collingwood's view only exists in the re-enactment of past thought. In 
this, he is not too far away from current post-processualist thinking. For the post-
processualist it is writing - 'rewriting' the past that brings it into existence. The 
objection to this view is that, potentially, anything goes. That there is a loss of 
objectivity. 
Collingwood's reply to this objection would be that history, as a practice, is 
concerned with asking and answering questions about the past which have arisen 
out of the consideration of material traces of the past which are existent in the 
present. The purpose of history is not to construct representations of a 'past', but to 
understand the trajectory of human thought as witnessed by the material evidence. 
The purpose of history is to understand human thought (as actions) which has lead 
to its present content and which is incapsulated in present thought. 
The doctrine of Re-enactment stipulates the necessary transcendental 
presuppositions required for historical thought.(Saari, 1984: 109) In re-thinking, 
historians place (incapsulate) past thought in the context of their own thoughts 
which transcend the re-thought thoughts. There is no question of complete 
identification of the historian's mind with the mind which is being studied. It is 
this gap between the historian's mind and the mind being studied that makes it 
possible for the historian to criticise the thoughts being studied. Thought, it must be 
remembered, consist in a dialectical scale of forms. Thus in rethinking Caesar's 
ambition, the historian cannot deal with ambitiousness in terms of its being a 
psychological characteristic. As Mink points out 'ambititiousness belongs to the 
second level of appetite (vague hunger for something) ; ambition belongs to the 
third level of desire (hunger for a specific object); ambitious decision belongs to 
the fourth level of will. In re-enacting the latter, the historian can and must re-enact 
ambitiousness and ambition as far as they survive in it.'(Mink 1968, 14) 
The logic (dialectic) of question and answer is the hermeneutical re-construction of 
a context (a form of life) for past thought expressed in material traces existing in the 
present. The thought expressed has no prior or independent existence apart from the 
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action which is its expression. Thus past thought is only accessible through being 
observable, the only questions that can arise about past forms of life are those 
which arise in the attempt to construct an intelligible context for the material traces. 
It is therefore argued here that the work by Ballim and others offers a controlled 
approach to constructing a 'conversation' in which the material traces are answers 
to questions. The questions are generated by exploring the implications of thought-
contents expressed in sets of propositions about the material traces. The intention is 
to exploit the precision and completeness in the use of available information offered 
by such computational methods. As Ballim, remarked, ViewGen takes its own 
belief states (expressed as propositions about the world and things in it) as a 
metaphor (model) of the agent's belief states. The simulative reasoning enacted by 
ViewGen or Dinsmore's mental spaces allows for the controlled and exhaustive 
elucidations of new feasible propositions. Feasible propositions about Palaeolithic 
life, i.e. propositions that could have been entertained in language by people then 
and expressed in actions would not include propositions about colour televisions 
and watching TV but would include propositions about animals, other humans, 
plants etc and determinate actions between them. Modes of reasoning adopted in the 
distant past, would certainly be inductive, if minimally deductive (see below). But 
how far it is possible to go with this is dictated by our ability to recognize the 
evidential status of material in the present and therefore what questions we can ask 
of it. The name of the game is making the material traces from the past intelligible, it 
is not to be able to say that this or that happened this way, only that it could have 
happened this way - and that we have, at this time, a warrant for so saying. 
It is therefore one thing to say we are different from those in the past, it is another 
to say that they are forever unintelligible to us. I f complete unintelligibility is 
proposed then on the same basis, we would also be unintelligible to each other. 
The central issue is not that we are the same or different, but understanding how we 
are the same, but different at all times. To make past life-ways intelligible we need 
to recognize or map the contours of the relevant psychological environment. The 
analytical key to understanding human action in a particular psychological 
environment is the unit of 'problem situation' in which people are confronted with 
a temporally fixed set of obstacles and affordances. But though we must f ix a 
situation, that is, reify it out of the flux of events in order to study it, it is always 
necessary to dissolve it back at some point into the flux lest the picture it offers us 
leads us into dogmatism. 
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5.2 Human Beings or Distorting Models 
In order to focus the issue of how human action should be modelled, I will 
examine a debate in Archaeology about how we should represent humans and 
understand their actions. The context of the debate was a jibe by Thomas (1988) 
accusing others (eg Jochim, 1976; Reynolds, 1986) of describing the Mesolithic 
period as i f it was a 'Cybernetic Wasteland'. Thomas was basically objecting to 
people in the Mesolithic period being characterized as Bayesian decision-makers^. 
More recently there is the publication of Mithen's The Thoughtful Foragers 
(1990) and further subsequent comment by Thomas (1991). 
Mithen's approach to the Mesolithic is an evolutionary ecological one in which he 
has sought to model decision-making by Mesolithic hunters by assuming that they 
were (a) rational decision-makers ; (b) processing information and taking decisions 
to attain various goals; (c) hampered by imperfect information ; and (d) subject to an 
inherently unpredictable environment. 
In The Thoughtful Foragers Mithen developed an algorithm which sought to 
embody the progress of a hunt. In constructing this algorithm, Mithen has drawn 
upon studies of both non-human and human foraging studies and psychology. The 
simulated hunt is decomposed into sub-goals in similar fashion to Newell and 
Simon's Heuristic search, Mithen comments 'the character of a problem and the 
different courses of action available are dependent upon the other problems and past 
solutions' (Mithen, 1990: 24) 
Mithen discusses how human decision making takes place within social contexts, 
but the relationship between people is restricted to that of mutual sources of 
information and the assessment of other's actions for one's own goals. Mithen 
utilises the discussion by Carston^ of human cognition and arrives at the following 
conclusions: 
^ By this it is meant that they (we) calculate the probabilities of outcomes (i.e. the basis of 
decisions) based on Bayes's Theorem which states 'that the probability of the hypothesis 
conditional on the data (or the posterior probability of the hypothesis) is equal to the probability of 
the data conditional on the hypothesis (or the likelihood of the hypothesis) times the probability 
(the so-called prior probability) of the hypothesis, all divided by the probability of the data' 
(HowsonandUrbach 1989:26) 
^ Carston, R. (1988) 'Language and Cognition' In Linguistics : The Cambridge Survey, 
Vol iii. Language: Psychological and Biological Aspects, F.J. Newmyer (ed.), pp 38-
68 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
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Knowledge of the world must also refer to what the world will be like at some time in the 
future, a belief as to the state of oneself and one's environment. Moreover since decision 
making is concerned with choosing between alternative courses of action we are concerned 
with knowledge about several, perhaps many, diffCTcnt possible worlds each resulting 
from one of the possible choices. It is on the basis of these beliefs about future possible 
states of the world that choice is made. In this respect we have characterised the mind as a 
means for making multiple simulation models of the future. 
(Mithen, 1990: 27) 
Mithen (1991), in further defence of his position, turns to the work of Oatley and 
Johnson-Laird (1987) who suggest that emotions have important cognitive 
function. Emotions are 'part of a solution to problems of organizing knowledge 
and action in a world that is imperfectly known and in which we have limited 
resources' (Oatley, 1992:3) The same point may be made with more colour by 
saying emotions function when rational solutions are unavailable by prompting 
commitment to plans or changes of plan e.g when agreeing to marry. 
Thomas originally argued that our understanding of the Mesolithic - Neolithic 
transition (i.e. from hunter-gathering to Agriculture) might best be achieved by 
'injecting a little history and human intentionality into the cybernetic wasteland of 
the Mesolithic.' (Thomas, 1988: 64) 
In response to Thomas, Mithen states his methodological perspective in 
contradistinction to what he takes Thomas's objection to be ; Mithen writes: 
At the heart of such ecological approaches is the notion of the individual as a Bayesian 
decision-maker: a rational, though imperfect, processor of information. The question 
prompted by Thomas's paper is whether this emphasis on the mind as an information 
processor loses something that is quintessentially human - the rich emotional life that 
people experience 
(Mithen, 1991: 10) 
We may point out here that the notion that humans are Bayesian decision-makers 
has been called into question; most recently, by Oaksford and Chater (1992) on the 
basis of computational intractability. It may be useful here to reiterate what Evans 
had to say on the question of human reasoning, namely, that one of the mysteries of 
reasoning research is that while human beings are manifestly intelligent in general 
they seem biased and error-prone when confronted with explicit reasoning tasks in 
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the laboratory. The answer, according to Evans may be that comparatively little 
real-world intelligence requires such explicit reasoning; that most reasoning 
involves the automatic induction and application of knowledge based schemas. 
However, the bounded rationality argument is answered. I f people do not use 
explicit reasoning processes in complex real-world situations, then the proposed 
criticisms of current theories of explicit reasoning evaporate. 
In defending his approach to decision-making, Mithen, I would say, 
misrepresents Oatley and Johnson-Laird. In Best Laid Schemes: the 
psychology of Emotions (1992) Oatley does indeed make much of the 
functional role of emotions that he and Johnson-Laird have claimed for them. But 
Oatley's discussion of Emotions is much more sensitive to wider social and ethical 
consideration. Oatley writes 
The fact is, as Kierkegaard supposed, that we live in two worlds simultaneously : a world 
of social and biological mechanisms that compel us though they are perhaps technically 
predictable and a world of possibilities limited only by our individual imagination and our 
preparedness to cooperate with one another...To a limited extent, then, as selves in 
relation to others, we come into a position to steer a litde bit. It is not that the worid 
comes imder control, but that oiu" actions and those of others with whom we construct 
mutual plans become, within limits, predictable and comprehensible, so that we may rely 
on ourselves and others. 
(Oatley, 1992: 413) 
I wi l l now turn to Thomas's further criticisms of Mithen, and tangentially, 
Collingwood. 
The nub of Thomas's criticism is the jdea that there is a stable and hence 
decontextualized human subject. (Thomas, 1991: 17) 
This supposed craving for the stable subject that can be modelled, mathematically 
in Mithen's case, is taken by Thomas to be the denial of history and the 
subordination of context. Quoting Michel Foucault, Thomas argues that there is 
nothing in man - not even his body - that is stable enough to serve as the beisis for 
self-recognition or the understanding of others. 'Desires, emotions, forms of 
reason and techniques of self-interpretation are all contingent and historically 
situated. Only when we abandon any fixed points in the human condition do we 
begin to think historically.' (Thomas, 1991: 17) Thomas goes on : 
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Htmian beings make themselves through their actions and interpretations, but they do so 
in the context of a certain 'technology of the self which exists independendy of the 
individual, in practices, tastes, opinions, theories, and language which are die domain of 
society. In consequence, the constitution of human identity is enmeshed in political 
strategies, whether overt or covert. 
(Thomas, 1991: 18) 
Thomas (1990) makes reference to Paul Ricoeur's distinguishing of three tropes 
of historical writing, they are (a) History-as-same; (b) History-as-other ; and (c) 
History-as-analogue. The bulk of archaeological writing falls under the category of 
History-as-same. i.e. people in the past are no different to ourselves. Collingwood, 
notes Ricoeur, offers the most sophisticated version of history-as-same ; and 
Thomas notes that Hodder takes Collingwood to be implying that certain universal 
structuring principles allow unique events to be appreciated by all people at all 
times. This is true of Collingwood, 'we are still the same naked animal', but only 
up to a point. 
All diese ways of working with tools are specialized ways of working without them. Man 
digs with a plough or a hoe or stick because he has first dug with his bare hands. He 
hunts with weapons because he once hunted unarmed. He judges the sowing time by the 
stars because he once judged it by guess-work. And however far he goes on the road of 
mechanization, he must still have a strong enough faith in his immediate activity to 
assure him that he can handle the tools he has invented and make them do what he 
wants...Behind all his array of scientific tools, man is still the same naked animal.^ 
(van der Dussen, 1981: 191) 
Technology has then, expanded our umwelt. It is also argued above, that for 
Collingwood, the principle of the double genesis of consciousness, that is, the 
vertical and horizontal relations of absolute presuppositions constitute the armature 
of historical reality and the dynamic of history. Again quoting Foucault, Thomeis 
dismisses the possibility of any universal structuring principle. FoucaultlO stated 
that 'there is nothing absolutely primary because, when all is said and done, 
underneath it all everything is already interpretation.'(Thomas, 1990: 19) 
9 Unpublished Manuscript 
10 Foucault, M. 1976 Nietzsche, Freud, Marx. In: Nietzche Paris: Cahiers de 
Rojaumont 
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History-as-other is typified by Foucault whose historicising of seeming universals 
of the human condition is achieved by the act of contrasting past and present. 
Genealogy - a contrastive history - Thomas argues, can provide a paradigm for 
effective archaeological research. Thomas states that: 
Such an archaeology, then would oppose itself to the forcing of the past into the present 
categories and classification. At each stage it attempts to maintain the strangeness of the 
past, its alien quality... So just as Derrida can demonstrate the absence of any fixity of 
meaning by moving constantly from one signifier to the next, we might search endlessly 
for a written past which finally breaks its ties widi the present. At some point we must 
come to a stop and write a story. 
(Thomas, 1990: 20) 
At this point history-as-analogue emerges as a narrative which we write but 
acknowledge as not the real past. The question now must be answered as to 
whether Thomas (and Foucault) have the right of it. 
Firstly, the phrase 'human identity' is somewhat incoherent. Individuals, we may 
say, have identities. Universals, on the other hand, marked by terms such as 
'human', we say, have natures. Again, human identities are not enmeshed in 
political strategies, rather, political strategies are constituted by, are expressed 
through human actions. Social practices, tastes, opinions, theories, and language 
may be beyond the control of the individual, given, in one sense. But all individuals 
partake in such and thereby contribute to them and shape them also. 
Subjectivity according to John Barrett, a notable Post-processualist is 'the means 
of knowing the worid and one's place in i t ' (Barrett, 1991: 2) Subjectivity in one 
sense, as given, is historically situated, but that does not mean it is unintelligible, 
'his mind is not an object in-it-self ; it is an attitude towards the real world, and to 
know his mind is to know and share that attitude.' (Collingwood, 1916: 156) But 
there is a different notion of subjectivity that has already been mentioned, one that 
does not see the ascription of mental predicates as marking subjectivity, but rather, 
as the fundamental mark of species recognition on which all social, and thereby 
individual life is constructed. 
For Collingwood, as for Wittgenstein and Weil, mind is never a mere spectacle to 
be watched from the outside, but always something that can be penetrated and seen 
from the inside, something one can share an attitude with, and this thereby marks 
the fundamental recognition of humanity. This 'attitude towards a soul' the 
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recognition of the humanity of others, not merely spans time, but is the universal 
foundation of self-hood. I f one denied all others, one would deny oneself. 
Thomas argues that desires, emotions, forms of reason and techniques of self-
interpretation are all contingent and historically situated. But what is it for desire 
and emotion to be historically situated ? Individuals are historically situated, and 
objects of desire are likewise historically situated e.g. someone in the Mesolithic 
could not desire to own a computer. Emotions and desire may be culturally 
controlled, i.e. what emotions can be expressed, or should not be expressed ; what 
may or what may not be desired. Emotion and its forms of expression (e.g. 
smiling) however, are grounded in our physiology, and physiology (our body) 
largely defines our emotional capabilities. Collingwood brings this point out in the 
passage below: 
Seeing and hearing are alternative specifications of their common genus sensation...so 
that an act of seeing is one act of sensation, and an act of hearing is another...we are 
preforming two acts of sensation at once...There is a relation between sensation and 
emotion which is more intimate than this. When an infant is terrified at the sight of a 
scarlet curtain blazing in the sunlight, diere are not two distinct experiences in its mind, 
one a sensation of red and the other an emotion of fear ; there is only one experience, a 
terrifying red. We can certainly analyse that experience into two elements, one sensuous 
and the other emotional ; but this is not to divide it into two experiences, acting 
independent of the other, like seeing red and hearing the note of a bell 
(Collingwood, 1958: 161) 
As Oatley maintains pace Harre, 'emotions are in part socially constructed, but 
they are constructed around a biological basis - a basis of mental states ^  concerned 
with the cognitive management of priorities in our everyday plans and actions. The 
occasions for these states depend strongly on the culture in which we live.' (Oatley, 
1992:119) Furthermore, in some cultures, there may be codes of conduct 
(e.g.keeping a stiff upper lip) which seek to control the expression of emotions and 
rules about what to do in certain social situations which actively suppress 
demonstrativeness, but not the emotions themselves. Oatley cites the Chewong of 
Malasia, in this context. Finally, as quoted above, Collingwood specifically 
discounts emotions as being proper objects of historical knowledge, but sees them 
as constituents of mind. The importance of emotions consist in the fact that they 
For Collingwood, emotion is an integral part of consciousness and is carried dirough, even into 
making an inference. 
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form the proximate environment in which our reason lives, as our physiological 
organism is the proximate environment in which they live. 
In order to further turn Foucault's spade, and thereby Thomas's, I must deal 
with the claim that underneath everything, there is only interpretation. Fortunately, 
Richard Shusterman (1992) has done this, or at least shown how this might be 
done. But also to be noted is the point that Weil made about our bodies 
categorizing the world before any thought, (see p. 57) 
Shusterman denies the hermeneutical universalist claim that there are no facts only 
interpretations by pointing out that although all understanding is selective, not all 
selective understanding is interpretive. Thus when understanding's selection is 
neither conscious nor deliberate but pre-reflective and immediate, we have no 
reason to regard that selection or the resultant understanding as interpretation. We 
can, claims Shusterman, understand something without thinking about it at all. 
Quoting Wittgenstein To interpret is to think, to do something ; seeing is a state... 
when we interpret we form a hypothesis vyhich may prove false' (Wittgenstein, 
1988a: § I I xi 212) Seeing 'the pain' in another, is not to make a hypothesis about 
that pain, rather, we hypothesis about its cause. Shusterman writes: 
To interpret a text would be to produce (at least mentally) an articulation ; a proper 
reaction, a shudder or a tingle, may be enough to indicate that one has understood. Some 
of the things we experience and understand are never captured by language, not only 
because their particular feel defies adequate hnguistic expression but because we are not 
even aware of them as "things" to describe. They are the felt background we presuppose 
when we start to articulate or to interpret. 
(Shusterman, 1992: 134) 
Mulhall's (1990) discussion of Wittgenstein's notion of 'seeing an aspect' and 
Heidegger's 'readiness-to-hand' add further weight to the claim that some 
understanding involves no interpretation. With regards to our utilization of objects, 
Mulhall argues that we sight through an object when encountering them in 
particular activities. The particular way we engage an object orients us towards a 
particular goal upon which we are focused directly and the things in our 
environment - given the kinds of things that they are - are treated as means towards 
that goal. In Gibsonian terms we directly perceive the affordances they offer us. 
Thus, the intentional acts that a person can perform within a social context, just like 
any other goal-directed action, are situated with respect to particular objects, these 
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objects are invested with functional meaning in relation to these actions. Treating 
material objects in their own right involves a completely different orientation and 
suspends the unhesitating way they can be absorbed into our activities as means. 
Mulhall writes: 
Similarly, an apt way of characterizing a relation of continuous aspect perception towards 
language would be to say that, in it, words are ready-to-hand for the speaker or author or 
audience. We do not have to ranember that "tree" means tree, texts and speeches directly 
convey information and express emotion rather than confronting us with symbols 
requiring interpretation: is short, words are available to us as particular means of 
achieving om- purposes and goals - just as a hammer is imhesitatingly utilized when our 
goal is hammering nails. 
(Mulhall, 1990: 140) 
When it comes to other people, we may or may not treat them in just the same 
instrumentalist way. To treat people in an instrumentalist way e.g. as Mithen does, 
is to reduce human action to utility, either for themselves or others. 
As I have shown, Collingwood, as much as any post-processualist, denies the 
objectivity of the past, but what he does claim is that there is continuity between 
past and present; continuity given in the development of mind i.e. self knowledge. 
It is the task of historians (broadly taken) to trace that development as and where 
they can on the basis of whatever can be couched as evidence. 
The claim that Collingwood, like many in archaeology, deals in history-as-same 
(albeit a sophisticated version) is unsustainable. Rather, Collingwood commends 
History-as-analogue based on at least, what Krausz (1991) terms Praxial 
constructionism. Krausz writes: 
the praxial constructionist makes no claims about whether diere is a past actually beyond 
that constructed by the historian. He or she affirms only that if there were such a past it 
could do no methodological or praxial work...as regards the conduct of historical inquiry, 
an historian is constrained by what survives, die materials and procedures of historical 
research. 1^ 
(Krausz, 1991: 218, 227) 
12 A case could probably be made for seeing Collingwood as a global constructionist - as one who 
holds that we can have no knowledge of a reality independent of the framework of knowing. 
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The point about the double genesis of consciousness lies in the distinction to be 
made in the apprehension of the social life made by an individual in their 
immediate consciousness of it, and their apprehension of 'continual becoming' 
within their life as already historically situated. The same situation can appear as 
perfectly stable (the same) and fleetingly transient (all ways different) to the same 
person at one and the same moment. The whole point of historical re-enactment is 
to try and stabilize transience by explicitly recognizing what features of human 
existence can be taken as stable and what must be held as transient. What is stable 
is that we are the same naked animal i.e. physical and cognitive potential, what is 
transient is the matrix of the umwelt, but there is an unbroken link in the 
transformed forms of the human umwelt. 
5,3 Belief & Conduct: 
In the above discussion, there is a tacit assumption that human conduct is 
rationalistic and amenable to corrective judgements; but beliefs are not all 
rationalistic. 
According to Vandenberg beliefs can be defined as fervent hopes maintained in the 
face of existential stress. In Collingwood's scheme, at the level of desire, opinion 
becomes conviction (a firmly held belief) as a result of critical comparison. Or at the 
level of wil l , as a result of reasoning. (Knowledge is opinion fastened by a chain). 
Furthermore beliefs are the thoughts that stand behind what is expressed in a 
statement or proposition, as their presuppositions. Absolute presuppositions are, in 
Mink's account of Collingwood, historically situated systems of a priori concepts. 
With Norman, mental models are constituted by beliefs about the worid. For 
Wittgenstein beliefs are inculcated with the training in one's first language. In 
learning to uses words and phrases etc, in many specific situations, we learn their 
meanings and thereby come to form beliefs about the worid . Thus beliefs are 
hinges around which our reasoning about the worid revolves. The belief that nature 
is uniform may be seen as a deep absolute presupposition about the worid. 
Rapaport points out that beliefs are sometimes about non-existents and one can 
believe propositions that are false. 
A l l the above take belief, generally, to be the result of empirical thought. There is, 
however, another form of belief which certainly does not rest on reason. Namely, 
religious belief. 
With empirical belief a person's decisions as to what to believe are grounded in 
information derived from perception etc, and a change in information may bring 
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about a change in belief. These are the kind of beliefs modelled by ViewGen. But a 
Christian's belief in God does not depend on the historical truth of the bible and 
cannot be refuted by any argument that shows the non-existence of God. Barrett 
(1991) after reviewing Wittgenstein's writings on religious belief concluded that 
religious belief is always a belief in something. But what that something is, is 
shown by what we do rather than by what we say, in praxis rather than dogma, 
theory and theological speculation. Wittgenstein , in his Remarks on Frazer's 
Golden Bough asks 'Was Augustine mistaken then when he called on God on 
every page of of the Confessions' and 'A religious symbol does not rest on any 
opinion. And error belongs only with opinion.' (Wittgenstein, 1989a: 3e) 
When, as Wittgenstein says , someone kisses the picture of a loved one, this act is 
not based on the belief that such an act will have any definite effect on the jjerson in 
the picture, rather, we act this way, and feel satisfied. And Collingwood remarked 
that' I have heard a philosopher confess a desire to dance upon a book whose 
doctrines he disapproved of (van der Dussen, 1981: 188) 
Both Wittgenstein and Collingwood make the same criticism of Frazer, namely, 
that he tries to explain ritual practice in scientific terms. According to Collingwood, 
both Frazer and Taylor treat magic as functional whereas Freud and Jung treat 
magic as psychological. Both methodologies are described by Collingwood as 
naturalistic. By naturalistic, he means that they treat the subject matter as external to 
a thinker, something that is not themselves but something else.' A "primitive" mind 
as the essential characteristic of the "savage" is constructed as an outward 
phenomenon, completely separate from the "civilized" mind that is studying it. It is 
classified, according to naturalistic methods, as mythopoeic insanity (Miiller), folly, 
(Frazer), or Neurosis (Freud).'(van der Dussen, 1981: 184 )13 None of these 
writers, according to Wittgenstein, takes account of the fact that magic and ritual 
play a special role in the lives of those who practice them, the striking fact being 
that it is only on certain occasions that people act in this way. Wittgenstein writes: 
That a man's shadow which looks like a man, or that his mirror image, or that rain, 
thunderstorms, the phases of the moon, the changes of seasons, the likeness and 
differences of animals to one another and to human beings, the phenomenon of death, of 
birth and of sexual life, in short everything a man perceives year in, year out, connected 
1^ Unpublished Manuscript 
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together in a variety of ways - that all this should play a part in his thinking (his 
philosophy) and his practices, is obvious, or in other words this is what we really know 
and find interesting. 
(Wittgenstein, 1989a: 6e) 
Maurice Bloch (1992) has recently argued for the 'quasi-universality' of minimal 
religious structures. According to Bloch, this universality rest on the fact that the 
vast majority of societies represent human hfe as occurring within a permanent 
framework which transcends the natural transformative process of birth, growth, 
reproduction, ageing and death. It is the near-universality of this construct, Bloch 
argues, which accounts for the occurrence and re-occurrence of the same structural 
pattern in ritual and other religious representations. ' I am seeking' he says, 'to 
establish a connection between a religious construction and universal human 
constraints.' (Bloch, 1992: 4) 
On a different aspect of religious and magical belief, Pascal Boyer (1992) looking 
at how anthropologists have understood magic and ritual, remarks that 
anthropologists when confronted with a "strange" account of why something did or 
did not happen, often take this to mean that the informant has a very different notion 
of causality. Questions of what constitutes rationality often then arise. 
Boyer takes a different approach to the question of causality by looking at the 
cognitive processes involved in representing causal connections. Boyer cites the 
experiment by Michotte^^ which seemed to show that some abstract principles of 
causation are mentally represented. 
Boyer writes: 
My argument here is that such abstract principles are so vague and unconstraining that 
they contribute very little to the cognitive salience of causal judgement. 
There are two main problems with the anthropological use of "principles of causality" as 
a solution to the problems of strangeness. One problem is that the abstract principles of 
causality that can be inferred from people's causal claims are in fact much less 
constraining than this description would require. Another problem is that the idea of a 
noncausal description of events makes little sense because the predicates used to represent 
events are often implicitly causal. 
(Boyer, 1992: 192) 
14 Michotte, A (1963) The Perception of Causality New York: Basic Books 
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Thus according to Boyer, causal judgements (outside western scientific practice) 
are not judged valid or natural on the basis of a strongly constraining notion of 
causation consisting of necessary / sufficient conditions for causal connectedness. 
The focus of Boyer's attack in this paper is the notion of cultural schemata and 
covering laws and the roles they are thought to play in causal judgements. 
Cultural knowledge, according to Boyer, is often described as consisting in 
schemata, that is, abstract rules specifying relationships between concepts, e.g. 
I F (ancestors angry) 
THEN (poor crops) 
Thus Clark (1990), mentioned in the second chapter, talks about general 
psychological laws couched in terms of beliefs and desires which constitute our 
folk or naive psychology. The implication being that the main cognitive processes 
involved in making causal judgements consist in providing instances for the 
variable ranges i.e. producing propositions from such schemata as above. The 
assumption being that people brought up in a certain culture are led to entertain a 
mentally represented schema of the form above and consequentially identify certain 
events or states of affairs as being instances of the conceptual slots in the schema. 
Boyer argues that the identification of the appropriate variable is not straight 
forward and is always uncertain. In the schema above, how does one tell i f in fact 
the ancestors are angry ? The application of a causal schema to any singular event or 
state of affairs presupposes the identification of those singular objects (situations) 
as belonging to certain types. For instance, Boyer cites the use of magical stones by 
the Aguaruna people of the Peruvian Amazon. These stones (there are three types) 
which are held to be magical in some way do not necessarily belong to any 
particular type of mineral. They may be any kind of stone at all. Thus 'finding out 
whether a stone belongs to any of the three categories (i.e.has magical powers) is a 
matter of reasoned guesses and corrigible inference.' (Boyer, 1992: 201) The 
identification or expectation, of causal powers, Boyer states, is generally founded 
on taxonomic identification and conversely, taxonomies of kinds, events, and 
properties are partly founded on causal criteria. Boyer writes: 
This applies to causal judgements in general; The "schematic" description of causal 
thinking should therefore include some description of the identification procedures 
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subjects use to sort out situations and objects. In the case of magical claims, the 
identification procedure takes place in a context of uncertainty. 
(Boyer, 1992: 202) 
At the heart of the notion of cultural schemata is the idea that people deductively 
generalize from the schemata to singular events, but, claims Boyer, deductive 
reasoning does not exhaust the actual use of cultural knowledge. This is particularly 
true, it is argued, in the domain of magic. Here, schemata do not provide a stable 
knowledge structure or base and must be ramified by conjecture and ad hoc 
hypotheses which are limited to certain specific contexts. 
After a discussion of the Fang people and their notion of evur (something which 
give superhuman power and is located in the stomach), Boyer notes that 
conversations about evur fall into two distinct registers. One consisting of vague 
generalizations put forward during causal conversations or contained in proverbs 
and other oral genre. The other type of discourse concerning evur, consists of 
definite and reliable statements about evur. These are termed by Boyer "specialist 
discourses". Some possessors of evur, e.g. witch doctors, use their evur to 
combat evil and antisocial influences on people. But as Boyer notes, their assertions 
are never about general properties of the "witchcraft organ" they are always focused 
on singular situations and problems. Thus witch doctors seldom make certain 
causal inferences on the basis of transmitted abstract models. Rather, they build a 
certain prototypical model by generalizing from singular cases and singular 
assertions about cases. (Boyer, 1992: 205) 
Boyer writes: 
The assumptions concerning evur that are used in causal judgements are not 
schemata...they do not constitute a stable knowledge structure made of general 
assertions...Rather, they are created by generalizing from singular instances, taken either 
from discourse or from experience and with the particular purpose of explaining a given 
singular situation Such generalizations do not become part of a "cultural model" of evur; 
they are transient structures that survive only so far as they make some particular 
explanations possible. 
(Boyer, 1992: 205) 
The problem of anthropological descriptions of magic and ritual, Boyer argues, 
is that they only consider deductive processes and not inductive reasoning which 
Boyer (also Wittgenstein) sees as the main process of belief fixation. Cultural 
schemata in part equate to folk or naive psychology but the implication to be taken 
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from Boyer's study is that folk or naive psychology as described by Clark in the 
second chapter is itself an ordering or rationalization which only captures features 
of our discourse about the world but not how we in fact go on in the world. Our 
beliefs are shown in the multifarious things we do (re Wittgenstein), and are 
thereby only individuated by the multifarious actions we undertake. Our beliefs are 
only imperfectly expressed by what we say about what we do. The falsity of our 
beliefs lies, not in expressing what is not the case, but in undertaking an 
inappropriate set of actions. This is central for any understanding of ritual practice 
as witnessed in the archaeological record. As argued above, past thought is 
identifiable because it is observable. It is in the remains of practices that non-
empirical beliefs are to be found, and not in propositions generated by social 
schema or more generally, world views.(This point will be taken up again in the 
next chapter.) 
The key point about deduction in our culture is the emphasis on validation and 
internal coherence. It is this which gives rise to the methodological and self-
correcting nature of our science. Falsity of belief presupposes standards of 
appropriate behaviour given by a form of life. The belief in God can only be seen as 
a false belief on the presumption that truth is empirically verifiable. 
Thus Wittgenstein writeslS; 
Queer as it sounds : The historical accounts in the Gospels might, historically speaking, 
be demonstrably false and yet belief would lose nothing by this: not, however because it 
concerns 'universal truths of reason'! Rather, because historical proof (the historical 
proof-game) is irrelevant to belief. This message (the Gospels) is seized on by men 
believingly (i.e. lovingly). That is the certainty characterizing this particular acceptance-
as-true, not something else. 
(Hannay, 1991: 139) 
According to Collingwood, our civilization has suppressed magic by the deliberate 
cultivation of a thick skinned or insensitive attitude towards emotion This 
suppression was achieved by the adoption of utilitarianism; our civilization prides 
itself on being rational and business-like, every act, custom and institution must 
show its utility. The outcome of worshipping utility, is a self-inflicted violence on 
our emotions, in order that they might be suppressed. The horror and fascination of 
15 Wittgenstein, L . (1989) Culture and Value trans. Peter Winch, ed. G.H. von Wright 
Oxford: Blackwell 
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magic (for us) lies in our perception of it being the systematic and organized 
expression of emotion. Collingwood writes: 
What we call primitive man does not lack science. He understands enough of mechanics, 
of chemistry, of biology, to plough and fish and throw spears, to light fires and bake 
pots, and to sow seed and breed animals...The savage is not outside us ; he is inside us. 
Conceiving ourselves as rational and civilized people, which is what we want to be, we 
are aware within ourselves of savage and irrational elements, part of our selves which we 
would willingly disown...In order to understand magic among primitives it is therefore 
first necessary to look for and understand certain emotions among ourselves. 16 
(van der Dussen, 1981: 190) 
To understand the action and beliefs of others we must temper the desire to be 
rationalistic and look to our own case, our own emotions, as also a guide; rather 
than our cultural emphasis on formal reasoning. The steadfastness of belief arises 
out of a form of life which gives the bedrock of our beliefs, the hinges, as 
Wittgenstein says, of our reasoning. Such belief is not solely intellectual or rational 
and based on evidence. It is also psychological - suffused with emotional content, 
ethical and based on a model of how we either wish to lead our life or think we 
ought to lead our life together with others. 
In the next chapter I will endeavour to tease out an approach to constructing the 
psychological environment from an archaeological perspective. I will also discuss 
the notion of representation and its application to archaeological problems. I 
conclude the chapter with a brief discussion on the future of archaeology and joint 
work with psychology. 
16 UnpubUshed Manuscript 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SOLVING T H E PROBLEMS 
OF 
A R C H A E O L O G Y & L I F E 
When these painful contradictions are removed...our minds, no longer 
vexed, will cease to ask illegitimate questions. 1 
Heinrich Hertz The Principles of Mechanics 
For the life of mind consists of raising and solving problems, problems in 
art, religion, science, commerce, politics, and so forth. The solution of the 
problems does not leave behind it a sediment of ascertained fact, which 
grows and solidifies as the mind's work goes on. Such a sediment is 
nothing but the externality of a half-solved problem : when the problem is 
fully solved the sediment of information disappears and the mind is left at 
liberty to go on 
R. G.CoUingwood Speculum mentis 
6.0 Introduction 
Lewis Binford complained that archaeology was dominated by a normative view 
of culture, meaning that a culture is composed / defined by a set of internalized 
ideas or norms carried by individuals and transmitted by diffusion and socialization; 
thus a cultural tradition is a patterned and integrated whole formed by a set of 
covarying ideas or norms which 'flow' across space and time. He also argued that 
Culture-history was vitiated, because it had to accommodate the psychological 
make up of people no longer with us ; material culture was said to be caused by the 
now opaque ideas in the minds of past peoples, therefore Binford and others 
argued that traditional archaeology could not test their theories because the "seat of 
causation" (meaning the conceptions and beliefs of past peoples) was not 
preserved. 
Post-processualists however now argue that it is prima facie implausible that 
human action could be adequately comprehended in strictly eco-materialistic terms 
given its distinctively intentional nature. Binford's theory cuts against both common 
1 Quoted in Monk, R. (1991) Ludwig Wittgenstein : The Duty of Genius p.446 
Vintage 
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sense and an extensive tradition in social scientific theory which presumes human 
subjects to be agents. Intentionality, concepts, beliefs, emotion, and subjectivity are 
now seen as necessary factors when dealing with human action, past or present. 
In this chapter I will endeavour to map out an old but now updated approach to the 
archaeological interpretation of human action. 
6.1 The Psychological Environment 
The human environment or umwelt, is not simply other people or things in the 
world, it is these together with the affordances for behaviour that they offer. It is 
species specific. The human point of view both reflects and defines what it is to be 
human. The human point of view is defined by the nature of the human ecological 
reality. (Loveland, 1991: 102) Our attitude towards a soul arises out of the 
recognition of other creatures as sharing the same complex set of transactions with 
the environment as we do. In so far as we recognise human behaviour in the 
material traces derived from the remote or near past, we posit the common ground 
on which we may seek to build an understanding of them. 
The dialectical relation between the individual and the group, is captured by 
CoUingwood's double genesis of consciousness, functioning as the armature of 
history. A more recent formulation of this idea would be Gidden's theory of 
structuration, thus 'Social structures are both constituted by human agency, and 
yet at the same time the very medium of human agency.' (Still and Good, 1992: 
109) 
We are able to act in the world in ways constrained by our ability to directly 
perceive affordances offered by things, peoples and situations. Ongoing activity, 
that is, the cultural setting is the immediate context of any individuated act. Thus 
act and context mutually constrain and support each other and neither can be 
described in isolation from the other. Still & Good (1992) state that: 
If we accept the view derived from Vygotsky that culture is located in the everyday 
practices...it presumably constrains the flow of social activity itself, it is not just 
present in the affordances abstracted from the flow. Culture is thus " an ethos embodied in 
practices, skills, habits, and styles, not a world view abstracted from the reality it 
encompasses"...Hence it is by no means a distorting screen between us and the real 
world... 
(Still and Good, 1992: 115) 
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Culture or tradition does not mean some Popperian third world composed of 
abstract intellectual systems independent of their implementation in people's minds. 
Rather, tradition takes the form of tradition-as-concrete-objects to use 
Boyer's (1987) terminology e.g stories, and artefacts. Boyer writes: 
Consequentially, it is impossible to use the term 'tradition' in any empirically significant 
way without making precise psychological claims about individual processes of 
memorization... The re-arrangements and adaptations undergone by traditional stories are a 
consequence of their pertinence. Peoples must 'process' them in order to remember them, 
as a material that cannot be connected to previous knowledge is very likely to be 
abandoned. The stories that are not distorted or re-arranged are simply forgotten, and the 
same holds for most traditional phenomena. In other words the 'choice' in traditional 
societies is not between verbatim reproduction and distortion, but between constant re-
arrangement and obUvion. 
(Boyer, 1987: 62) 
Boyer goes on to argue that 'conceptions', ideas, beliefs or 'world views' and 
other intellectual constructions, cannot be repeated. But it is utterances and 
gestures, and I would add, material transformations (physical actions), that are 
reiterated or repeated. It is what is actually treated as relevant, repeated and 
authoritative which lies at the surface of social communication i.e. memorized 
gesture, utterances and forms of action. 
The claim that culture is composed of a set of covarying ideas or norms (re 
Binford) is rebuffed by the central role of Gibsonian affordances in mediating 
human actions and Boyer's emphasis on cognitive processing in the act of 
repeating or reiterating what is relevant to the people concerned. But of course, as 
Collingwood would have i t ' the mind is what it does ; it is not a thing that thinks, 
but consciousness ; not a thing that wills, but an activity.' (Collingwood, 1916: 34) 
Thus in so far as we can arrive at a description that leaves no question unanswered 
that arises from the description itself, we have correctly described what has been 
done and what has been thought. What is done and what is thought stand as the 
unity of inside and outside - concave and convex. 
This view of culture also points the way to resolving (exploring at least) the 
question as to why variation, discontinuities, reversal of trends and other anomalies 
are found in the archaeological record. 
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I f we take the example of flint knapping: knapping is a craft, therefore, there is a 
distinction between means and ends. In reaching the end, the finished flint, the 
means has disappeared. The means here are the raw material to be transformed, 
tools used and the controlled , ordered actions which bring about the transformation 
of the flint. Tools, when not used, are potential means. The final form of the flint is 
determined by the degree of control over the process exercised by the knapper in the 
face of contingent flaking. The skill therefore lies in the ability of the knapper to 
adapt the sequence of types of blows to the flint. Too rigid a routine or un-reflexive 
knapping in general would lead to widely variant results. There would be no proper 
form. Fashioning a flint requires the skill to be able to judge when one form of 
blow - strength, position, angle, etc - is appropriate or not. This ability to judge is 
just like the ability to use words in the appropriate context in the appropriate way. 
With regards to learning one's mother tongue. Rush Rhees states that: 
There is not any single thing which is learning to speak - as though that were an 
operation too, or something over and above what we do with these various expressions. 
But knowing the use of such expressions - being able to use them on the occasions when 
they arise in connexion with other people - that is speaking. 
(Rhees, 1970: 82) 
Likewise, there is no single way of learning to knap a particular shape of flint 
(type) in a particular way over and above what to do with various actions. Nor is 
there any single way - sequence of blows - that will guarantee the desired result. It 
is knowing how to use such actions when the occasion requires them. Even in 
today's world where there are detailed plans available which specify the sequence 
of construction operations e.g. in building a house, the house will inevitably differ 
from the plan in many subtle and idiosyncratic ways. 
To understand why something came about that way, it is necessary to re-construct 
how it came about that way. And that means reconstructing the actions that went in 
to it, and not simply constructing a formal description of its final form. 
Reconstruction starts with the final form and works backwards, but the final form 
mirrors imperfectly some global intention or plan. To understand why the final 
form is how it is, it is necessary to fill in a gap where a chain of intentional acts 
once was located. 
At the level of the material artefact, it is the obstacles and affordances of the 
material which constrain the generation of new affordances by human action. The 
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'language' of knapping or house building is learned in the same way as language 
proper, that is, within a tradition. The imposition of form and the boundaries of 
what is the 'proper' form for any given artefact will be constrained and directed by 
the affordances of the materials and the historically situated constitution of the 
tradition i.e. ways of doing. A tradition is nothing more than the way of doing. 
Artefacts such as palaeolithic stone tools, in so far as they are made by repeated 
and controlled types of actions, will never match exactly the intended shape so far 
as that may have been cognized, simply because there is a limit to the control that 
can be exercised over the knapping process. Each blow wil l always have 
unintended (accidental) consequences. Ricoeur is right in this respect. But standard 
forms are a consequence of the level of control of the constituting actions and 
thereby the outcomes. The possibility of distinct cultural forms likewise reflects the 
competence, control, and suite of techniques employed within the tradition. It is not 
the shapes that are cognized and learnt but the actions and the ways of executing 
them, together with judgements about what is proper. New forms are born out of 
the losing and adopting of old and new procedures respectively together with 
changes in judgement about what is appropriate. 
Reed (1991) concluded his paper with the view derived from Lave (1988) and 
Rogoff (1990) that cognitive skills emerge as a consequence of an individual's 
learning to share affordances, actions and intentions as a result of learning to 
coordinate and cooperate in working with others. This prompts the question of 
language development and tool use. 
I f 'standardized' form results from the controlled execution of sequenced actions 
reflecting a tradition, and this is what is learnt together with the criteria of relevance 
(form and function) for the group, then standardization stands as circumstantial 
evidence of communicative behaviour. Or rather, such items were a topic of 
conversation. Cognition as 'ways of doing' arises along with the practice of 
language, as an integral part of language development, since language is a 'way of 
doing' with sound and body movement. 
There has been a long running debate in archaeology about the reality of certain 
'stone tools' to give them the benefit of the doubt. Are they the result of intentional 
human action, or have they been produced otherwise e.g. by the action of water or 
fortuitous splitting. Such a 'tool' may not have been manufactured, but it may still 
afford functional uses. It is only when the existence of such 'artefacts' is cited as 
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evidence of intentionality, that the recognition of intentional action is problematical. 
Collingwood writes: 
Actions carmot stricdy be classified at all. What is a lie ? Intentional deceit ? Then it 
covers such cases as ambiguous answers, refusals to answer, evasions...we cannot easily 
say when such concealment of the truth is intentional...A classification of actions, in 
short, can only exist so long as we refrain from asking the precise meaning of the terms 
employed. 
(Collingwood, 1916: 206-7) 
Collingwood here is arguing that the problem of recognizing intentionality is in 
part grammatical, i.e. what criteria do we bring forth to judge what is or is not to be 
taken as intentional. Already in 1916, Collingwood prefigures Wittgenstein and 
Derrida. 
In developing the notion of psychological environment in the light of 
archaeological concerns it is necessary to recognize that the potential scale of 
operation is rather large. Thus, to take Collingwood's discussion of Hadrian's wall 
and its purpose. It is not principally Hadrian's immediate intentions as such that are 
the object of study. That is, his immediately given ecological resources of 
behaviour. Rather, what is of interest is the military situation which Hadrian and 
his governor had to contend with together with, the wider strategic goal maintaining 
political dominance. Both political dominance at home vis-a-vis would-be 
contenders for the position of Emperor; and and physical dominance over the 
malcontents within the conquered peoples. 
The intention of the architect to build the wall, leads to a completely different 
problem space to that of Hadrian though the final goal state is shared. Archaeology 
and its mobilisation of science can inform the reconstruction of the architect's 
problem space, and with a high degree of certainty but not Hadrian's problem 
space. To adequately define Hadrian's problem vis-a-vis the Wall, (here Hadrian's 
intention stands for the intention of the Roman state) it is necessary to decide what 
the primary functions of the wall could be before the structure of the wall can be 
cited as evidence for that function. 
At the other end of the scale, how do we formulate the likely problem space of 
some anonymous member of our ancestral species H. erectns. 
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It would seem a good place to start with the umwelten of our token proto-human. 
The physical environment is accessible to us through studies of pollen, and bone 
assemblages etc. Thus we could find something to say about the climate and food 
resources available to her. Also, bone studies on H. erectus indicate the size and 
general deportment she would have had. Comparative studies on Chimpanzees, 
their Umwelten and how they function in it, is also a source of ideas for a plausible 
reconstruction. So far as the intentionality of our token H. erectus is concerned, the 
ecological resources for behaviour, as Heft terms it, are specifiable in the general 
case.Since we may take intentional acts to be always situated and since intentions 
cannot be described in the absence of some foreseeable expression , in so far as we 
have observable traces of action, the direct intention to act in this way or that, is 
accessible case by case. Decideability, as we have seen, is not guaranteed. Since we 
have really no idea about the command of 'language' exercised by H. erectus we 
carmot meaningfully ascribe to them forward planning of their actions as we would 
understand such things. Nevertheless, language as we understand it did come about 
and this must be seen as a major transformation of the human psychological 
environment. 
From Edwards'(1991) discussion of discourse and categorization we get the view 
that the meaning of category terms and the objects, persons, etc, to which they 
refer cannot be fully explicated in isolation from the forms of discourse and the 
activities mediated by such discourse. Since discourse is always temporally situated 
and inhabits the matrix of practical activity of people, the meaning of categorical 
terms under which objects are classified and sorted must a fortiori be that of those 
who are talking and acting. The problem that faces the archaeologist, particularly 
the prehistorian, is the gap between our activity and mediating discourses, and 
those of the past, with respect to the extant material. 
The only people who are now talking (to any great extent) about archaeologically 
derived artefacts are present day archaeologists (obviously enough). This would 
seem to present a major obstacle to those archaeologists who would seek the 
meaning that artefacts had for the makers of such artefacts. But on this account, the 
meaning for the makers is situated in the affordances that the material offered them. 
It is the set of affordances which determines the place material artefacts held within 
any given discourse and therefore how they were indexed by terms (words) used. It 
is the flow of afforded human action, including discourse, that fixes the meaning of 
material culture. Meaning resides in activity, in the flux, not the form; though form 
constrains to a lesser or greater degree, that activity. 
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Category terms used by people in the past must have been as plastic as ours are 
since objects would have (one may suppose) featured in a multitude of different 
discourses. As Edwards remarks 
It would not be possible to establish die existence of named objects, bodily actions and 
significances in the physical world, or in behaviour, prior (emphasis added) to the 
construction of such naming practices, since it is essentially through and for those 
practices that categories are brought into existence. This does not deny that named objects 
have to be distinguishable, whether they are motor cars or focal areas of the colour 
spectrum 
(Edwards, 1991: 527) 
The last sentence of the quote makes it clear that although things in the world are 
always distinguishable, their categorical status does not lie primarily in their 
physicality but in the role they play in the actions and concerns of humans as 
mediated by discursive practices. 
It is, as has been argued, (a) the actions in which the artefacts were utilized that is 
central, their form is only important in so far as it affected their various functions ; 
and allied to this point is (b) the implication that human modes of action serve as a 
uniform base on which to understand specific configurations of acts. 
In order to make both points more fully, I will cite the case of Dyirbal 
classification discussed by Lakoff (1987). 
Dyirbal is an Australian aboriginal language and has been described by Dixon. 
(1982)2 
Dixon reports that when a Dyirbal speaker uses a noun in a sentence, the noun must 
be preceded by a variant of one of four words, namely, Bayi, Balan, Balam, 
and Bala. These words serve to classify all objects in the Dyirbal universe. To 
speak proper Dyirbal then requires the correct word before the noun. Thus Bayi 
classifies; men, kangaroos, possums, most snakes, most fishes, some birds, most 
insects, the moon, storms, rainbows, boomerangs, some spears. 
Balan classifies; women, bandicoots, dogs, platypus, echidna, some snakes, 
some fishes, most birds, fireflies, scorpions, crickets, the hairy mary grub, 
anything connected with water or fire, sun and stars, shields, some spears, some 
trees. 
2 Dixon, R.M.W. (1982) Where have all the Adjectives Gone? Beriin : Walter de Gruyter 
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Balam classifies ; all edible fruit and the plants that bear them, tubers, ferns, 
honey, cigarettes (?!), wine, cake. 
Lastly, Bala classifies ; parts of the body, meat, bees, wind, yamsticks, some 
spears, most trees, grass, mud, stones, noises and language. 
Clearly the Dyribal categorization is quite unlike our categorization, at least on the 
surface. Dixon concluded that there was a system operating. In general Bayi, 
grouped (human) males ; animals : Balan grouped (human) females; water ; fire; 
fighting. : Balam grouped non-flesh food, and Bala grouped everything not in the 
other classes. 
Dixon also found that items which were associated in activities tended to share the 
same prefix e.g fishing spears are in the same class as fish i.e. Bayi like wise 
fighting spears are Balan i.e. to do with fighting. Yet another modifying principle 
is the myth-belief connection. Thus birds are held to hold the dead spirits of females 
and are therefore Balan. Except willy-wagtails who are mythical men thus Bayi. 
Lastly there is the 'important property' criterion which may serve to move things 
from one class to another. The most important property seems to be harmfulness, 
thus the stone fish is Balan along with fighting and other dangerous things. We 
may note that our Dyribal speaking Australians should be told that cigarettes are 
harmful and thus Balan and not Balam. 
Lakoff cites the Dyribal classification as conforming to a general schema which he 
claims is universal and has the following characteristics. I report Lakoff directly. 
(1) Centrality: What we have called basic members of categories are central. 
Willy-wagtails and the moon are less central members of Bayi than men. 
(2) Chaining: Complex categories are structured by chaining ; central members 
are linked to other members, which are linked to other members, and so on. For 
example, women are linked to the sun, which is linked to sunburn, which is linked 
to the hairy mary grub. It is by virtue of such a chain that the hairy mary grub is in 
the same category as women. 
(3) Experiential Domains : There are basic domains of experience, which may 
be culture specific. These can characterize links in category chains. 
(4) Idealized Models : There are idealized models of the world - myths and 
beliefs among them - that can characterize links in category chains. 
(5) Specific Knowledge : Specific knowledge (for example, knowledge of 
mythology) overrides general knowledge. 
(6) The Other : Conceptual systems can have an 'everything else' category. It, of 
course, does not have a central member or chaining etc. 
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(7) No Common Properties : Categories on the whole need not be defined by 
common properties. There is no reason to believe that the Dyribal find anything in 
common among women, fire, and dangerous things etc. Nor do they assume, so 
far as is known, that there is anything feminine about fiery or dangerous things. On 
the other hand, common properties seem to play a role in characterizing the basic 
schemas within a category, (edible plant, human male, human female) 
Motivation : The general principles given make sense of the Dyribal 
classification, but they do not predict exactly what the categories will be. 
Jumping ahead to Lakoff s general conclusions on the classificatory systems of 
humans, he concludes that classifier systems reflect the experiential, imaginative, 
and ecological aspects of mind. Quoting Denny (1976)^ Lakoff makes the point that 
'the semantic function of noun classifiers is to place objects within a set of classes 
different from, and additional to those given by the nouns. These classes are 
concerned with objects as they enter into human interactions.'(Lakoff, 1987: 
112) 
Denny holds that cross-culturally, classifiers fall into three basic semantic types, all 
of which have to do with human interaction. The three types are physical 
interaction e.g. handling ; functional interaction e.g. using an object as a 
vehicle ; and social interaction e.g. ethical attitudes. Denny claims that the 
range of physical classifiers correlates with the kind of significant physical activities 
performed by a given culture.(Lakoff, 1987: 112) 
In short, our conceptual system is intimately bound up with physical and cultural 
experience but nevertheless there are reasons to think there are uniformities within 
the diverse forms of categorization structure, likewise, in religious activity, as 
Bloch seeks to show, (see previous chapter) 
When we turn to consider modes of cognition, there is evidence to suggest that 
there is a degree of uniformity across cultures. The culture-historical approach to 
psychology developed by the Russian psychologists Vygotsky and Luria took as its 
basic premise that social experiences are expected to stimulate different types of 
mental processes, not just supply different knowledge.(Kozuhn, 1990: 128) 
Summarizing and defending Vygotsky and Luria, Kozulin (1990) argues that the 
cultural-historical theory Vygotsky and Luria propounded stresses the difference 
between various cognitive processes leading to the solution of a test problem. While 
3 Denny, J. P., (1916) What are noun Classifier's Good for In Papers from the Twelfth 
Regional Meeting, Chicago Linguistics Society. Chicago Linguistics society 
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it is clear that both "primitive" and mcxiem (educated) people are capable of solving 
certain syllogistic problems, they will use different means. The "primitive" may 
arrive at the correct answer by substituting his or her personal experiences for the 
terms of the syllogism, the educated individual relied on thinking in verbal, 
idealized meanings of the words. Thus in both cases the structure of the syllogism 
remained the same but the mechanism (approach) to the solution was different. 
Kozulin writes: 
The cultural-historical point of view emphasized that such a transition changes the entire 
system of reasoning, with personal experiences, once at the forefront, later becoming 
subordinate moments in the predominantly verbal type of thinking...One of the central 
issues of cultural-historical theory was the denaturalization of psychological functions 
under the influence of psychological tools. Instead of an immediate interaction with 
problems posed by the environment, the himian mind becomes involved in the indirect 
relationships mediated by more and more sophisticated systems of symbolic tools. 
(Kozulin, 1990: 134) 
We come here to the question of meaning construction Shore (1991) agues that a 
theory of meaning construction needs to be consistent with general trends in 
hominid evolution. Such trends, are identified by Shore as being the progressive 
dependence on symbolic mediated adaptations ; a need for reliable mechanisms of 
social coordination and communication in the face of changing environments ; the 
recognition of growing social interdependence together with growing cognitive 
capacity for autonomous mental representations and the transformation of 
idiosyncratic temperaments into full-blown personalities. ; the extension of memory 
beyond the individual's social repositories e.g traditions or institutions ; and the 
creation of stable intersubjective significances which support traditions and 
institutions. 
Furthermore an adequate understanding of meaning construction should account 
for differences and relations between subjective meaning and intersubjective 
meaning. Shore takes up the point made by Taylor who argued that 'What the 
ontology of main-stream social science lacks is a notion of meaning as not simply 
for an individual subject [but] of a subject which can be a "we" as well as an "F'.'^ 
(Shore, 1991: 11) 
4 Taylor, C (1979) Interpretation and the Science of Man. In Interpretive Social Science 
A Reader Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds. pp 25-71. Berkley: University of 
California Press 
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Shore argues that we do not have to choose between structuralist and praxis-
orientation accounts of meaning construction. Thus formalist accounts of 
knowledge structures employ constructs like schemata, mental models, and 
prototype. Whereas praxis-oriented perspectives treat meaning construction as a 
creative and on-going process that accompanies practical activities and problem 
solving and involves analysis of "discourses" in experience rather than structures 
of experience. Commenting on the attacks on objectified knowledge structures that 
have come from post-structuralists who argue that they are reifications. Shore 
argues that such reifications are likely to be an essential (and an "essentialist") 
moment in all cultural cognition. Shore writes: 
Yet cultural processes include reification as a necessary moment in both individual 
understanding and social coordination of experience. It is important to distinguish the sort 
of subversive reification against whidi the new ethnographic sensibilities are directed 
from the other reifications that are intrinsic to cultural cognition....Since reification 
occurs only as part of a larger dialectic by which these structures are re-created ia 
experience, neither reification nor praxis alone can constitute the essence of cultural 
analysis. A general theory of culturally mediated meaning construction should make clear 
the relations between the objectifying and the creative dimensions of meaning making. 
(Shore, 1991:11) 
6.11 Intentionality, Discourse and Human Action 
On the basis of Wittgensteinian arguments, Harre argues that much of our talk is 
not quite what it seems, thus when I say ' I know I feel sick' I am not making the 
same kind of epistemic claims as when I say '1 know you are sick'. In fact, in the 
first case I am not making any epistemic claim at all since 1 cannot doubt what 1 
feel, although I can be deceitful in what 1 say about what I feel. Here the claim 'I 
know you are sick' displays what CoUingwood, after Socrates, would call opinion 
on a chain. The chain being a chain of inferences either based on deduction from 
what has been said, or induced from behaviour ; or both. 
As with feelings, so it is with actions; I cannot doubt my intention to do X, but I 
can doubt my ability to carry it through since this depends on the relation I have to 
states of affairs in the world. For instance, i f I say ' I intend to go to the moon' and 
do so intend rather than just saying so; now in the Nineties I can at least envisage 
what I would need to do in order to carry through my stated intention. But in the 
Fifties, my honest intention could find no possible expression. The intention 'to go 
to the moon' would perforce be an empty one, and no one would take my statement 
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seriously, unless the context of my utterance was such that no one would take me 
literally; i f say, the utterance were part of a poetic recital. 
It can be seen, then, that circumstance is central to the attribution and indication of 
intentions. I f one were concerned to attribute intentionality, as Julian Thomas was 
to people in the Mesolithic, then he would have to demonstrate that the intention 
attributed had some means of actual expression. Only intentions that have given rise 
to observable expressions are the subject of attribution, those that have not, still 
remain confined in unarticulated (silent) speech acts and are therefore at best, only 
possible intentions. Intentions we may say are only actual when giving rise to 
observable phenomena. 
To be an agent, is to form and carry through intentions, that is, to act in some 
definite way and thereby display one's intentionality. Intentions belong to the act, 
whereas reasons belong to the discourse which inhabits the interstices of our 
actions and indexes those acts. Intention marks the synchronic situated act and 
reasons mark the diachronic frame which links acts in time, thereby bringing them 
into relation with each other. With discourse, we set forth the future possibilities to 
act and explain the past actualities of action. 
What our words and sentences connote to others is determined by our visible 
behaviour, the expectations that others have of us i.e. social mores, and the shared 
grammatical form of our language, embodying the multifarious ways in which 
words are used in communicative situations. The role material culture plays in our 
activities is determined by the way in which it derivatively issues from our actions 
on the physical world. As Collingwood maintained, the proper object of choice 
which is the implementation of an intention, is an act. The acts afforded by the 
physical world together with our intentionality which is grounded in those 
affordances, issue in material cultures which then go on to play their roles in 
further acts. 
A complete description of human action in the sense that Collingwood envisaged as 
being the aim of historical re-enactment would have to bring into intimate relation 
the intentionality expressed in the observable material culture grounded in the 
ecologically given affordances, and the discourse in which it could have been 
enmeshed and indexed. The coherence of an alien material cultural assemblage, 
o however it was put together, will be reflected in the possibility of constructing a 
meaningful discourse around it which stands as its description. Though the position 
(function) of each item of material culture within that discourse need not be fixed. 
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each new configuration will produce different foci of stress and strain in the body 
of the discourse so constructed. The material culture should mould the discourse 
through the process of question and answer to arrive at a description with the 
minimum of stress and strain ; but perhaps not too quickly, since it is the stresses 
and strains which are most illuminating. The relationship between the material and 
the discourse / description is not rigid but flexible as in CoUingwood's felicitous 
example of the foot and a shoe: 
This is as much to say that the two sets of data which have to be fitted together are not 
rigid data, like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, but flexible data like a foot and a shoe... And 
the consequence is that the difference between a good historical theory and a bad one is not 
the difference between assembling a machine righdy and assembling it wrongly so that in 
one case it will work and in the other case it will not. 
(CoUingwood, 1938 : 26) 
In line with Shore's contention, a general theory of culturally mediated meaning 
construction should make clear the relations between the objectifying and the 
creative dimensions of meaning making. In weaving of a discourse / description 
around the material culture by question and answer, such relations between 
objectifying and creative dimensions of meaning should become apparent. However 
it is perhaps useful now to approach the question from the opposite formalistic end 
of the matter and take up the question of representation and material culture. 
6.2 Representations 
The idea of a 'mind set', 'mental template' or 'cognitive map' to give it its latest 
formulation by Colin Renfrew, is an idea which is rejuvenated from time to time. It 
underlies the claim of historical situationalness, cultural differences and types. But 
what can be meant by it ? 
The question of representation has cropped up at various point in the thesis; from 
Edelman we get the notion of reentrant connection, where the agent's perception of 
the world (i.e.. the ability to perform perceptual categorizations on signals from the 
world) is affected not only by perceptual experience but also relations between 
those experiences and introspections from which that agent may attach values to 
those experiences. 
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From Norman there is the idea of mental models that are incomplete, unstable, 
overlapping, self-contradictory and parsimonious. There are also limitations on 
peoples ability to 'run' their models. From Collingwood we get selective attention 
and abstraction but in addition, the methodological imperative of looking for the 
cormections among apparently unrelated mental functions as occurrences at different 
levels of consciousness of the same fundamental activity. 
Underlying all these accounts of representation is the notion of construction 
(unconscious and conscious) and the imposition of ordered objectivity, i.e. 
reification. Kant and Hertz draw attention to the distinction made in the German 
language between senses of 'representation' e.g. Vorstellungen and Darstellungen. 
I propose to use these terms to mark distinctions within the concept of 
representation. 
Darstellungen (upper case) will denote objective, public, verbally communicible 
representations ; darstellungen (lower case) wil l denote objective, non-
communicible representations. The difference between these forms of 
representation is not absolute, rather, there is a difference in degree of abstracted 
'arbitrary' structure. What is arbitrary is features of the environment abstracted, not 
the resultant structure of the representation. 
In the light of the discussion of affordances in the second chapter vorstellungen 
wil l be held to be generated by the perceived affordances under the constraints 
imposed by ecological obstacles. It is the obstacles in our path which command 
(select) our attention and thus shape the darstellungen with which we operate in the 
world. As Weil stated, it is only those things within the field of action which do not 
constitute an obstacle that are transparent for thought in the way completely clear 
glass is for sight. 
The dialectical interplay of affordance and obstacle confronted when moving 
through the environment or acting on the world generates vorstellungen mediated 
by our sensory organs. Thus the mental model that I have of my immediate 
surroundings, the model which constrains my interaction with the world is 
vorstellungen based on environmentally structured sensory inputs constituted as 
perceptual categories (re. Edelman and Brooks), being mediated and generated by 
intentional behaviour driven by appetite and desire. 
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Such vorstellungen are stabilised or constructed by fourth level consciousness (re. 
Collingwood) by further abstraction to form conscious darstellungen which are 
objective for the individual. The constructive move from vorstellungen to 
darstellungen roughly equates to the cognitively generated analogue of the umwelt; 
while the constructive move from darstellungen to Darstellungen is the move from 
language (understood as the cognitively generated analogue or model of the 
umwelt) to speech and thus on to writing and art. Thus Darstellungen are the 
developmentally generated and therefore shared basis for communication which 
unites all within a given language community. 
I f I describe in words and sentences, or paint a picture of my surroundings I will 
have fixed my mental model, so construed, as Darstellungen which are public and 
available to others. In other words, I will have abstracted and fixed a selective, 
objective, and in some sense, veridical representation of the world. When we 
construct scientific models or works of art, we are further abstracting, to create 
objectified Darstellungen out of the cognitively achieved darstellungen but at the 
same time purposefully manipulating the form of the Darstellungen in the light of 
particular ends. There is a difference between Darstellungen constructed by 
consciousness and which is individual though socially founded in language, and 
those of science, which is purely social, that difference is purpose, (intention) 
A l l constructed representations reflect purpose. Consciousness has experiential 
purposes e.g walking; while science has experimental purposes. Experiential 
purposes reflect experiential problems for the individual. 
It is not, pace Bridgeman, that immediate environmental contingencies drive 
behaviour, rather they define the possibilities within which we must choose. Sitting 
here in front of a computer screen, I cannot make myself a cup of coffee. To do that 
I must move in certain ways - get out of the chair, walk a certain distance in the 
appropriate direction etc, - my intention is 'make a cup of coffee' but I cannot 
determine how I shall actually do this ahead of actually moving. With each move, 
(standing up etc,) a new situation confronts me. I cannot actually know what will 
happen next, but I keep moving. Retrospectively, it is possible to re-construct the 
central elements of my intentions, my plan - make a cup of coffee, but as has 
already been stated in chapter five, the reconstruction of the steps by which a 
solution was reached has the lucidity which did not characterize the confusions and 
false starts of the problem-solving process itself. I move through the problem space 
with expectations of what is before me,these expectations may be realised, or not, if 
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not I need the reflexes and skill of judgement to negotiate any obstacle which may 
confront me. 
As Oatley argued in an earlier quote as selves in relation to others (and the world) 
we come into a position to steer a little bit. It is not the world that comes under 
control (planning is about the exercise of control over a situation) but that our 
actions and those of others with whom we construct mutual plans (share intentions) 
become, within limits, predictable and comprehensible, so that we can rely on 
ourselves and others. 
The steering that Oatley refers to is what Collingwood meant by his development 
of practical consciousness. In chapter four I wrote that at the level of desire we get 
an affirmation, namely, what I want is A. Then we get a negative element via 
reflection - I want A, but not B. This leads on to the conviction (i.e. capricious 
choice) that I really want A rather than B which is equivalent to A is good a 
judgement which, by reflecting upon, can be backed up with reasons. Rational 
choice is the re-affirmation of A is good along with the reasons for it being so. 
Collingwood's account sets out the internal structure of intentional acts and the role 
played by the assignment of values. 
Bridgeman's appropriation of the concept of plan does violence to the objective 
nature of plans given by their intersubjective foundations; speech, as Vygotsky 
argued, is developmentally internalized but the ability to plan at the individual level 
is founded on the fact of joint planning. This point may more accurately stated by 
substituting for planning the generation of mutually held expectations. In talking 
and writing we are able to make explicit our expectations of how things should go. 
We are able to review the possibilities of obstacles before us. Our immediate 
existence as an unbroken flow of acts cannot be 'planned' in this way. It has to be 
lived. How this actuality squares with our explicit preformed intentions is another 
matter. Emotions, according to Oatley, play the role of reflexive re-orientation in 
the face of obstacles to our intentions. Either at the level of immediacy or life plans. 
What is important is the planning not the plan. At the neurophysiological level, as 
Dennett shows, no particular draft, or vorstellungen in my terms, can be taken as 
authentic over and above any other. With the coming into consciousness i.e. as 
darstellungen there emerges the possibility of action ; it is only with reflection on 
the actuality of acting in this or that manner that an act can be couched in terms of a 
wider structure or plan. The recognition (existence) of a plan rests in the 
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judgement of the possibility of acting. But planning is a process which runs 
throughout. 
With language we objectify the worid, with discourse we continually reorder or 
reclassify the world and thereby set it before each other as knowledge. Science 
therefore, is the outcome of a reflexive attitude to this general process. Heidegger 
writes 5: 
Modem science's way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence 
of forces. Modem physics is not experimental physics because it applies apparatus to the 
questionings of nature. The reverse is true. Because physics, indeed already as pure theory, 
sets nature up to exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance, it orders its 
experiments precisely for the purpose of asking whedier and how nature reports itself 
when set up this way. 
(Ihde, 1983: 239) 
The move from darstellungen to Darstellungen is just this imposition of order. 
Speech, gesture and other physical acts objectify (make public) still further our 
darstellungen but as representations, Darstellungen are necessarily more arbitrary 
versions of darstellungen since they embody a change in purpose. 
What then is the relationship between conscious darstellungen and observable 
Darstellungen? This is the central problem of archaeology. 
Shore promotes the theories of Werner and Kaplan^ on symbol formation. Werner 
and Kaplan argue that perceptual objects (darstellungen) as well as symbolic 
vehicles (Darstellungen) are established in terms of organismic schematizing and 
the possibility that an inner similarity between the vehicle and the referent may 
occur without this similarity being apparent to an (alien) observer. The observer, it 
is argued, regards solely the external, geometric-technical properties of the word-
form and the object. This is historically true of Archaeology and certainly true of 
many archaeologists. 
^ Heidegger, M. (1977) The question concerning Technology' Basic Writings trans David 
Krellp296 Harper and Row 
6 Wemer, H & Kaplan, B. (1963) Symbol Formation New York: Wiley and Sons 
161 
According to Shore, in this schematizing activity (vorstellungen-darstellungen to 
Darstellungen) by which symbols and the associated referents are neither fully 
arbitrary not fully determined, 'the key process is the creative construction of 
idiosyncratic analogies, primitive sensory metaphors' (Shore, 1991:15) 
Symbols are constructed by the mind by reproducing the subject's physical 
experiences of the world in mental representations of conventional sign-forms. 
Meaning construction rests then, it is argued, on the cognitive process of 
schematizing activity. Shore argues after Armstrong that 'Human history is 
marked by the exploitation of the potentialities of spatial and temporal analogies.' 
(Armstrong 1981: 24) Shore writes: 
Analogic construction is probably essential to the formation of die "sensory concepts". 
Complex sensory experiences are brought into an intimate relation with public symbols 
(linguistic and otherwise), overcoming the initial contingency of their artificial 
relationship. This sort of schematizing process makes possible die unification in 
consciousness of cultural symbols and their referents. A culturally constructed world is 
thus experienced as a "natural fact" which is to say a meaningful world. 
(Shore, 1991: 16) 
Burbridge (1990) notes two important features about analogies, that they (a) 
express similarities between different things ; which are (b) similarities of relation. 
We use analogies to identify relationships for which we have no names (Brubridge, 
1990 : 5) The practice of discussing a newly recognized aspect in one domain via 
the more fully developed vocabulary of another domain underiies the construction 
of cultural schemata (Darstellungen) which link up and weave together diverse 
experiences. As Wittgenstein argued,' what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect 
is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other 
objects.'(Wittgenstein, 1988a : 212a) We therefore become aware that a new kind 
of description might be made of the object as a whole. 
Sharing the same obstacles and affordances is then the necessary ground for shared 
understanding. In order to understand and thereby model the actions of people in 
the past, particularly the remote past, it is necessary to bring into focus the obstacles 
and affordances both physical and social that they would have encountered. But that 
cannot be done without reference to their means for overcoming obstacles and 
utilising affordances. i.e. specifying their umwelt. 
In so far as members of our species in the remote past (to give the extreme case) 
share with us the same potential set of affordances dictated by the physical nature of 
162 
our bodies, we share a common potential for action and thought. We share, in 
other words, the possibility of arriving at the same darstellungen as them mediated 
by the same vorstellungen arising out of our shared physical nature confronted by 
any given environment. What separates us from them is the development and 
growth of tool use, both symbolic and non-symbolic with which our umwelt has 
been made richer and more diverse. 
What differs is not us, our concepts or conceptions, but the situation in which we 
operate and the material, social and linguistic resources through which we operate. 
The key to understanding the past is to focus on the situation pertaining under 
differing descriptions. The descriptions that we may come to are partially governed 
by what exists in the present that may partake in our conversations in the role of 
evidence; that is, the evidential hinges around that which our description / 
conversation may turn. It is the state or conduct of our discussion that brings in to 
play different sources and types of evidence. 
Conducting a conversation about the past and reaching a warranted set of 
conclusions is the problem space of the archaeologist. Inclusive of that 
problem space, is also the problem space people who are the subject 
of our conversation. 
Thus problem solving has a double aspect (hence the doctrine of re-enactment) for 
the archaeologists, because from their perspective (a) there were no problem 
situations in the past other than the ones in which the recovered material to hand, 
counted as part of the answer; and (b) there is the material itself which must be 
made intelligible, i.e. the existence of the material poses a problem for the 
archaeologist. 
The material presents an obstacle in that (a) it is fragmentary ; (b) out of its usual 
social context; (c) has also been re-configured through its depositional history and 
in the act of recovery. But at the same time, the material still offers up the 
perception of human affordances to the archaeologist, in much the same way as it 
did to its original makers and users, e.g. I would use a 'hand axe' in the very same 
way as would its Palaeolithic maker. Faced with these facts, the archaeologist has 
no option but to make the attempt at re-creating the matrix of social action in which 
the material can be seen to offer affordances of action perceptible to the modem 
viewer. But in doing this, the archaeologist hitherto moved from a Darstellungen 
(the archaeologically excavated record fixed by practice of excavation and the 
attendant theories and presuppositions of the archaeologist - itself constituted or 
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composed of other Darstellungen - the physical material as such) to darstellungen-
vorstellungen (original <-> re-enacted) which is the goal sought. It is rather like 
fixing the plot of a story (i.e. excavating a site or sites) and then explicating the 
elements of the plot to give coherence, but in doing that it is also necessary to 
recursively rejig the plot in respect of the detailed interactions between the elements. 
Hence it is not possible to start with excavation, rather, excavation must become an 
integral part of the re-enactment process and be guided by it. 
It is what Bruner (1991) calls the problem of 'hermeneutic composability' 
(mentioned in chapter two) with regard to narrative construction. In establishing a 
reading of the whole text we appeal to readings of its partial expressions, but 
because we are trying to explicate meanings we can only do so by relating the 
meaning of partial expressions (artefacts, etc) to the meaning of the whole text (the 
site or site complex). 
In a narrative we interpret the parts in the light of a putative story or plot and re-
work the plot as new elements are introduced in order to maintain coherence and 
intelligibility. 
This requirement would not mean a change in what is done i.e. techniques of 
excavation and survey but of seeing how the very process of excavation and 
survey can be brought into the process of re-enactment. That is, excavation and 
survey must become part of the 'conversation' and not its starting point. 
6.3 Is There a Future for Archaeology ? 
By insisting along with Collingwood, on the ideality of the past, the current and 
historically given raison d'etre for archaeology is undermined. But as we have 
seen, for Collingwood, the only serious purpose of historical study is to understand 
the present into which the past has been transformed. 
History, as Collingwood continually repeats, is mind's self-knowledge. 'If he [the 
historian] is able to understand, by re-thinking them, the thoughts of a great many 
different kinds of people, it follows that he must be a great many kinds of man. He 
must, in fact, be a microcosm of all the history he can know. Thus his own self-
knowledge is at the same time his knowledge of the world of human 
affairs.'(Collingwood, 1987: 115) 
Norton (1992) argues that the conceptual foundations for the value pluralism (i.e. 
the fact that the same object can have different values for different person) that 
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history provides lies in normative individualism. This normative individualism is 
described by Lomasky (1984): 
To be committed to a long-term design, to order one's activities in light of it, to judge 
one's success or failure as a person by reference to its fate: these are inconceivable apart 
from a frankly partial attachment to one's most cherished ends...Practical reason is 
essentially differentiated among project pursuers, not merely contingendy differentiated by 
various causal constraints that each person faces from his own spatio-temporal location. 
That end can be achieved by B may provide B overwhelmingly good reason to act; 
that C could be equally effective in advancing E i may merit vanishingly litde weight in 
C's deliberations as concerning what to do 
(Lomasky, 1984: 44) 
As Norton remarks, 'from this account of human beings as individuated pursuers 
of projects it follows that an understanding of anyone's present conduct requires 
reference to the ends to which it is directed.'(Norton,1992:9) 
Collingwood argues that the study of history as the re-enactment of past thought, 
affords insight in to how to act in situations which fall outside the familiar 
categories. Even when confronted by a situation in which there is a rule to follow, 
there is always a mismatch between the ideal which gave rise to the rule and the 
concrete situation being confronted. The task of history is to train the eye to see the 
situation before you in its fully concrete form. This requires the mastery of 
problem formulation or summarization. 
History as re-enactment is to be seen as a discourse centred on, and directed by 
the recovered material culture. The purpose of this discourse is to lay bare the full 
panoply of afforded actions (material and social) hinted at and supported by the 
material in the light of ecologically expressible intentions of agents relative to a set 
of ecologically afforded purposes. The point of such an exercise, however, should 
be not merely to 'explain the past' but rather, to create an environment in which the 
relationships of language, social action and material transformation of the physical 
world can be explored in a unified way. 
The operational focus of such an approach could be located in Expert Systems / 
A I geared to problem solving exercises related to archaeological interpretation. 
With ITS, Cognitive Psychology and Archaeology can interpenetrate to their 
mutual benefit. Archaeology generates multilayered problem spaces to model and 
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explore, whilst ITS provides a rigorous environment for both the practitioner and 
student archaeologist to develop a fuller understanding of their field of study. 
In an earlier chapter I felt obliged to criticise current work which seeks to use 
Expert systems for archaeological purposes. The general criticism I would make 
and which lies behind the specific ones made is that archaeology in the main has 
lost its way and its sense of purpose by its denial of what is property human in 
human action i.e. the relation between thought and action. The active engagement 
of the past through Expert systems / ITS within a Collingwoodian perspective of re-
enactment would, I contend, cut across (a) the processualist reduction and 
triviaJization of human experience ; (b) the post-processualist tendency to disengage 
from and alienate the past experience of human kind ; and finally (c) offer 
archaeology an opportunity to put itself and its worthy and legitimate concerns at 
the heart of a multi-disciplined educational approach which re-connects the ethical 
and practical life of today through a consideration of life-worlds no longer in 
existence. 
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E P I L E G O M E N A 
The supposed problematic relationship between intention and process which 
underlies differences in archaeological approaches to the past can be seen as 
something of an illusion. Human intentions are in principle, perceptible, as Heft 
maintained, they are not in the head but in the situation in which individuals find 
themselves as they move within it. In so far as it is possible to describe that state of 
affairs, it is possible to perceive intentions. Gibsonian Affordances offer the link 
between the conscious subject and the objective ecological state of affairs. 
Affordances bridge Binford's eco-materialistic archaeology and Hodder's 
subjectivist archaeology. 
Collingwood shows us how to organize and join both aspects; A I offers a rigorous 
computational method of so doing. 
I have argued that Expert Systems and ITS should be used to form the basis of a 
multi-disciplined educational environment in which we can seek to explore the 
relationships between language, social action and material transformations of the 
physical world. The larger aim is ethical, not didactic. The aim is to 'train the eye' 
to see the situation (whatever situation) in all its concrete particularity by working 
through the obstacles and affordances it offers. It trains one to know how, why and 
when to act. 
But perhaps we ought also to bear in mind the following : 
It is perhaps not possible to carry out this process (of construction of external worlds) in 
the full consciousness of what one is doing : the illusion (my emphasis DW) of 
abstract objectivity is essential to it: it must be done in good faith, in the belief that one 
is now at last discovering the ultimate truth, coming into contact with a pre-existent and 
absolute reality. 
The truth is not some perfect system of philosophy: it is simply the way in which all 
systems, however perfect, collapse into nothingness on the discovery that they are only 
systems, only external worlds over against the knowing mind and not that mind itself 
(Colhngwood, 1924:315-6) 
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